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CHAPTER 1:   General introduction 
 
1.1 Nature of the water sector 
 
The water sector encompasses the main water uses for ecological and socio-economic 
development. The sector explores, abstracts, distributes, regulates and manages water 
resources - for use in ecosystem services’ sustenance, waste disposal, human 
consumption and in production (agriculture, energy, transport, manufacturing, tourism, 
etc). At the domestic level, water consumption in sufficient quantity and quality is a basic 
human right (United Nations, 2010) indispensable for a healthy and productive life.1  
 
The  water  sector  is  unique  in  a  number  of  ways.  First,  water  resources  are  finite  and  
transverse territorial boundaries. They are hardly confined to particular hydro-geological 
spaces.  Their allocation given their centrality to human life, use and sustainability is 
thus, susceptible to politics among diverse stakeholders (Savenije, 2002). Moreover, their 
valuation is tied to the incurred extraction, conveyance and disposal costs that vary from 
one region to another (Kessides, 2004). 
 
Second, large storage dams, treatment plants and network mains are used to convey, often 
against gravity, piped water services to connected customers (Savenije, 2002). To 
establish these systems, utility managers have to incur lump-sum capital investments, 
upfront (Kessides, 2004). These investments however, face long-term recovery periods of 
about 10-15 years (for plant and machinery), 20-30 years (for buildings) and 50-60 years 
to recover costs incurred in dam construction and land acquisitions (Twort et al., 2000). 
By implication, utility managers can not rely only on the existing customers to fully 
recover the costs, but also, future demand. Besides, it is not easy to relocate or reuse 
installed water supply assets for other functions (Blanc, 2008). This makes the industry, 
especially in developing countries, unattractive to private entrepreneurs who seek 
immediate returns on investments (Prasad, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2009).  
                                                      
1 To sustain human life, the World Health Organization recommends the daily use of 25 liters of water per capita 
(Kessides, 2004). 
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Third, two-thirds of water supply costs are tied to network pipe-installations (Abbott et 
al., 2011).2 This makes it costly to duplicate systems and open the industry to product 
(and to some extent, entry) competition. The low value added in water distribution makes 
it impractical to rely on centralized distribution systems (Savenije, 2002; Nauges and van 
den Berg, 2007). The latter are common for example, in electricity provision where 
decentralized transmission systems are more expensive (Savenije, 2002). In the water 
sector, decentralized systems are commonly organized around regional or municipal 
monopolies (Prasad, 2007).   
 
Fourth, water supply is largely an economic service or a private good whose consumption 
depends on customers’ abilities to pay (see Nickson, 1999). Moreover, this prevents 
possible free-rider behaviors. On the other hand, governments incur high opportunity 
costs for such exclusivity in service provision (Savenije, 2002). This makes safe water 
supply, especially in low income regions, a merit good or service for which universal 
coverage by governments is necessary in order to mitigate costs due to negative 
externalities such as the overexploitation or pollution of underground reserves by non-
state or individual providers (Kessides, 2004).3  
 
Provision of merit goods (water, sanitation, security, health care and basic education, etc) 
is however prone to X-inefficiencies (Santhakumar, 1998). Owing to information 
asymmetries between governments and citizens among other problems, governments can 
impose specific consumption levels against public will – e.g., use of far-located water 
taps, schools and health centers. Such arrangements can thus mask non-optimal solutions 
and decisions by governments (Walsh, 1995). These traits, among others, have 
continually sparked debates around the sector’s development, organization and 
regulation, as well as, shaped policy strategies across different countries, globally.  
 
 
 
                                                      
2 For an historical technological overview of the water sector since the early 19th century and its subsequent North-
South transfer, see Braadbaart (2009), Abbott et al. (2011) and Angelakis et al. (2012). 
3 For an extensive discussion on merit goods and services, see Schwartz (2006) and Schouten (2009). 
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1.2 Reforms and sector development 
1.2.1 Reforms and the public service sector  
Reforms are a product of both desirable and feasible ideas or models of change that are 
designed through complex multi-leveled networks and applied at varied speeds and 
extents across sectors and countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2002). Change is triggered, 
among other aspects, by complexity, skills advancement, environmental threats (or 
opportunities) and chance incidents (Rusaw, 2001).  
 
First, as organizational structures become complex, devolved multi-leveled governance is 
preferred to ease activities’ coordination and communication. Second, advancements in 
organizational aptitude (human, technological and financial) can create opportunities 
based on which different models of change can be realized. Third, environmental threats 
(e.g., climate change) and opportunities (e.g., globalization) can pressure, facilitate and 
maintain change. Fourth, chance incidents or crises can expose deficiencies in systems 
that subsequently provoke change.  
 
In the process of change, organizational structures and processes are transformed or re-
engineered with an aim of getting more outcomes with fewer resources (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2002). This however, comes at a cost in overcoming resistant forces from 
interest or ignorant groups such as labor unions (Mwanza, 2001). Resistance may arise 
when new ideas contradict or detract existing sector developments (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2002). In other cases, proposed changes can entail colossal capital investments or 
encounter time-delays in amending or establishing supportive legislative frameworks. On 
the other hand, policy makers can agree on the need to change but not how and to what 
extent to change (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2002). 
 
Since the 1970s, public sector delivery processes and structures have faced distinct 
paradigm shifts denoted variedly as “post-bureaucratic”, “managerialism”, “new public 
management”, “market-based public administration”, “entrepreneurial government” and 
“new public policy” (Lynn, 1998; Manning, 2001). These neoliberal ideologies form part 
of the models of change that were advanced as an alternative to the classical Weberian 
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public sector decision making model, since the 1940s (Lane, 2000). These paradigm 
shifts occurred first in the western countries with the exception of Germany, Greece, 
Japan and Spain; and latter by the early 21st century, in Africa, South America and South 
Asia (Hood, 1995; Ferlie and Steane, 2002).  
 
Before the 1940s, centralized public bureaus and enterprises invested in, owned and 
regulated key basic service infrastructure including energy, health, postal, security, 
transport, water and sewerage services (Hood, 1995; Manning, 2001; Ferlie and Steane, 
2002; Laking and Norman, 2007). The intention was to crowd-out private sector 
monopolies and spearhead efficient and equitable socio-economic development (Lane, 
2000).    
 
By the mid 20th century however (Lane, 2000; Frant, 1998), public choice proponents 
accused the traditional public bureaucrats of rational choice tendencies based on self-
interests’ pursuit. Public bureaus were blamed for over-appropriation of sector budgets in 
ways that would assure economic rents to the bureaucrats rather than the 
public/customers. Since it was not in their interest to cut costs devoid also, of competitive 
pressures, public enterprises suffered X-inefficiencies/slacks. Principal-agent adherents 
pointed to the possible rent-seeking activities of regulated monopolies that would seek 
favorable regulation of entry, tariffs and standards in favor of certain products from non-
autonomous public regulators. Given information asymmetries between public 
enterprises (agent) and the government/ministry (principal), agents were able to extract 
monopoly profits. Moreover, principals indirectly paid-off all related transaction costs 
incurred by the agents.  
 
The neoliberal agenda (Durant, 2001; Feldheim, 2001) seeks to first, bust and downsize 
bureaucracies or Weberian governance frameworks. This strategy assumes that 
individuals are rational self-interested decision makers whose motives to work are driven 
by economic goals. As such, contracts should be used to seal economic relations between 
workers and their employers. To avoid public choice problems among politicians, 
contracts have been advanced on the other hand, to assure a closer match between 
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customer demands and public servants’ interests (Frant, 1998; Lynn, 1998). Second, 
devolve rather than centralize responsibilities to local authorities, private or non-
governmental organizations. Unlike public managers that (Liou, 2001: 513) “have legally 
based purposes, operate by vast system of rules and regulations and serve clientele who 
have rights and privileges set in legislation rather than market-driven interests”, it is 
easier as noted by Liou, for non-public managers to command and effect change among 
lower echelons.  
 
Third, deregulate public service sectors in attempts to reduce costs and user prices; and 
increase firms’ entry, merger, acquisitions and innovativeness. Fourth, expose public 
service sectors to (quasi)competition and fifth, focus on results rather than procedures. 
For more information on how these neoliberalistic strategies have been defined and 
implemented divergently across varied sectors globally, see Hood (1991: 1995), Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992), Lane (1994), OECD (1995), Borins (1997), Burki and Perry (1998), 
Kernaghan (2000), Manning (2001), Ferlie and Steane (2002), Parker and Saal (2003), 
Pollitt (2003).   
 
 
1.2.2 Neoliberal reforms and the urban water sector  
In the urban water sector, different accounts of the neoliberal reforms exist (see Walsh, 
1995; Sheshinski and Lòpez-Calva, 2003; Harvey, 2005; England and Ward, 2007; 
Nauges and van den Berg, 2007; Prasad, 2007). For an overview of the origins and nature 
of these neoliberal reforms, see Harvey (2005) and England and Ward (2007) among 
other authors. 
 
In Africa, since the late 1980s, “there (was) is little prospect for improvement unless the 
water supply and sanitation sector (engaged) engages in broad institutional reforms with 
the aim of increasing financial autonomy and providing greater transparency” (Mwanza, 
2001:3). The sector faced operational deficiencies, political meddling and regulatory 
difficulties that necessitated urgent remediation (Mwanza, 2001, see also Chapters 2 and 
3).   
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To address these problems, different neoliberalistic policies were proposed and advanced 
variedly across water sectors in the continent (Nickson, 1999; Larbi, 2001; Kessides, 
2004; Estache, 2005; Van Dijk, 2006; Baietti et al., 2006; Nyarko, 2007; Schwartz, 
2008).  
 
First, there was a move to corporatize state-owned utilities with a preference for lean and 
autonomous organizational forms that were legally separated from the state and managed 
by visible managers. Notwithstanding their intrinsic social missions, these corporatized 
entities were founded on (or expected to operate under) clear commercial objectives and 
bound by specific corporate laws. Second, there have been attempts to employ mutually 
voluntary, incentive-based and time-bound contracts. These have been used to inject 
competition - through bids or benchmarking and assure efficient, transparent and 
accountable service delivery.  
 
Third, the use of contracts has made it easy to engage private entrepreneurs in the sector. 
Privatization among other approaches 4  has been advanced in attempts to boost 
innovation, technical capacities and fiscal austerity in the water sector. Closely linked to 
this move is the attempt to fourthly, decentralize decision making and service provision 
mandates to local governments/municipalities. This has been seen as a way to devolve 
resources, increase systems’ flexibility and grow a customer-centered service. Fifth, 
independent regulation or regulation by contracts has been adopted as a way to protect 
both customers and service providers. Sixth, policy making has been retained in the 
hands of the government or the department/ministry responsible for water resources 
development.   
 
 
1.2.3 Criticism of neoliberal reforms  
While meaningful, neoliberal agendas have widely been criticized. First, downsizing 
efforts have been blamed for the loss of jobs and tied social security benefits, family or 
                                                      
4 See Schouten (2009) for a detailed analysis of these private sector participation developments and shifts in the water 
sector since the 1990s.  
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community fragmentation, insecurity, low-self esteem, depression and mistrust of public 
service sectors and organizations (Feldheim, 2001; Hood 1995). Whereas retrenchment 
exercises have prioritized firms’ economic interests, they have ignored other non-
economic and non-concrete rewards that motivate employees to engage in paid work such 
as self satisfaction linked to affective, self sacrifice and normative motives (Feldheim, 
2001).  
 
Second and especially when dealing with (naturally) non-competitive sectors such as the 
water supply, both public and non-public providers are susceptible to rent seeking 
behaviors, predominant with monopolies (Savoie, 1995; Castro and Heller, 2009). 
Besides, the inconsistent empirical evidence on the superiority of private over public 
enterprises in these non-competitive environments (see also section 4.2) does not 
explicitly support market over non-market solutions to public failure. Indeed, the 
invisible hand of markets does not always result in optimal resource allocation (Jreisat, 
2001).  
 
Third, neoliberal policies especially in the water and sanitation sector “did not emerge 
from an analysis of the particular problems and requirements of these services, but have 
rather been imposed on the sector in the course of the process of economic globalization” 
(Castro and Heller, 2009:24). Similar views have been made by Schouten (2009) who 
notes that neoliberal policies have not been based on scientific evidence but a set of 
beliefs. That is, lean is better than overstretched government departments, more business 
is better, market mechanisms bring change and private sector participation results in 
cheap, faster and long term private capital and management expertise.   
 
For a continent that is presently challenged by mounting urbanization and climate 
variability pressures (UNICEF and WHO, 2011) however, neoliberal ideals have 
certainly broadened the managerial choices available to water sector stakeholders in 
Africa. These have been instrumental in the water sector’s efforts to meet increasing 
demands for safe, reliable and sustainable services.  
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This thesis restricts itself to the urban water supply sector in Africa. We define safe 
(potable, quality, etc) water coverage to entail mainly, piped water supplies within 200 
meters from observed customer meters (MWLE, 2006: 2007). This is because, unlike 
non-piped sources, quality standards for most piped water systems are guaranteed by a 
centralized entity at the national or sector level. 
 
 
1.3 Structure and contribution  
 
Drawing from the above discussion, urban water sectors, like any enterprise, are 
susceptible to dynamic change. To explain this phenomenon, it is worthwhile to examine 
how and why reforms - from their introduction to implementation, are unpredictable. 
Besides, policy makers need to understand the potential implications of such 
unpredictability on reform processes (extent, pace, etc) and outcomes.   
 
Chapter 2 examines the nature and influence of two overriding ‘water politics’ domains 
in shaping neoliberalist utility reforms since the mid 1990s. Using the case of the 
Ugandan urban water sector, the chapter discusses how actors at the global water politics 
and at the politics of water policy, i.e., at the sovereign national level, interacted and 
transformed reform paths in the sector. We conclude that utility reforms are inherently 
political in nature. This political process is most pronounced when organizational 
changes, as part of the reforms’ implementation plan, are demanded. As the reforms 
unfold, the bargaining power and influence of involved actors change. This in turn results 
in changing reform trajectories. 
 
The use of ‘multi-level politics’ in analyzing reform processes provides useful insights on 
potential reform dynamics. These mask however, the underlying governance structures 
and shifts that respectively, influence and characterize restructuring processes. We 
provide in Chapter 3 a framework for analyzing governance shifts in the water sector.  
We identify four mutually dependent governance structures that practitioners and 
academics can use to further analyze reform processes in the water sector. We argue that 
policies, institutions, organizations and infrastructure or resources matter in discerning 
multi-layered governance shifts, given reforms. Indeed and given the existing 
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infrastructure (technology, resources, etc), policies, institutions and organizations interact 
constantly across global, inter-state, national and local water politics’ domains.  
 
This interaction is translated and manifested in both major and minor governance shifts. 
Major shifts engender changes in policies, institutions, organizations or actual 
infrastructure (resources or technological choices) that trigger innovativeness in the form 
of new structures or increased diversity, in other governance structures. This can be 
exemplified by the creation of a regulatory agency that follows the enactment of an Act 
of Parliament. Minor shifts embody changes in one of the governance structures that may 
not lead to changes in other elements.  
 
In  other  words,  while  Chapter  2  analyses  the  political  processes  in  the  reforms’  
introduction and implementation, Chapter 3 looks at how these neoliberal reforms have 
changed existing governance structures in recipient countries. In particular, we focus on 
the predominant governance structures’ mix at given periods of time for the Zambian 
urban water sector. We concentrate on the neoliberalistic reforms that were advanced in 
the sector between 1993 and 2010. The chapter concludes that, over time, the momentum 
of involving private sector organizations in the provision of water services in Zambia has 
diminished. However, private sector institutions have increasingly been incorporated in 
‘public’ service provision modalities. 
 
On the other hand, the continued advancement of these organizational and institutional 
governance structures across the urban water sector urge for performance assessments in 
the sector. This is urgent for the developing countries and Africa in particular that have in 
the past, received limited empirical attention. Some rare exceptions are studies based on 
data provided by supra-national organizations such as the World Bank - through its 
International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IB-NET),5 or 
similar regional initiatives such as the South East Asian Water Utilities Network 
benchmarking program.6  
                                                      
5 The project is implemented in partnership with the World Bank and the Water and Sanitation Program. It is funded by 
the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, see http://www.ib-net.org. 
6 See http://www.seawun.org/benchmarking.  
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We focus on the role of organizational shifts in service provision on urban water utilities 
(hereafter, WUs) performance. To provide services following the reforms, governments 
can abstract, treat and distribute potable water through a department within or a public 
company owned by, the ministry of water or the local government. In this case, the 
department or the public company is dependent on the government for infrastructure 
financing and regulation. The government sets and enforces services’ user fees and other 
output-quality standards.  
 
Second, governments can unbundle services production (raw water abstraction, treatment 
and storage) from distribution and delegate the latter to public companies or private 
operators. In the former case, a public-public partnership is constituted in which the 
government owns the assets, approves tariffs and regulates the public company’s 
operations at arms-length. The public company manages established assets and is free to 
externally source additional funds besides public subsidization. Regarding the latter case, 
a public-private partnership is arranged between the government and a private operator. 
Asset ownership remains the mandate of the government but tariff setting and operations’ 
funding are a priori provided (and continuously renegotiated) in the contract.  
 
Thirdly, water production and distribution mandates can be delegated to a private 
operator through a (non)renewable license to operate. This limits government’s role in 
assets ownership, financing and tariff setting to operations’ (i.e., service level, quality, etc) 
regulation. The latter can be arranged formally in the form of an independent 
agency/department or informally within the ministry.  
 
Both public-public and public-private partnership arrangements typify the case of the 
Ugandan urban water sector, discussed in Chapter 4. To assess their role on the sector’s 
performance, we first examine the technical efficiency differences between both utility-
groups. Secondly, we use diverse utility-specific exogenous factors to explain the 
differences. We further examine to what extent utilities could improve their efficiency by 
optimizing their scales of operation. Performance is considered in light of the key urban 
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water sector objectives that are to universally increase qualitative water coverage and 
subsequently, enhance utilities revenue.  
 
We rely on a two-staged bias-corrected metafrontier based on the data envelopment 
analysis (hereafter, DEA) estimators. We find the public-private compared to the public-
public owned utilities less technical output-efficient. The kind of managerial ownership 
adopted by WUs in Uganda positively and significantly influences subsequent utilities’ 
efficiency. However, public-public owned utilities operate largely under decreasing 
returns  to  scale  while  the  average  public-private owned utility operates under an 
increasing return to scale region. While there is no consensus in literature on the 
preferable optimal operation sizes for urban WUs (Carvalho et al., 2012), we find 
diseconomies of scale to happen after service coverage of about 29,868 customers.   
 
Besides knowledge on utilities technical performance and given present efforts towards 
the Millennium Development Goals (here after, MDGs) attainment by 2015, it is 
imperative to explore and understand potential productivity dynamics among WUs in 
Africa. More so, it is central for utility managers, regulators and other interested policy 
makers to ascertain and explain diverse productivity determinants. The latter provide 
useful insights on what, why and how productivity at the sector or WU levels could be 
improved, given the reforms.  
 
Chapter 5 examines and explains the productivity of two urban water sectors in Africa: 
Uganda and Zambia (i.e., for WUs under public ownership). Since the mid 1990s as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, ideologically comparable water sector reforms were 
introduced in both sectors. While both restructuring processes differ in their 
implementation and outcomes, analogous neoliberalistic reform strategies were advanced 
in both countries. These were in attempts to not only increase WUs’ efficiency, but also, 
their effectiveness (i.e., total productivity). 
 
Inter-temporal productivity trends and their drivers are examined by a bootstrapped 
biennial Malmquist productivity measure. We find, given the reforms, that utilities’ 
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technical inefficiency decreased over time. Zambian utilities are found to be more 
efficient but at the expense of high water losses. Urban WUs in Uganda experience a 
large productivity growth, thanks to increased catch-up rates. A negative correlation is 
observed between investments in urban water distribution and productivity growth. 
 
Chapter 5 provides interesting insights on utilities productivity growth due to technical 
change, technological efficiency change and scale changes. The chapter however, does 
not identify which productivity changes are due to effectiveness besides efficiency 
increases. Yet, urban WUs, as with any other firm, ought to operate both efficiently and 
effectively. In the case of Africa where universal safe water coverage remains a major 
challenge (WSP-WB, 2009), the need for effectiveness without resources wastage 
(efficiency) is evident. Chapter 6 provides a step-wise approach for evaluating WUs’ 
efficiency and effectiveness. Taking the case of urban WUs in Africa, we estimate in a 
first step, utilities’ technical efficiency. In a second step, we examine utilities’ 
effectiveness in meeting existing customer demands for drinking water services within 
their licensed service areas.  
 
The difference between (in)efficiency and (in)effectiveness is decomposed in a third step. 
To ascertain and explain the extents to which utilities utilize available resources to 
achieve complete effectiveness, we take the ratio of utilities’ effectiveness to technical 
efficiency. We refer to this ratio as utilities’ ‘potential input capacity’ (PIC). PIC values 
equal to unit imply exact resource allocation. PIC values of more than one denote excess 
use of existing resources due to inefficiency problems. To attain 100 percent 
effectiveness, related utilities do not need extra inputs but efficiency improvement. PIC 
values of less than one on the other hand, reflect resources deficiency. Related utilities 
are efficient but unable to attain complete effectiveness that demand additional input use. 
A final step explores country specific (e.g., income per capita), sector specific (e.g., 
regulation) and utility specific (e.g., density economies) inefficiency and ineffectiveness 
determinants. These steps are described in detail in section 6.3.3. 
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We find WUs to suffer technical inefficiency rather than ineffectiveness challenges. This 
finding is consistent across the varied African regions (East, West, South, etc). By 
implication, these utilities do not need extra inputs to entirely extend services in their 
operational areas, but the efficient use of their available resources (capital, labor, etc).  To 
increase utilities technical efficiency and effectiveness levels nonetheless, countries’ 
economic advancement is significant. 
 
 
1.4 Analytical approach  
 
This section introduces the non-parametric approach that is used in Chapters 4 to 6. The 
qualitative approach employed in Chapters 2 and 3 is detailed in sections 2.2.2 and 3.2.2. 
 
1.4.1 Non-parametric (frontier) estimators 
In assessing urban WUs’ performance, binary (partial productivity) ratios of output to 
input are often used. Binary ratios are preferred as they are easy to measure and to 
understand (see Smith, 1990). Nonetheless, they face a number of limitations that hinder 
full performance assessments (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). First, binary measures compare 
different utilities against a single indicator while ignoring other equally important and/or 
competing indicators. Second, they do not take into account any heterogeneity across 
utilities and compare firms assuming constant returns to scale. By construction, small-
scaled utilities appear less productive than the large-scaled utilities on variables with 
scale economies (and vice versa for variables with diseconomies of scale). Besides, due 
to Fox’s paradox, lower values for all considered binary combinations do not necessarily 
imply low total productivity for a specific utility since utility managers can as well utilize 
sub-processes that have relatively higher productiveness than others (Bogetoft and Otto, 
2011). 
 
Multidimensional frontier techniques provide an endogenously weighted approach where 
an entity is compared to a best practice. To estimate the production technology (or 
frontier of the best practice observations), two benchmarking approaches are presented in 
literature. Both require information on utilities’ input and output variables. A frontier is 
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then fitted on top of these data points and a measure of (technical) inefficiency is taken as 
the distance between the estimated frontier and the specific data points or observed 
utilities (Coelli et al., 2003).  Nonetheless, both methods face different advantages and 
disadvantages. Econometric frontier models define a priori functional form on the 
sampled data (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, Translog, Fourier), have a well established statistical 
inferencing framework and it is easy to incorporate environmental or discretionary 
variables into the models (Fried et al., 2008). The former property in particular is 
however problematic as the functional form or the direction in which inputs are converted 
into outputs, is often unknown.  
 
On the other hand, even though researchers can test and reject models in which chosen 
input or output vectors have the wrong sign - relative to those that are predicted by 
economic theory, a wrong (functional form) specification could lead to biased results 
(Yatchew, 1998). Non-parametric models such as DEA (used in this thesis) do not 
assume a functional form on the data, are flexible and easy to compute through linear 
programming techniques. They are nonetheless, deterministic7 in nature (Charnes et al., 
1978; Banker, 1984).  
 
DEA is a data-oriented linear programming technique for summarizing performance, in 
the form of indices, among complex8 utilities (Cooper et al., 2011). The technique defines 
a production technology that embodies a piecewise convex surface that envelopes all 
sample utilities. Performance is thus measured relative to this production technology, 
referred also, to as the best-practice frontier. Dissimilar to econometric techniques that 
rely on the central predispositions of observed data, DEA estimators are further preferred 
for their ability to reveal more insightful data relations that are otherwise masked (Cooper 
et al., 2011). Practitioners and academics can easily use estimated indices to assess utility 
performance and regulate or set different quality, quantity and price-related targets. 
 
DEA measures and especially, those that allow production technologies to exhibit 
varying returns to scale were first introduced by Banker et al. (1984). Banker et al. 
                                                      
7 Assume observed data is free of noise or measurement errors. 
8 Use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs. 
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modified - by imposing a variable returns to scale (here after, VRS) constraint, Charnes et 
al. (1978)’s conical hull estimators 9  that assumed constant returns to scale (CRS) 
technologies. This made it possible to assess performance across varied service sectors 
(such as banking, education, transport and water industries) that are not only complex but 
exhibit also, diverse market sizes.  
 
To overcome the deterministic nature of DEA, Chapters 4 to 6 apply a DEA approach 
that is based on a double-bootstrap procedure (Simar and Wilson, 2007). Whilst the 
bootstrap procedure suffers a number of limitations especially with small samples, it   
“currently offers the only sensible approach to inference” deterministic DEA estimators 
(Simar and Wilson, 2011: 250). To generate data and subsequently estimate smooth 
production technologies in this double bootstrap environment, different assumptions arise 
(see Cooper et al., 2011 and the references therein). First, the production technology is 
assumed to be convex (i.e., the frontier consists of convex combinations of observed 
input-output combinations), bounded and closed for all input and output vectors in 
specific identically, independently and randomly selected samples.  
 
Related to this assumption is that of ‘no free lunches’. That is, non-negative and freely 
disposable inputs are at least needed to produce some freely disposable outputs. Free 
disposability means that an output can still be produced with even more inputs or; for the 
same level of inputs, less outputs can be produced. These assumptions, among other 
properties, have widely been developed in literature (see Fried et al., 2008; Simar and 
Wilson, 2007: 2011) and assure consistent DEA estimators.  
 
Besides, the double-bootstrap procedure helps us to reduce the influence of noise in data 
(Kneip et al., 2003). Noise can arise from measurement errors, typological mistakes or in 
the form of outlying or atypical observations. The bias due to noise in this stochastic non-
parametric environment is computed by taking the difference between the efficiency 
estimates based on the ‘true’ unobserved variables and those based on the ‘biased’ 
observed variables (Emrouznejad and De Witte, 2010; see also Daraio and Simar, 2007). 
                                                      
9 These estimators stemmed on Farrell (1957)’s efficiency analyses.  
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This  is  estimated  within  the  first  bootstrap  procedure  that  defines  also,  specific  
production technologies for observed utilities.  
 
Implicitly, the double bootstrap procedure assumes a separability condition between the 
production inputs and outputs space (in the first bootstrap procedure) and the 
environmental variables space (in the second bootstrap procedure) such that the latter 
does not influence the shape of the technology frontier but the mean and variance of the 
inefficiency process.  To this end, the procedure first smoothes the irregularly bounded 
densities of observed input and output vectors and second the technology frontier. Both 
(first and second) bootstrap procedures are outlined in detail in Simar and Wilson (2007 
and elaborated further in Simar and Wilson 2011). They yield consistent inference 
parameters (confidence intervals, standard errors, etc) of the approximated estimators 
(Kneip et al., 2008).  
 
To avoid extra computational difficulties inherent especially in small samples, such as, 
the curse of dimensionality problem (slow convergence rates with increases in input and 
output vectors, see Simar and Wilson, 2011), production variables in Chapters 4 to 6 are 
kept at minimum relative to the observed WUs. Indeed, our analyses satisfy the rule of 
thumb of Banker et al. (1989, see also Paradi et al., 2004) in addressing degrees of 
freedom problems.10 Assuming n  and m  to be the number of input and output vectors 
used in an analysis, the sample size ( s ) should satisfy > @)(3  ;max mnmns ut .   
 
1.4.2 Measurement orientation  
We assume that urban WUs strive to maximize their outputs with given inputs. Moreover, 
given the prevailing need to halve by 2015 the number of persons without access to 
sustainable safe water systems, it is likely that African WUs prioritize outputs’ expansion. 
As such, we adopt an output-maximization objective for the analyses in Chapters 4 to 6. 
This is contrary to most productivity analyses for WUs in the development countries 
where service coverage deficits are not an issue. Then the problem revolves around costs 
                                                      
10 The degrees of freedom increase with the number of observations (i.e., WUs) and decrease with the number of input 
and output variables used. 
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minimization rather than services expansion. For an overview of these input-oriented 
(where resources are radially minimized given certain output units), other non-oriented 
(where both input and output vectors are simultenously and non-radially reduced and 
maximized) or multiplicative (non-dimensional) models, see Cooper et al. (2007: 2011).  
 
1.4.3 Analytical framework 
Mostly, WUs have no control over their operational scales except through acquisitions 
that have to be approved by a government institute. Utilities operate within predefined 
licensed jurisdictions and as such, there scale of operation is given. Consequently, with 
the existence of multi-scaled utilities across the African urban water sector, Chapters 4 to 
6 assume VRS. As such, utilities’ inefficiency can be explained by the prearranged scales 
that are not a fault of the utilities. 
 
In a first step, DEA estimators are used to estimate the reference unobserved true 
production technology. For observed utilities, DEA assumes a production technology 
which transforms non-negative M x 1 inputs (x) into S x 1 output (y) vectors (Coelli et al., 
2005). The production technology set (T) for N WUs (i = 1, 2, 3,…,N) can be defined as:  
 
 ^ `y producecanx;iy;ix:iy,ix T 00 !!                                                 [1.1] 
 
T is unobserved but can be estimated )ˆ(T  by the DEA estimators (Simar and Wilson, 
2011). An output distance function (equation 1.2) defined on an equivalently denoted (as 
the production technology set T) output set {P(xi)}11 is used to estimate WUi’s technical 
efficiency )ˆˆ( iET T .
12  
 
  ^ )`ix(P)ˆ/iy,ix(:  miniy,ixoD ! TT 0                                                          [1.2] 
 
                                                      
11  Algebraically expressed as TiyixiyyproducecanxiyixP   ),(:}:{)( . )( ixP denotes the set of all 
output vectors (y) that can be produced by use of a given input (x) vector. 
12 And WUi’s effectiveness as is the case in chapter 6.  
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iyixoD ,  represents the maximal radial expansion of specific outputs given existing 
resources. Utilities are technically output efficient ( Tˆ  = 1) or effective (as discussed in 
Chapter 6), if they operate on or along the estimated technology )ˆ(T  and technically 
output inefficient ( Tˆ  <  1)  or  ineffective,  if  they  operate  below Tˆ . The distance Tˆ  
estimates the output shortfall reflected by the euclidean distance to the boundary of the 
production frontier from WUi, in a direction parallel to the output axes and orthogonal to 
the input axes (Daraio and Simar, 2007).13 
 
DEA-VRS considers the following optimization problem that is solved for each of the N 
utilities (i = 1,2,3…N) in T periods (t = 1, 2, 3… T): 
 
ii OI ,
max       iT                                                                                          [1.3] 
  Constraints:      ,0d iYiyi OT  
      ,0d ixiXO  
  ;0tiO 1 ¦ iO  
 
Where iT  is a scalar variable that approximates WUi’s technical efficiency (1/ iT ). iy  is 
the output vector for WUi while Y is the output matrix for all N WUs  in  a  given  time  
period. iO  represents the non-negative weights while X  is the input quantities’ vector for 
all N WUs. ix  is the input quantities’ vector for WUi while 1 ¦ iO  imposes VRS to the 
linear program. 1/ iT gives the output-oriented technical efficiency estimates for observed 
WUs relative to their specific best practice technology.  
 
While this section described the conventional DEA optimization framework, we adopted 
Simar and Wilson (2007)’s double bootstrap algorithm that builds on this DEA model. 
                                                      
13 Besides these output distance function measures, other approaches including the use of hyperbolic or directional 
distance functions, are possible (see Cooper et al., 2011). 
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Sections 4.5, 5.3.2 and 6.3.1 detail how different inputs and output variables were chosen 
and employed throughout the thesis.    
 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
To sum up this chapter, the urban water sector in most developing countries and Africa in 
particular has experienced different transformations with the onset of the neoliberal 
ideologies. Sector policy makers (and all interested stakeholders) need to understand the 
nature of these transformations, their influence on the existing governance structures and 
their role in utilities’ performance improvement. This thesis attempts to diagnose and 
provide valuable insights to these complex issues.   
 
To examine different angles of the reform processes, Chapter 2 looks at the politics that 
preceded and followed the reforms’ initiation. Here, we rely on the Ugandan urban water 
sector, whose reform process has been highly profiled internationally since the early 2000 
(see  Section  2.6).   Due  to  the  political  nature  of  the  process,  we  find  its  outcomes  to  
constitute a number of compromises among various stakeholders.   
 
Chapter 3 examines the nature of these compromises. In particular, the chapter analyzes 
how the emphasis on neoliberal reform strategies influenced sectors’ policies, institutions 
and organizations. Since comparable developments as discussed in Chapter 2 are visible 
in other African countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania, 
another case study, that is, the Zambian urban water sector, is preferred. Nonetheless, 
similar conceptual frameworks (as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3) can be used to analyze 
analogous reform processes in other sectors (in Uganda, Zambia, etc) and urban water 
sectors across the African continent. 
 
Common to the neoliberal reforms (as evidenced in Chapters 2 and 3) is the increased 
emphasis on performance improvement (cost-recovery, target achievement, efficiency 
increases, etc). The role of these reform elements in improving WUs’ performance is 
variedly explored in Chapters 4 to 6. Here, performance scores and their determinants are 
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estimated and decomposed. For broader analyses of the issues, operational data from 
varied case studies is used. Chapter 4 focuses on the Ugandan urban water sector. Here, 
performance across the public-public owned and public-private owned urban WUs is 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 5 compares the productivity of the public-public owned urban WUs in Uganda 
with that of the Zambian urban WUs. The latter utilities are also public-owned. Chapter 6 
relies on a larger representative dataset of urban WUs in 21 African countries. Here, 
efficiency and effectiveness estimates across the utilities are estimated and decomposed. 
For multi-dimensional insights on utilities’ performance, different modelling approaches 
are employed in each of these chapters (see Sections 4.3, 5.2 and 6.2 to 6.3).  
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CHAPTER 2:   Politics and water utility reforms14 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Globally over the past decades, the public sector has increasingly been subject to reforms. 
These changes to state structures and dynamics have increased in pace and scope more 
than previously experienced (Thynne, 2000). The water supply and sanitation sector has 
not been an exception to this proliferation of public sector reforms. In particular, the 
onset of neoliberalism and its emphasis on altering market-state relations has had 
tremendous impact in the water services sector. “Private institutions” (Bakker, 2002), 
“market organized production” (Swyngedouw, 2004) and “private sector ethos” (Smith, 
2004) have become increasingly important in the water services sector. At the same time, 
these reforms though visible in many countries, have neither spread as a unitary coherent 
concept nor have their pursuit led to homogeneous outcomes.  
 
Two main reasons appear to explain these heterogeneous outcomes. Firstly, neoliberal 
reforms that have swept through the global water services sector essentially represent 
broad strategic concepts that have been primarily crafted at the international policy 
spheres for reorganizing institutional patterns at the national water service sectors, rather 
than a clearly defined end-state. Secondly, neoliberalism is “path-dependent” and 
“contextually specific” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002:349; see also Peck, 2004).  
 
In this chapter, we examine the politics of public utility reforms by examining the reform 
process of the Ugandan urban water service sector. During this reform process, some 
elements of a neoliberal reform agenda were ingrained in the sector while other reform 
aspects were strongly resisted by a coalition of key sector stakeholders.  The neoliberal 
reform agenda that was introduced across most public sectors in the 1990s, reasserts “an 
old neoclassical economic argument that society functions better under a market logic 
than any other logic, especially a state-command one” (Purcell, 2008:13, see also sections 
1.2.2 and 1.2.3). In order to stimulate economic growth and innovativeness in 
                                                      
14 This chapter is adapted from “The politics of utility reform: A case study of the Ugandan water sector” that is already 
accepted for publication in Public Money and Management journal (with Klaas Schwartz). 
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competitive sectors, market institutions are advocated for an efficient allocation of inputs 
and production of outputs. For a natural monopoly like the water supply sector, neoliberal 
reforms have been characterized by the transfer of service production and provision rights 
from the public to private actors and the incorporation of market institutions within the 
public domain. 
 
We illustrate that the particular manifestation of these reforms in Uganda is the outcome 
of a protracted political process involving organizations and actors operating at different 
‘politics’ levels.  We highlight the importance of the interaction between the national 
urban WU and international financing agencies and the impact this interaction has had on 
the respective bargaining positions of the actors. 
 
The case of Uganda is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, important institutional 
elements associated with neoliberalism have been incorporated within the sector since the 
early 2000. These elements include a strong emphasis on service provision by an 
autonomous organization, increased importance of cost-recovery and efficiency gains and 
the introduction of more business-oriented performance management strategies. 
Secondly, the case highlights clear shifts in the direction of reforms as the bargaining 
position of different actors and organizations changed over time. At the onset of the 
reforms in the late 1990s for instance, the government’s intention was to strengthen the 
private sector’s role in urban water provision (MWLE, 1999: 20). Despite these initial 
intentions however, complete private sector participation never fully materialized 
especially, across large towns in Uganda. Instead, reforms across the Ugandan urban 
water sector took the form of commercialization of the existing national public WU.  
 
 
2.2 Conceptual approach and study methodology 
2.2.1 Conceptual approach 
To analyze the reform processes that unfolded between 1997 and 2009 in the Ugandan 
urban water sector, we employ the “water politics” conceptual framework (Mollinga, 
2008).  This framework is based on the premise that water management is inherently 
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political in nature. It identifies a typology of “water politics” that stretches across four 
domains. Across these domains, social power relations converge, mediate and shape 
water management processes in and across states. The four domains comprise the (i) 
global water politics, (ii) inter-state hydropolitics, (iii) politics of water policy, and (iv) 
everyday politics.  
 
While  the  four  domains  are  largely  differentiated,  they  are  nonetheless,  strongly  
interlinked and interact with one another. In our analysis, we focus particularly on two of 
these domains identified by Mollinga (2008). That is the global politics and the politics of 
policy at the sovereign states’ level. Of importance to note is that Mollinga developed 
this framework to analyze politics in water resources management. In the context of 
urban water supply, as is our case, the domain of inter-state hydropolitics becomes less 
relevant as it is unlikely that water distribution systems transcend national borders. More 
so, this chapter does not explore the everyday politics that characterize daily social power 
relations at the local community levels.   
 
Global water politics refers to water discourse, policy and tentative regulation at the 
international level. Actors in this political arena constitute organizations and institutions 
that are internationally active in the water services sector. They include among others, 
development banks, some national governments, UN agencies, international interest 
groups, international NGOs, international water management and supply companies, 
practitioners and academics.15 They form a “network of water policy elites” (Conca, 
2006) that discusses and at times advocates policy prescriptions for reforms in the water 
services sector. Often anecdotes and success-stories (‘best-practices’) of successful 
providers are used to promote specific policy prescriptions (see for example ADB, 2007; 
Schaub-Jones, 2008; Solo, 2003).  
 
The politics of policy on the other hand, concerns the policy processes regarding water 
supply services within sovereign states. Sector policies, programs and projects are 
"negotiated  and  re-negotiated  in  all  phases,  stages  and  at  all  levels,  and  are  often  
                                                      
15 It should be noted that in addition to these global actors, global social movements such as the social justice or anti-
privatization lobby groups among others, operate also within this global domain.  
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transformed on their way from formulation to implementation" (Mollinga, 2008:12). 
These transformation paths depend on one hand, on the existing sector priority areas and 
on the other hand, on veiled interests by external stakeholders. 
 
The arena of global politics and that of the politics of policy are strongly interconnected. 
Ideas and policy prescriptions emanating from the global level are translated into national 
water policies or programs. Similarly, national water organizations influence the 
discussions and negotiations that occur at the global politics level. For a detailed 
overview of the four ‘water politics’ domains, see Mollinga (2008 and the references 
therein). 
 
2.2.2 Study methodology 
We use both primary and secondary data sources to explain the neoliberalization 
processes across the Ugandan urban water sector. First, qualitative in-depth interviews 
with the key stakeholders engaged in the Ugandan urban water supply development were 
carried out in September 2009 (see Table 2.1). Unlike other qualitative data collection 
techniques including focus groups, in-depth interviews offer detailed and clear 
understanding of complex or delicate phenomena as experienced by experts (Legard et 
al., 2003). We used both semi-structured and closed interview guides to interview the 
chosen key informants (referenced henceforth as KIU). Appendix 1 provides a sample of 
the interview guide used in Uganda.  
 
Expert interviews lend themselves to a number of biases. For instance, they comprise the 
subjective opinions, perceptions or stories by the chosen interviewees. For the case at 
hand, we purposely selected informants to include all experts with first hand information 
on the urban water sector reforms and the sector. For this, we chose the key decision 
makers across all stakeholders in the Ugandan urban water sector. To assure the validity 
of and add-onto the collected interview information, we triangulated the interviewees’ 
opinions with the related annual sector reports and other sector or organizational 
publications. Moreover, we compared these opinions with different perceptions acquired 
via informal discussions with other sector actors.   
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Table 2.1:   Key informants interviewed in Uganda 
 
Organization Number of respondents 
1. National Water and Sewerage Corporation 5 
2. Kampala Water and Sewerage Companyɀ 5 
3. Ministry of Water and Environmentȕ 5 
4. Ministry of Local Government and HousingȜ 1 
5. CPs: ADA, AfDB, EU, GTZ, UNICEF, WSP-WB¥  6 
6. NGOs: UWASNET, Water Aidɻ  2 
7. Association of Private Water Operatorsÿ 2 
8. Private Consultant, water and energy development* 1 
TOTAL 27 
CPs: Cooperate partners, ADA: Austrian Development Agency, AfDB: African Development Bank, EU: European Union, GTZ: 
German Technical Cooperation, UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund, WSP-WB: Water and Sanitation Programme of the 
World Bank, NGOs: Non-governmental organizations, UWASNET: Uganda Water and Sanitation NGO Network. 
 Chief managers in charge of commercial, corporate, customer care, engineering, legal, planning and development affairs. 
ɀ Managers in charge of corporate management, customer care, marketing, sewerage services and urban poor issues among others. 
ȕ Commissioners in charge of liaison; reforms; rural, urban and small towns’ water development and water for development.  
Ȝ Principal inspector of operations. 
¥ Infrastructure specialists, programme officers, technical advisors and water and sanitation specialists.  
ɻ Programme officers in charge of advocacy, communication and policy affairs. 
ÿ Chair and programmes coordinator. 
* The former director of the Privatization Unit under the Ministry of Finance and Planning. 
 
    
Prior to providing an historical overview of the Ugandan urban water supply sector in 
section 2.4, we first discuss how global politics transformed reform trajectories across the 
global urban water sector since the late 1970s. Section 2.5 investigates in particular, how 
global water politics interplayed with institutions and stakeholders at the politics of 
policy level in Uganda. The nature and implications of this interaction are moreover, 
explored. Section 2.6 provides an encompassing discussion of how global politics shaped 
reform trajectories especially in Uganda while section 2.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
2.3 Global water politics: From infrastructure to institutions 
 
This section highlights how global politics transformed reform trajectories across the 
global urban water sector since the late 1970s. We focus on the African continent whose 
efforts of attaining affordable, sustainable and universal potable water coverage have 
long been challenged (AfDB, 2010; WSP-WB, 2009). Besides service coverage deficits 
of about 35 percent (WSP-WB, 2009), utilities across the continent suffer multifaceted 
technical problems reflected for instance, in high water losses (Mwanza, 2005). In 
addition, utilities face chronic financial difficulties as a result of low metering rates, low 
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user tariffs and unreliable consumer records that constrain billing and revenue collection 
practices (Mwanza, 2005; World Bank, 1994). 
 
On the other hand, advanced policy reforms emanating largely from the global sphere and 
aimed at addressing these challenges have transformed considerably over the past 
decades. Prior to the 1990s, reforms in the water services sector had a strong focus on 
infrastructure development. Guided by the persistent infrastructural ideal of providing 
universal and standardized services to everyone worldwide, the predominant approach to 
expanding access for unserved populations lay in the construction of sufficient hardware 
to provide services and transfer technical know-how to WUs (Gleick, 2003). This 
infrastructure focus became increasingly challenged particularly, after the disappointing 
results of the International Drinking Water Decade (1981/1990). The Decade adhered to 
the exceptionally ambitious target of providing potable water and improved sanitation 
services for all. The outcome of the Decade was however, disappointing. At the end of 
the decade, as many people still lacked access to safe drinking water and sanitation 
services as when the Decade began (Economist, 1994).  
 
As a reaction to the unsatisfactory results of the International Drinking Water Decade, a 
new reform agenda became prevalent. Rather than having a primary focus on 
infrastructure, the new global consensus argued that institutions matter. Subsequently, 
reforms that focused on institutional build-up and strengthening were propagated across 
the African water sectors. Rather than viewing resource and infrastructure shortages as 
the main obstacles in improving service provision, impediments were increasingly 
presented as being ‘institutional’ in nature. Spiller and Savedoff (1999:2) for example, 
argue that; 
  
“the nature of the sector, coupled with a nation’s political institutions, […] 
together create incentives for government-owners of public utilities to 
behave opportunistically, for the service providers to operate inefficiently, 
and for the consumers to withhold support to the sector. As such, the water 
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services sector under these circumstances has a tendency toward a low-level 
equilibrium from which it is difficult to escape”. 
 
In addressing these institutional obstacles, reforms largely reflected the prevailing 
neoliberal restructuring ideology in other public service sectors such as education, 
energy, health, telecommunication and transport (see Harvey, 2005). Privatization and 
commercialization were promulgated as the future of the water supply industry 
(Idelovitch and Ringskog, 1995; Nickson, 1997; Panayatou, 1997; World Bank, 1997; 
Spiller and Savedoff, 1999; Franceys, 2008). Privatization can be defined as the 
organizational change in ownership (from public to private) and management (from near-
complete public control of water-supply functions to the involvement of the private 
sector) (Bakker, 2002). A fundamental element of this approach was the takeover of 
state-owned utilities by private organizations.  
 
Advocacy for (complete or near complete) private sector involvement was based on a 
number of arguments. First of all, private sector involvement was believed to increase 
utilities efficiency as service providers were meant to operate under profit motives guided 
by clearly defined performance contracts. Secondly with private sector involvement, 
regulation was separated from actual service provision thus, addressing the poacher-
gamekeeper problem.16 Thirdly, experience from privatization projects in England and 
Wales “played a major role in convincing policy makers worldwide, that private 
financing of urban WUs could be viable” (Marin, 2009:19; Franceys, 2008). 
Subsequently, private operators were viewed as a potential source of investment-
financing required to improve services. 
 
 
2.4 The Ugandan urban water service sector 
 
In this section, we provide an historical overview of the Ugandan urban water service 
sector. We in particular, highlight the overriding reasons that lend the sector to 
                                                      
16 The poacher-gamekeeper problem concerns the concentration of regulatory and operational functions within the 
same public sector entity. This results in weak or dysfunctional regulation, accountability and transparency of 
concerned service providers (Foster, 1996). 
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restructuring by the end of the 1990s. Henceforth, we rely largely on the findings of the 
key-informant interviews (see section 2.2.2). 
 
2.4.1 Historical overview 
Following independence in 1962, nation building was the topmost priority of the 
Ugandan government (Hope and Chikulo, 2000). As part of this drive, existing public 
infrastructure was extended and maintained through investment subsidies.17 Population 
growth rate was minimal and most urban households enjoyed piped water services.18 
Economic mismanagement during the Idi Amin Dada's presidency and severe political 
turmoil following that presidency led to skilled workers and investors fleeing the country. 
As a result, export revenues declined and public infrastructure including water supply 
systems, deteriorated.19 By the mid-1980s, Uganda was nearly a ‘failed state’ (World 
Bank, 2009).20  
 
In 1972, the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (hereafter, NWSC) was 
established by decree 34 as a parastatal owned fully by the Ugandan government. This 
followed recommendations of a study on ‘how to corporatize utilities’ funded by the 
African Development Bank.21 A Board of Directors was appointed by the Minister of 
Mineral and Water Resources (hereafter, MMWR) 22  consisting largely of political 
appointees. The Board appointed a Managing Director and oversaw the corporation’s 
activities. 23  It constituted the link between NWSC and the MMWR. Some Board 
members were housed within the NWSC building and hence, were indistinguishable from 
the corporation’s management. This meant that “when a board member requested for a 
                                                      
17 KIU 8, 9. 
18 For more information on how the piped water and sewerage systems evolved in Uganda before the 1950s, see 
Nilsson (2006). 
19 KIU 13, 17, 19. 
20 According to KIU 13 and 17, Uganda was a “dead state”. 
21 KIU 3, 4. As noted in Muhairwe (2009), the study was moreover, undertaken in collaboration with the World Bank 
and the World Health Organization. 
22 The MMWR transformed into the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment in the early 1990s and later to the 
Ministry of Water and Environment in 2007. 
23 KIU 9. 
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corporation’s vehicle (among other assets for official or personal use), s/he was given a 
vehicle, yet such was neither provided and budgeted for, nor accounted for”.24  
 
NWSC provided water and sewerage services to the urban towns of Kampala, Entebbe 
and Jinja.25 The MMWR through water departments on the other hand, provided water 
and sewerage services to the rest towns outside NWSC’s mandate. The ministry 
designed, reinforced and regulated the sectors’ policies and programs.26 This conflict of 
interests within the Ministry meant that NWSC had very little incentive to improve 
performance. Resultantly, “pipes extension and maintenance works took long to finalize 
or never ended (as) the investor and implementer self-supervised herself”.27 Regulatory 
frameworks related to water service coverage, quality, user fees and performance 
management were absent. 28  The MMWR ended-up “doing nothing” 29  in terms of 
providing reliable services and regulating sector operations.  
 
Recruitment, promotion and dismissal of staff in the ministry were based on self-defined 
criteria highly prone to political manipulation.30 Water departments essentially became 
“analogous to political-family businesses”. 31  Moreover, financial support from the 
government to the water departments was minimal, insufficient or often delayed. 32 
Consequently, newly established but far-located (i.e., away from Kampala the capital 
city) districts hardly attracted and/or retained skilled personnel. As noted by KI 14, “no 
one was willing to work from the remote towns that for the most, lacked basic amenities 
like passable roads, decent housing, electricity …and so forth”.  
 
Service expansion was politically-driven and mostly in return for political favors. 33  
Priority was first to the government organizations, ministers and permanent secretaries’ 
                                                      
24 KIU 1. 
25 KIU 1, 4, 27. 
26 KIU 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 26, 27. 
27 KIU 17. 
28 KIU 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 25, 27. 
29 KIU 27. Illustratively, no operational records were kept also by NWSC in this era. The existing few were manually 
stored and haphazardly maintained (KIU 23, 27). 
30 KIU 9, 10. 
31 KIU 1, echoed also by KIU 10, 14. 
32 KIU 15. 
33 KIU 1 – e.g., in return for appointments to different positions in the Ministry. 
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residents and other senior government functionaries.34 These three customer types usually 
either never paid their water bills at all, or on time. Politically-driven network extension 
and maintenance operations were often costly and counter-productive as they entailed 
mains extension to the city fringes where most government officials resided. Given that 
most households lived within cities; such main’s extension works were only accessible to 
a few households (located along the extended networks) depending on their abilities to 
pay.35 
 
 
2.4.2 Increased demands for quality water supply services 
By the early 1980s, only 7 (out of 37) urban towns had functional, though poorly-
managed, piped water systems. Service coverage stood at a mere 18 per cent.36  During 
the end of the International Drinking Water Decade, multiple externally funded multi-
sectoral and non-state actors saturated the sector with isolated, non-coordinated and non-
regulated water supply projects.37 These projects prioritized infrastructure development.38  
Through a World Bank loan guaranteed by the MMWR, for example, the ‘Seven town’s 
water supply project’ was instituted in 1987.39 The project expanded water production 
infrastructure across Kampala, Entebbe, Jinja, Mbale, Masaka, Mbarara and Tororo.40  
 
A follow-up ‘second water project’ funded by the World Bank, Austrian government and 
the European Union extended water works and distribution lines across the seven towns 
between 1990 and 1999. 41   The projects were successful, as long as funding was 
sufficient. When funding ended with the projects expiration, the schemes quickly became 
non-functional. 42  Local communities were in most cases hardly familiar with the 
                                                      
34 KIU 1, 3, 6, 7. 
35 KIU 6. 
36 KIU 16. 
37 KIU 9, 10, 14, 16, 24. 
38 KIU 13, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27. 
39 KIU 4, 15, 16. 
40 After the project’s termination, further development and management mandates of water schemes in Mbale, Masaka, 
Mbarara and Tororo were transferred to NWSC. 
41 KIU 4. Each financier signed a bilateral foreign aid arrangement with the government (through the ministry). 
Financial facilitation was largely supply-oriented and based on “take it or leave it” principles. 
42 KIU 20, 21, 27. 
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schemes’ operations.43 In response, most affected communities sought other alternative 
water sources whose quality and reliability was hardly guaranteed. 
 
Despite the investments, revenue collection stagnated.44 By the end of the 1990s, NWSC 
debts amounted to more than US$45 53 million (Muhairwe, 2009). The national utility 
was “broke and did not have anything. (The utility) had to simply borrow money to pay 
(its) staff”.46 Moreover, NWSC management was found incompetent, non-transparent and 
corrupt. 47  Staff productivity was estimated at 36 staff per 1000 connections against 
Africa’s best practice of less than 10 employees per 1000 connections (Muhairwe, 2009). 
Each NWSC employee and her/his immediate family were entitled to free medical care 
by the corporation. In most cases, however, employees’ extended family members and 
friends benefited also from the free health care policy (Muhairwe, 2009: 339). The 
corporations’ operating costs (related to energy, personnel, transport, security expenses, 
etc) resulted in monthly deficits of about 384 million Ugandan Shillings48 (Muhairwe, 
2009). Direct investments into infrastructural projects through NWSC “were similar to 
sinking 100 million dollars into a company that does not operate meaningfully”.49  
 
The World Bank in particular, redefined its investment strategy from direct infrastructural 
development and capacity building, to the facilitation of the Water Sector Reforms Study 
in June 1999.50 Plans for the study had started in September 1997 but, faced severe 
resistance until mid 1999. To assert its seriousness in launching the study, the World 
Bank warned that “if you (the MMWR) do not do the study this time, we will not give you 
any money both for investment and capacity building”.51  
 
 
                                                      
43 KIU 4, 10, 20. 
44 KIU 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 19. 
45 American dollar. 
46 KIU 23. 
47 KIU 10, 13, 15, 24, 26. For instance as noted by KIU 6, some staff colluded with customers to underestimate their 
water consumption bills. 
48 About US$ 354, 571; 1997 equivalent (http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates). 
49 KIU 23 and confirmed by KIU 3. 
50 KIU 15, 23. 
51 KIU 15, who was involved in the World Bank facilitated Water Sector Reforms Study that commenced in June 1999. 
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2.5 Politics in the Ugandan urban water sector: Nature and implications 
 
This section describes how global water politics interplayed with institutions and 
stakeholders at the politics of policy level in Uganda. The nature and implications of this 
interaction are examined.  
 
2.5.1 From privatization to commercialization 
As part of the Economic Recovery Programme (hereafter, ERP), the World Bank 
pressured for the privatization of the public sector in Uganda (Kuteesa et al., 2010). This 
ERP essentially emulated Structural Adjustment Programmes (henceforth, SAPs) 
implemented elsewhere, globally. SAPs austerity measures were conditioned on loans 
granted to most transition and low income countries and advanced as the only macro-
economic and human development strategy by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund.52 During this time, the World Bank acted as a global knowledge broker 
that mediated, performed and championed exemplary policy models often as the one and 
only solution (cf. Rap, 2006). In Uganda “…privatization was advanced as the only best 
way of running urban water services provision”.53  
 
The Ugandan urban water sector conformed to the World Bank’s pressures through the 
Ministry of Finance. 54  In 1997, NWSC was enlisted for full privatization by the 
Privatization unit of the Ministry of Finance as provided by the Public Enterprises 
Privatization and Divestiture (PEPD) statute.55 In the same year, the Local Government 
Act Cap 243 (RoU, 2008) and the Water Act Cap 152 (RoU, 1997) were enacted. These 
Acts allowed for service provision decentralization and private sector participation, 
respectively. 
 
The Water Sector Reform Study facilitated by the World Bank proposed the procurement 
of a single lease contract for the then 33 largest towns and a management contract for the 
remaining small towns overseen by the Water and Sanitation Development Agency 
                                                      
52 For an overview of the nature and effects of SAPs, see SAPRIN, 2004 (and the references therein). 
53 KIU 1. 
54 KIU 17, 18, 25. 
55 KIU 4, 12, 15, 20. 
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(MWLE, 2001). Other proposed privatization options included the (i) formation of an 
Urban Water Alliance under a management contract to provide water supply services to 
all 78 urban towns under an Alliance Board oversight, (ii) procurement of a single lease 
for all 78 urban towns, and the (iii) procurement of a single concession contract for the 3 
largest urban towns (Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja) and other private operators for the rest 
towns, under management contracts  (MWLE, 2001).  
 
To advance its intended reforms, the World Bank sponsored several senior urban water 
sector employees to attend trainings, workshops and conferences related to infrastructure 
and public service privatization (Muhairwe, 2009). These activities were mainly targeted 
at preparing the sector for increased private sector involvement. In addition, the World 
Bank facilitated a study tour of key sector stakeholders, including top ministerial 
functionaries, as part of the Water Sector Reform Study to Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Senegal. These countries represented cases where private sector involvement was already 
in existence or was being pursued.56 
 
Between 1998 and 2001, the World Bank facilitated the procurement of the first 
international private operator for the city of Kampala.57 A German engineering company, 
H.P. Gauff Engineers, was contracted on a 3-year management contract to run the 
Kampala Revenue Improvement Programme (hereafter, KRIP) (NWSC, 2003). While 
KRIP contract excluded water production and sewerage services provision, it was meant 
to comparatively distinguish private from public sector performance (NWSC, 2001). 
More so and “given that Kampala was NWSC’s cash cow58, successful performance of 
the private operator would eventually lead to (justify) similar contracts across the rest 
urban towns”.59 This initial contract with an international private operator was largely 
seen as a “transition to full-fledged privatization” (Muhairwe, 2009:12) but did not yield 
much success. 60  Following the end of the contract, a second international private 
                                                      
56 KIU 15, 27. 
57 KIU 3, 5, 10, 13, 18, 27. 
58 With the highest active customers and generating about 70 per cent of NWSC’s total revenue (Muhairwe, 2009). 
59 KIU 9 and also noted by KIU 10. 
60 KIU 3, 5, 10, 13, 18, 27. For a detailed discussion of how and why this privatization pilot failed, see Muhairwe, 
2009. 
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operator, ONDEO Services, was contracted between 2002 and 2004 (NWSC, 2003). This 
contract was again facilitated by the World Bank but was also, not very successful.61  
 
2.5.2 Contesting privatization 
As a minimum requirement, all reforms require rules and legal frameworks to guide and 
sustain them (Patashnik, 2008). The enactment of supporting legislation however, is not a 
guarantee for successful (non-disputable) reforms implementation. In the case of Uganda, 
legal frameworks that allowed for privatization were easily accepted and implemented. 
Related organizational reforms were nonetheless, much more problematic and 
contested.62 Organizational changes that would logically ensue from privatization were 
particularly opposed by the new NWSC’s Management Board that was instituted in 
1998. 63  The Board resisted the Water Sector Reform Study’s recommendation to 
privatize NWSC arguing that the World Bank’s push to privatize the national utility, 
packaged in numerous conditionalities, was “irritating and humiliating” (Muhairwe, 
2009: 259). 64  Officials within NWSC preferred “home-grown alternatives” to the 
“misleading ready-made solutions” by the World Bank (Muhairwe, 2009: 178, 280-282).  
 
Having witnessed the privatization of other state owned enterprises including the Uganda 
Commercial Bank, Uganda Grain Millers and the Uganda Posts and Telecommunication 
Corporation, NWSC privatization “for ordinary employees meant in practice, the loss of 
jobs - the only source of income and means of livelihood, and the premature termination 
of careers” (Muhairwe, 2009: 333).65 Moreover, privatization was seen to compromise 
the corporation’s autonomy in decision making. External financiers, especially those who 
advanced privatization, were perceived as presumptuous, overbearing, intrusive and self-
servicing (Muhairwe, 2009). NWSC preferred to self-regulate its operations with minimal 
                                                      
61 KIU 3, 5, 10, 13, 18, 27. See also Muhairwe, 2009 and NWSC, 2003. 
62 KIU 1, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 23, 26, 27. 
63 KIU 1, 9, 12. 
64 Moreover, as noted by KIU 15 who also took part in the study tour that was part of the Water Sector Reform Study, 
privatizing Ugandan’s urban water industry through concessionary arrangements was not an option following a similar 
failed pursuit for Accra city in Ghana. Similar observations were noted by KIU 10 and KIU 23. 
65 Similar observations were made by KIU 3, 9, 10, 11. 
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or no interference from international financiers, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Water, Lands and Environment (hereafter, MWLE).66  
 
In order to resist privatization, NWSC’s top management developed a broad coalition of 
stakeholders. The management sought support of the corporation’s Board of Directors, its 
Service Area managers, its staff, the media and the Uganda Public Employee Union.67 
Moreover, although the Ministry of Finance and the MWLE (through the Directorate of 
Water Development) officially supported the Water Sector Reform Study 
recommendations, 68 some officials within the government preferred sector 
commercialization under public ownership. These influential senior government officials 
provided crucial support for NWSC’s efforts to resist privatization.  
 
2.5.3 Stronger bargaining position for the NWSC 
The home-grown alternatives preferred by NWSC, came in the form of 
commercialization. Commercialization entails changes in water supply institutions with 
the application of private sector culture that emphasizes efficiency, effectiveness, 
competition and economic equity advancements (Bakker, 2002). Smith (2004) refers to 
this commercialization phase as the second wave of neoliberalization. WUs remained 
government-owned, but were organized as autonomous corporations according to private 
sector principles and management practices.   
 
In 1999, the 100-day programme was rolled-out by the new NWSC management.69 The 
programme aimed at improving water and sewerage services production, increasing 
potable water distribution, strengthening revenue collection and costumer care 
improvement (NWSC management, 1999). As noted by then Managing Director of 
NWSC,  the  “100-Day programme was meant to serve as a beacon of performance 
                                                      
66 KIU 12, 13. 
67 KIU 1. 
68 KIU 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20. 
69 Confirmed also by KIU 15.  
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measure that must be maintained to ensure the viability of NWSC irrespective of the 
looming privatization” (Muhairwe, 2009: 31).70  
 
More so, NWSC instituted Area Performance Contracts that were later substituted with 
the Internally Delegated Area Management Contracts (hereafter, IDAMCs).71 IDAMCs 
are internal management contracts (between NWSC the Head Office and the Area service 
providers that constitute all gazetted large urban towns) that emulate the management 
contracts of the Office of Water in England and Wales (Muhairwe, 2009). The IDAMCs 
introduced decentralized autonomous service provision, performance-based management 
and competition through benchmarking.  
 
Best performers based on prior set targets are quarterly rewarded with bonuses, cash 
prizes, trophies and promotions; but chronic poor performers, for more than 3 
consecutive months, are demoted or laid off.72 In  implementing  these  reforms,  NWSC,  
“used the shadow of privatization to spur staff productivity” (Muhairwe, 2009: 259, see 
also Table 2.2). Internal reforms that introduced private sector institutions and practices 
that under other circumstances would have been difficult to implement, became feasible 
under the looming privatization. Introduction of these efficiency-oriented reforms 
improved the performance of the national utility (see Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2:   NWSC Performance, 1998 – 2010 
Indicator 1998 2004 2010¢ 
Unaccounted-for-water (as a percentage of the total water produced) 49 %¥ 37.6 %Ȝ 33.3% 
Staff productivity (total staff per 1000 connections) 36‡ 10Ȝ 6 
Service coverage 48 %į 65 %Ȝ 74 % 
Connections (total active water supply accounts) 34,272¥ 100,475Ȝ 246,459 
Collection efficiency 71 %¥ 98 %® 100 % 
Source: NWSC management, 1999 (¥); NWSC, 2003 (‡); Mugisha, 2008 (į); NWSC, 2004 (Ȝ), NWSC, 2009a (®) and NWSC, 
2010 (¢).  
Service coverage: Total population served with piped water supplies within NWSC’s service area. 
Collection efficiency: Percentage of the revenue collected from billed water/expected revenue from all billed water. 
 
                                                      
70 Analogous programmes were initiated by the Dar es salaam Water and Sewerage Corporation (after the exit of City 
Water private operator in 2005) and the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company between November 2005 and February 
2006. The nature, successes and failures of these 100-days change programmes (including the NWSC’s 100 
programme) are discussed in Schouten and Buyi (2010).  
71 KIU 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24. 
72 KIU 1, 4, 5, 6. 
 46
2.6 Global politics in shaping national reform trajectories 
 
This section discusses how global politics shaped national urban water sector reform 
paths especially, in Uganda. We draw from the fact that the context in which water sector 
reforms were implemented globally had changed considerably by 2003. First of all, the 
threat of privatization had diminished by 2003 as the privatization policy had lost 
momentum internationally. Various high-profile privatization projects were cancelled, 
faced technical or financial difficulties (Prasad, 2008).  
 
In 2000, the concession contract in Cochabamba, Bolivia, was terminated following a 
period of unrest described as the “Water War” (Perreault, 2006:150).73 Other highly-
publicized urban water contracts, such as those in Manila and Jakarta, faced substantial 
operational challenges (Jensen, 2005; Braadbaart, 2007; Prasad, 2008). Besides costs 
incurred prior to or during these privatization periods, affected countries faced an 
additional “burden of paying compensation to private companies that (had) failed to 
deliver but (were) entitled by contract to receive such payments” (Castro, 2009:28). 
 
Not only did international organizations become more hesitant to promote privatization 
but the private sector itself also, appeared less interested in fostering water projects in 
developing countries (see Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2009 for an overview of 
international private sector investments in the water sector between 1995 and 2004). As 
noted by the Chairman and CEO (Chief Executive Officer) of SAUR International, these 
concessionary or full divestiture arrangements were based on unrealistic convictions that 
the private sector has unlimited funds and is able to engage in good business whereby 
“water pays for water” (Talbot, 2002:20). More over, there were attempts to apply costly 
European standards in developing countries yet, providers were not able to recover 
related investment costs solely, from service users. Faced with such limitations, investors 
sought “other potentially more remunerative markets” (Talbot, 2002:18). 
 
                                                      
73 Analogous cancellations occurred in Argentina (Tucumán), Atlanta, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chad, Mali (Bamako), 
Senegal (Conakry) and Tanzania (Dar es Salam) ĺ see Zanetta (2001: 525), Auriol and Blanc (2009: 213) and Twort 
et al. (2000). 
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In exemplifying this shift for instance, one of the leading international private operators, 
SUEZ (now SUEZ Environment), indicated that it would only “concentrate on the 
soundest markets that provided the most recurrent revenues starting with the Franco-
Belgium domestic market and including the European Union and North America” 
(SUEZ, 2003:2). The Action Plan continued to explain that “exposure to emerging 
countries, as measured by the capital employed, was expected to be reduced by close to 
one third” (SUEZ, 2003:2).  
 
In other words, the international private sector was becoming less willing to be involved 
in providing services in developing countries. At the same time, the World Bank, which 
had been one of the strongest promoters of private sector involvement, found itself 
confronted with disappointing levels of lending to the water supply and sanitation sector. 
Lending decreased by more than two-thirds between 1996 and 2002 (World Bank, 2005).  
 
The strong decline in lending to the water supply and sanitation sector by the World Bank 
(through loans and guarantees by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the International Development Agency), led to a policy shift in the 
Bank. Roughly speaking from 2003 onwards, the World Bank set to engage itself again 
with public sector WUs (Baietti et al., 2006; Prasad, 2008). In ‘re-engaging’ itself with 
public service providers, for example, the World Bank implicitly acknowledged that the 
promise of large-scale private sector involvement as it was envisioned in the early 1990s 
did not live up to expectations. By 2003, the “privatization decade” (Franceys, 2008) 
roughly came to an end. 
 
At the same time, the bargaining position of NWSC was strengthened between 2000 and 
2004 as a result of the impressive performance improvements highlighted for example in 
Table 2.2. These performance improvements propelled NWSC’s reputation, globally.74 
Increasingly, the national utility was presented at international water fora as a successful 
reformer. Along with this exposure came the international recognition for the utility, 
which further boosted its bargaining position in the reform process. Also within Uganda 
                                                      
74 Noted also by KIU 4. 
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the  reputation  of  NWSC  grew.  NWSC  was  seen  as  the  most  capable  organization  to  
manage rehabilitated water systems. Between 2001 and 2006, eight additional towns 
were transferred to the service area of NWSC by the MWLE (Nabakiibi and Schwartz, 
2009).  
 
One of the most important consequences of gaining international recognition was that 
NWSC was able to capture the attention of alternative external financiers. This greatly 
reduced its dependency on the World Bank and the accompanying policy prescriptions 
and further strengthened its bargaining position. These external financiers, such as the 
German Development Bank (KfW) and the European Union, replaced the World Bank as 
the dominant external financier. These financiers placed less emphasis on NWSC’s 
privatization, as long as the process of commercialization was continued.75 For NWSC, 
this conditionality was easily accepted, - as commercialization was very much in line 
with the prevailing organizational strategy and interests of the utility. Commercialization 
with its emphasis on financially autonomous agencies meant that, as long as performance 
would remain in line with sector expectations, NWSC would have considerable 
autonomy to make decisions.  
 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
Using the case of the Ugandan urban water sector, this chapter divulged that decision-
making regarding the direction of public utility reforms is a highly political process 
involving actors operating at multiple levels. At the global level, the World Bank, 
adhering to its global policy of promoting private sector involvement, strongly pushed for 
the privatization of the urban water industry in Uganda. As the reform process continued, 
however, the respective bargaining positions of different actors started to change. 
Internationally, privatization as a reform policy started to lose momentum as large-scale 
contracts collapsed or faced operational difficulties. Increasingly, the international private 
companies became hesitant to embark on new privatization initiatives.  
 
                                                      
75 Analogues observations were made by KIU 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27.  
 49
While legal frameworks that allowed for privatization were easily adopted, related 
organizational reforms were strongly resisted. A coalition incorporating the NWSC’s 
management board, senior officials in the Ugandan government ministries and the media 
opposed organizational reforms associated with privatization. The NWSC further 
strengthened its bargaining position by displaying remarkable performance improvements 
which captured the attention of the international water community. The ensuing access to 
funds from alternative external financiers meant that dependency on the World Bank 
loans diminished. Using its strengthened bargaining position, the NWSC managed to 
shift the direction of the initial organizational reforms from complete privatization to 
sector commercialization that was more in line with the utility's interests.  
 
What we learn from this chapter is that, reform processes in urban water supply are 
inherently political in nature. As power relations among actors at both global and national 
policy levels transform overtime and space, initial reform strategies mold and reshape in 
line with the interests of the most hegemonic actor - at either or both policy levels. 
Organizational changes that entail the loss of control/power by incumbent (public utility) 
managers are largely contested than the crafting or amendment of existing legislative and 
institutional frameworks.   
 
Chapter 3 extends this investigation to examine what these mean for policies, institutions 
and organizations at the national sector level. While similar developments are observed 
for the Zambian urban water case (discussed in Chapter 3), we use a different conceptual 
approach to analyze the process. This helps us to provide a comprehensive understanding 
of the neoliberal reform process (i.e., from two African urban water sectors). 
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CHAPTER 3:   Analyzing water utility reform processes76 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The global water sector, as discussed in Section 2.3, has experienced multileveled 
governance shifts since the 1980s. Following the disappointing outcomes of the 
International Drinking Water Decade, global focus in dealing with urban water sector 
challenges shifted from an infrastructural to an institutional outlook. The latter, drawing 
from the then prevailing neoliberalistic ideology, was advanced to entail increased private 
sector participation (hereafter, PSP) in the production and provision of water services. 
Conversely however, initial PSP exercises faced different operational challenges as 
discussed in Section 2.6.  
 
Various reasons explain why it was difficult to establish functioning PSP especially, 
across the developing countries. First, high transaction costs undermined the successful 
operationalization of these projects (Hall and Lobina, 2005). These transaction costs 
manifested in legal, consulting and other financial expenditures incurred in PSPs’ 
establishment, risk management and in the establishment of regulatory structures. 
Second, the design of the first PSPs contracts in the early 1990s was conceptually flawed 
(Braadbaart, 2005). These flaws resulted into failed tenders and the suspension of 
contract negotiations. Besides, awarded contracts had to be renegotiated shortly after they 
became effective.  
 
Thirdly, designed PSP projects lacked matching regulatory structures prior, during and 
after their design (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Prasad, 2006). This followed the 
inadequate institutional capacities of the receiving sectors. Fourthly, contracted 
international water companies were largely profit-seeking and risk avoiding (Lobina and 
Hall, 2003). This behavior went against the main tenet of the water services sector in 
most developing countries - where water provision is considered not only an economic 
service but a social good with environmental benefits. 
                                                      
76 A modified version of this chapter is available as: Kemerink, J., Mbuvi, D., and Schwartz, K. (2012). Governance 
shifts in the water services sector: A case study of the Zambian water services sector. In Katko, T., Juuti, P., and 
Schwartz, K. Water services management and governance: Lessons for a sustainable future, IWA Publishing.  
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While the water privatization decade ended by 2003, this did not imply that the water 
services sector in developing countries and Africa in particular, returned to the service 
provision modalities of the decades before the onset of private sector involvement. 
Service provision remained public, but utilities were increasingly expected to operate in 
line with private sector management practices and principles (shifts to sector 
commercialization).  
 
These sector transformations motivate the current chapter’s inquiry in analyzing reform 
processes. We provide a framework for analyzing governance shifts in the water sector 
(see Section 3.2.1). We use the case of the Zambian urban water sector and focus on the 
neoliberalistic reform processes that characterized the sector between 1993 and 2010. We 
find that, although the momentum of involving private sector organizations in the 
provision of water services in Zambia may have diminished over time, private sector 
institutions have increasingly been incorporated in ‘public’ service provision modalities. 
 
Prior to discussing the main governance shifts across the Zambian urban water sector in 
section 3.3, the following section discusses the conceptual approach and methodology 
employed by the study.  Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
3.2 Conceptual approach and study methodology 
3.2.1 Conceptual approach 
In analyzing reform processes, this chapter distinguishes four mutually dependent 
governance structures. That is; policies, institutions, organizations and (existing) 
infrastructure or resources. Scott (2001) and Hage and Meeus (2006) define institutions 
as the agglomeration of rules, laws, routines, practices and habits that prescribe and 
regulate the behavior of markets (economic dimension), states (political science) and 
organizations, associations or individuals (sociological dimension). These institutions can 
either  be  imposed  on  actors  or  translated  to  fit  within  the  local  polity  conditions  
(Campbell, 2006). Relying on game theory, Aoki (2001:10) characterizes institutions as 
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self-sustaining systems of shared beliefs – about salient ways in which ‘the game is 
repeatedly played’ or the ‘rules of the game’ are repeatedly played.  
 
Furubotn and Richter (2005) define institutions as a set of formal and informal rules, 
including their enforcement arrangements. Rational actors acting for the public interest 
can consciously create these rules and their enforcement mechanisms or they can occur 
spontaneously. Furubotn and Richter institutional outlook borrows strongly from the new 
institutional economics that sees ‘institutions’ as devices for reducing transaction costs - 
that in turn, have cascading influences on entities’ performance. Transaction costs 
increase with uncertainty, delayed or uncoordinated decision making among actors. As 
costs increase, so does the performance (economic, political, social) of related actors’ 
decrease. These studies bunch-up the ‘rules of the game’ with their enforcement 
arrangements and structures. Following Aoki (2001) however, it is not the semantics of 
words that matter, but how they are conceptualized in explaining specific phenomena. 
We treat these aspects separately.  
 
We understand institutions in  a  sociological  sense  in  that  they  comprise  the  social  
arrangements that shape, regulate and reproduce human behavior across time and space. 
These social arrangements may be formal in nature but can also be informal. At any 
given time and location, multiple institutions may co-exist (and possibly conflict) at the 
same time. Similar to earlier literature on the other hand, we see policies as the rules of 
the game that define and limit choices. Policies may be explicit - such as the Zambian 
National Water Policy of 1994. More so, they can be implicit or largely symbolic in 
nature. 
 
Hage and Meeus (2006) define organizations as the formal structures that are 
intentionally established for explicit purposes. Besides these formal structures, Furubotn 
and Richter (2005) broach the informal organizations that are spontaneously created by 
invisible hands (e.g., markets) for particular purposes. For the case at hand that relates 
specifically to the water services sector, we refer to these formal and informal structures 
as actors. We thus understand organizations to constitute those stakeholders that are 
 53
formally ascribed with the responsibility of providing services, developing policies 
and/or regulating the sector. They comprise of ministries, departments, asset holding 
agencies, regulators and utilities among others. Besides, we understand organizations to 
concern other actors that influence decision-making processes in the sector such as, non-
governmental entities.   
 
Policies, institutions and organizations continually interact given existing infrastructure 
(technology, resources, etc) and stretch across a polity continuum. See Figure 3.1. Similar 
to Mollinga (2008, explained earlier in Section 2.2.1), we distinguish the polity range. 
Analogous to chapter 2, we focus on shifts in governance structures (spheres) at the 
global and national water policy levels.  Shifts in governance spheres can manifest as 
either major or minor. Major shifts embody changes in either organizations, policies, 
institutions or the actual infrastructure, resources or technological choices that result into 
subsequent changes in another (or other) governance structure(s). Minor shifts reflect 
changes in one of the governance structures that may not lead to changes in other 
elements. Given this interaction, reform processes can be analyzed in terms of the 
prevailing mix of organizations, policies, institutions or actual infrastructure (resources or 
technological choices) that predominate the water services sector at a given time and 
space. 
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Figure 3.1:   An illustration of governance structures’ interdependence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Study methodology 
To explain governance shifts in the Zambian urban water sector, this chapter, similar to 
chapter 2 (see section 2.2.2), relies on both primary and secondary data sources. The 
former constitutes data gathered through in-depth face-to-face interviews with key urban 
water sector stakeholders across Zambia in August 2009. 27 key informants were 
interviewed (see Table 3.1) by use of both semi-structured and closed interview guides.77 
Key informants (referenced hereafter as KIZ) presumed to possess significant first hand 
information on the sectors’ developments since and before the country’s independence, 
were preferred. We added to and verified this interview data with related information 
                                                      
77 These were similar to the guide provided in Appendix 1. 
Organizations 
Policies 
Institutions 
Resources/infrastructure 
(i.e., the dark grey part) 
 
National Global 
Polity continuum 
 
Source: Authors illustration. 
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from archival sector reports and other relevant publications availed online or by the 
different interviewed stakeholders. 
 
Table 3.1:   Key informants interviewed in Zambia 
Organization Number of respondents 
1. NWASCO (water and sewerage services regulator) 4 
2. Devolution Trust Fundɀ 2 
3. Ministry of Energy and Water Development (MEWD)ȕ 2 
4. Ministry of Local Government and HousingȜ 3 
5. Lusaka Local Council¥ 1 
6. Lusaka Water and Sewerage Companyɻ 7 
7. CPs* : AfDB, DANIDA, UNICEF, GTZ and EUÿ 4 
8. NGOs: Water Aid and WASAZA (Programme managers) 2 
9. Environmental Council of Zambia (Director) 1 
10. Private consultant in water and energy development (former  
      Permanent Secretary of the MEWD) 
1 
TOTAL 27 
NWASCO: The National Water Supply and Sanitation Council, DANIDA: Danish International Development Agency, WASAZA: 
Water and Sanitation Association of Zambia. The rest as earlier defined. 
 Chief Managers in charge of corporate, customer, financial, public relations and technical affairs. 
ɀ Fund manager and the socio-economic specialist. 
ȕ Directors and managers of information, planning and water resources & supply affairs.  
Ȝ Urban water principal engineer and the Infrastructure support services director. 
¥ Community expert 
ɻ Managers in charge of audit, corporate affairs, customer relations, finance, peri-urban, public relations and sewerage services. 
ÿ Programme managers, Water and sanitation specialists and Water governance heads.  
* We were unable to reach any informant from the Water and Sanitation Programme of the World Bank in Zambia. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Governance shifts in the Zambian urban water services sector 
 
We first provide an historical overview of the Zambian urban water services sector. 
Subsequently, we discuss the governance shifts that took place in the sector. We examine 
how policy changes interplayed with subsequent organizational and institutional 
transformations given the existing resources (infrastructure) in the sector.  
 
3.3.1 Historical overview of the urban water sector 
Demand increases with the rise of new developmental sites (breweries, abattoirs, 
bakeries, residential estates, etc) in the late 1960s challenged the socialist government 
that was at the same period, experiencing severe fiscal crises. Real gross domestic 
product (hereafter, GDP) growth declined from 7.1 (1970) and 2.5 (1975) percent to 0.1 
percent in 1980 (Barry, 1990). Global oil prices increased as national earnings, largely 
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from copper exports, declined. Investments as a percentage of the GDP declined from 29 
(1970) and 18 (1980) percent to 10 percent in 1988 (Barry, 1990, see also Cocq, 2005). 
Resultantly, subsidies to public services including water supply, shrunk (Barry, 1990; 
GoZ, 2006).78  
 
The Department of Water Affairs (hereafter, DWA) under the Ministry of Water, Land 
and Natural Resources (hereafter, MWLNR) developed water resources, built water 
supply infrastructure (rural and urban), supplied water and provided sewerage services to 
district townships as well as, designed and enforced sector legislation. A water board 
established in 1946 regulated (only surface) water resource abstraction. Water and 
sewerage service provision including user tariffs, services quality and systems 
functionability was unregulated.79 Water departments (alike other public offices) became 
unattractive to skilled personnel.80   
 
To bridge the gap in water provision, other line ministries including the Ministries of 
Works, Health, Education and Local government and housing provided water supply 
services to government institutions, hospital employees, schools and the rest district 
townships through local authorities. Private organizations (including mining and other 
manufacturing companies) provided water and sewerage services to their employees 
(NWASCO, 2002). Non-governmental operators (local community groups, international 
organizations, etc) provided water and sewerage services in the form of projects or water 
trusts.81 Formal urban areas were firstly prioritized while “attention to the non-planned 
peri-urban regions was only after (or  as  a  response  to) water borne and water related 
disease outbreaks”.82 By nature, this multiplicity in water services provision resulted in 
activities duplication, information asymmetries and piecemeal projects that relied on 
erratic funds.83  
 
                                                      
78 Similar observations were made by KIZ 1, 9, 13, 27.  
79 KIZ 5, 20. 
80 As investments to the sector became negligible, skilled personnel attraction and retention became a challenge – noted 
KIZ 1, 2, 27. 
81 KIZ 10. 
82 KIZ 15, similar observations by KIZ 2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 20, 27. 
83 KIZ 4, 5, 10, 13, 27. 
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Water supply at the district townships was part of the overall public service provision 
mandate of the local authorities as provided in the Local Government Act Cap 281 (GoZ, 
1991).84  Local authorities conjointly provided water and sewerage services with other 
council services including urban planning and drainage, road development, street 
lighting, education, cemetery, health, fire fighting, rural water supply, housing and solid 
waste disposal. Revenue from these services was banked in a common account from 
where allocations to the different departments (based on perceived needs) were made. 
Being among the few revenue-generating utility services, accrued water and sewerage 
service revenue (i) subsidized other council services and (ii) was used for other personnel 
costs such as, to remunerate council members’ allowances. Fewer (or no) funds were 
(re)invested in water mains extension and maintenance (Opio-Lukone, 2003, Cocq, 
2005).85  
 
Local authorities/councils owned most of the urban residential houses. Own-council 
tenants hardly paid their utility bills as they owned the houses and provided all related-
utility services. Utility services’ user fees were incorporated in the monthly housing rent. 
This aggregation concealed the true economic value of clean piped water supply and 
constrained any efforts to monitor and control wasteful water consumption. Moreover, “if 
a property was disconnected for non-payment, its occupants alternatively drew water 
from their neighbors who hardly felt the pinch of such extra usage since billing was 
based on a fixed monthly assessment”.86  
 
It was a challenge for the water departments to identify and confront water-bill defaulters. 
First, regulatory capacities within the departments and DWA lacked.87 Secondly, related 
perpetrators constituted sensitive government institutions (hospitals, police barracks, etc) 
or officials (ministers, city mayors and their allies).88 “If a government department (or 
official’s residence) was disconnected for non-payment, we (DWA management) would 
                                                      
84 KIZ 27. 
85 KIZ 12, 20. 
86 KIZ 6 and echoed by KIZ 27. 
87 KIZ 18, 20, 26. 
88 KIZ 27. 
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get phone calls from allover to reconnect the disconnected premises without discourse”.89  
This continued until the late President Levy Mwanawasa “strongly instructed the 
controlling officers in the government (ministers, etc) to promptly settle their 
departmental and residential municipal water bills from their centrally allocated 
ministerial utility allowances”.90  Through the then Secretary to the treasury, the late 
President instructed DWA in writing to “treat all government officials as the rest 
customers and disconnect them if they defaulted their water consumption bills”.91   
 
3.3.2 Policy changes 
Soon after the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981/1990), 
the first multi-party government was elected in Zambia. Providing water services 
remained a challenge to the new government. Lusaka province where the country’s 
capital city is located, received for example, less than 2 hours of daily water supply 
(Nyumbu et al., 1997). More than 60 percent of the distributed water was lost through 
illegal connections. About 72 percent of the then formally connected customers in Lusaka 
province were discontent with the services reliability, sufficiency and quality (Nyumbu et 
al., 1997).92 As noted by KIZ 20, it was impossible to maintain constant water supplies as 
demand outstripped existing supply schemes’ capacities. 
 
With the support of, respectively, GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) and KfW 
(German Development Bank), Lusaka and Chipata local authorities transformed their 
water schemes into water and sewerage companies in 1989 and 1992. 93  These 
commercial utilities were purposely established as pilots in experimenting whether and 
how local authorities could cost-effectively provide universal and affordable quality 
water supply services and ultimately, increase revenues. However, elected water board 
                                                      
89 KIZ 6. 
90 KIZ 6, 10, 25. 
91 KIZ 6. 
92 Such dissatisfaction was not  unique for  Lusaka inhabitants  but  also among other  customers  nationally  as  noted by 
KIZ 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 15, 17. 
93 KIZ 16. 
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members to the newly established companies were mainly political appointees (e.g., city 
mayor or other council members).94  
 
These political appointees were hardly familiar with the operation and management of 
WUs. It was hard to hold the board members accountable. Routine maintenance was 
neglected to the detriment of the few existing water production and supply systems. 
Sector subsidization was likened to “putting money into a hole”95. At the same time the 
economic downturn that characterized the country since the 1970s 96  meant that the 
Zambian government had few funds to invest in the water services sector. Between 1990 
and 1995, budget allocation for investments in the water service sector dropped from US$ 
4.3 million to US$ 0.9 million (Nyumbu et al., 1997). 
 
Further reforms were initiated shortly after the establishment of the pilot utilities in 
Lusaka and Chipata provinces. Consensus existed between the various stakeholders in the 
Zambian urban water sector that the causes of poor performance could be backtracked to 
the sector’s legislative, institutional and organizational ‘weaknesses’ (Chanda, 2000). In 
addressing these weaknesses, additional reforms were initiated in 1993. These latter 
reforms correlated with other neoliberal restructuring programmes introduced in Zambia 
under the auspices of the World Bank (Cocq 2005, Opio-Lukone, 2003).97  
 
These restructuring programmes reflected strongly, the PSP focus of the World Bank 
(GoZ, 2006). By 1994 the government of Zambia adopted the National Water Policy and 
the Institutional Framework for Water Supply and Sanitation. These were designed by the 
Water Sector Development Group (hereafter, WSDG) under the oversight of the Inter-
ministerial Programme Coordination Unit (hereafter, PCU) established by the Cabinet 
(Nyumbu et al., 1997). In steering sector restructuring, the documents provided for the98:  
 
                                                      
94 KIZ 13, 20, 27. 
95 KIZ 20. 
96 Per capita income fell from US$ 752 in 1965 to US$ 351 in 2002 (Dagdeviren 2008:103). 
97 Analogous observations were made by KIZ 2, 24, 25.  
98 Noted also by KIZ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27. 
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o Isolation of water resources development from water supply and sanitation 
provision 
o Separation of regulatory and executive functions from water resource 
development and services provision   
o Devolution of water supply mandates to local authorities and private enterprises 
o Full cost recovery – in the long run 
o Human resource development – for effective institutions 
o Use of appropriate technologies that are suitable to and informed by local 
conditions, and 
o Increased sector prioritization by the government – reflected in improved 
budgetary allocations. 
 
To provide a legal basis for the reform’s implementation, the WSDG prepared the first 
legal draft by 1995. Following a period of consultation, the revised draft was submitted to 
the Ministry of Legal Affairs. Over a period of 18 months, the proposed legislation was 
discussed by the Ministries of Local Government, Energy and Water Development. By 
November 1997, the parliament enacted the Water Supply and Sanitation Act (WUP, 
2001). 
 
 
3.3.3 Institutional shifts 
Based on the policy principles set forth in the National Water Policy, private sector 
institutions (emphasizes on the economic value of potable water provision, performance 
management, quasi-competition, etc), were introduced in the water services sector. These 
institutions were fundamentally advanced to allow the sector attain full cost recovery by 
2010 and ultimately, universal urban water services coverage (NWASCO, 2005:13, see 
also Dagdeviren, 2008). User fees were readjusted in attempts to achieve full-cost 
recovery.  
 
In 2005, the national water regulator approved nationally, tariff adjustment proposals 
ranging from 20 to 50 percent increases in user tariffs (NWASCO, 2005). To stimulate 
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efficiency, the national regulator introduced quasi-competition through benchmarking 
(based on one-dimensional measures - refer to Section 1.4.1). Over these benchmarking 
exercises, utilities’ performance is assessed and published annually in comparative sector 
reports. These ‘internal competition’ exercises motivate previous-poorly performing 
utilities to outperform their peers and/or perform as the benchmark/best-practice utilities 
(NWASCO, 2005).  
 
Based on the sector principles as provided by the National water policy, arm’s-length 
utilities’ operation – i.e., by the government was advanced. Given Zambia’s inability to 
sustain water services sector subsidization, ‘agencification’ of service providers was 
pursued. 99  Agencification refers to “the conversion of government-departments that 
previously operated in a hierarchical chain […] into semi-autonomous [agencies]” (van 
Donge 2002: 315). These utilities, operating at arm’s length of the government, would be 
expected to reap the efficiency gains associated with private sector organizations. 
NWASCO, for example, argues that organizing utilities as autonomous agencies “gives 
more promise to the achievement of cost recovery leading to more sustainable provision 
of services” (NWASCO, 2006:6). 
 
 
3.3.4 Organizational changes 
Policies implemented by the mid 1990s (see section 3.3.2) influenced the organizational 
setup of the Zambian urban water services sector. A key element of the National Water 
Policy is that it called for the isolation and dedication of water resources development, 
services provision and sector regulation functions to separate entities. Water resources 
development included all activities linked to raw water mapping and abstraction for 
agricultural, municipal and industrial use. Water services provision entailed operations 
associated with the (i) development of raw water pumping, storage, treatment, 
distribution and waste water disposal infrastructure, (ii) systems maintenance and (iii) the 
overall water supply management. Regulatory functions included tasks such as ‘service 
                                                      
99 KIZ 10. 
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areas’ delineation, tariffs approval, standards design and enforcement as well as, service 
providers’ licensing.  
 
First, as provided by the 1997 Water Supply and Sanitation Act, an independent 
regulatory agency - the National Water Supply and Sanitation Council (hereafter, 
NWASCO) was established in 2000.100 The design and implementation of this regulatory 
structure was mainly informed by the ‘British-regulatory’ framework (Foster, 1996). Its 
organizational structure however, built on the existing PCU organs, in that, the PCU 
became the regulator. NWASCO’s board reports to the Zambian parliament through the 
Ministry of Energy and Water Development (hereafter, MEWD).101 
 
In its capacity102, NWASCO licenses service providers and regulates user tariffs and 
quality standards. The regulator is responsible for advising the government, licensed 
service providers and customers on matters related to services provision and 
management. This is for instance, accomplished through the Water Watch Groups 
(hereafter, WWGs), Part-time Inspectors (hereafter, PtIs) and desk officers. WWGs and 
PtIs were respectively established in 2002 and 2005 as volunteer customer groups and 
inspectors. They support NWASCO’s local regulatory activities including service 
provider’s supervision and customer care (NWASCO, 2009: 2010a: 2011). PtIs do not 
form part of the centralized NWASCO’s full-time personnel and thus allow for a 
decentralized regulatory outreach. By 2010, NWASCO engaged 9 WWGs and 17 PtIs 
(NWASCO, 2010b). Desk officers are assigned among NWASCO’s full-time staff to 
each licensed service provider for close regular performance monitoring and assessment. 
 
NWASCO arbitrates disputes among sector stakeholders. Dissatisfied actors can 
nonetheless seek redress from the Minister of MEWD and/or the high court of appeal.103 
The regulator in collaboration with other actors such as the Environmental Council of 
Zambia designs and enforces other health and environmentally-related guidelines. It 
                                                      
100 KIZ 2, 5, 6, 23. Alternatively, government departments can regulate the sector, but as noted by KIZ 5, 6, 9, 25 and 
27, these departments lack oversight boards and hence prone to political meddling and corruption. 
101 KIZ 5, 13, 23. 
102 KIZ 2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 20, 24, 27. 
103 KIZ 1. 
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hedges service provision activities against likely political capture possible especially, 
with the unpredictable government reshuffles. 104  To surmount probable regulatory 
capture, the regulator is largely financed by the (public) service providers. The latter 
contribute 2 percent of their turnover in the form of license fees. In 2003 when the 
contribution by the licensees was 1 percent of their turnover, license fees comprised 72 
percent  of  NWASCO’s  budget.  The  remaining  18  percent  was  financed  by  the  
government and other external financiers (NWASCO, 2004a). 
 
Second, the actual service providers changed. As part of the new organizational 
framework, water supply and sanitation responsibilities were devolved to Local 
authorities (city, municipal and district councils). This act provided local authorities with 
a number of options for organizing service delivery in their locality (GoZ, 1997). Local 
authorities could105: 
 
o Provide services through a section or department within the Local authority 
o Establish Commercial Utilities (hereafter, CUs). In this scenario, a local authority 
could establish a government-owned company (either on its own or jointly with 
other local authorities) and transfer responsibilities for providing services to this 
government-owned company. 
o Involve the private sector in providing services through management, lease, 
concession or build-operate and transfer contractual arrangements. Over the same 
period, a study by the English private operator Severn Trent (financed by the 
World Bank) examined the possibility of involving the private sector in service 
provision in Zambia. The study, using the case of Lusaka city, concluded that 
involving private operators by way of lease contracts was the most preferred 
reform strategy. After heated discussions on the study’s recommendations, 
however, the proposal was shelved-off (Cocq, 2005).106 
                                                      
104 These are exemplified by the erratic appointments of (i) ministers in the ministries of Local government and housing 
and Energy & water development and (ii) board members - some of whom are unfamiliar with the ministerial 
operations (KIZ 5, 10, 20, 22).   
105 Also pointed out by KIZ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 23. 
106 Moreover, attempts to involve a French private operator to improve water services provision at the Copper Belt 
region in the mid-1990s by the World Bank, were not successful (KIZ 2, 7, 9, 12, 20, 23). While the private operator 
only managed the existing infrastructure, user fees increased over the time of the contract (KIZ 16). 
 64
Eventually, the sector opted for the creation of government-owned regional CUs that 
would however, operate as private companies under the Zambian Law and according to 
commercial principles. The preference for CUs is strongly linked to the adherence of the 
private sector institutions described in section 3.3.3 and in particular, targeting the 
attainment of full cost-recovery. 107  Table 3.2 provides an overview of water service 
providers in Zambia since the 1970s. 
Table 3.2:   Water service providers in Zambia, 1997 - 2009 
Provider Before 1997 2004 2009 
Central government 46 0 0 
Local authorities 29 23 0 
Commercial utilities 2 51 11 
Private schemes* 7 10 6 
TOTAL 84 84 17 
Sources: NWASCO, 2004a: 2010a. 
*Constitute companies such as the Zambia Sugar PLC, Chilanga Cement, ZESCO, Konkola Copper Mines (KCM-Nampundwe), etc that 
supply water services to their employees as a fringe benefit (2010a). 
 
 
First, as evident in Table 3.2, service provision by the central or local governments has 
faded out since the early 2000. Reliance on CUs has become the dominant organizational 
mode for organizing services provision in the Zambian urban water sector. Secondly and 
in efforts to maximize potential scale economics, larger regional operators (CUs) have 
been established solely or conjointly by Local authorities.108 In 2000, six CUs (Kafubu, 
Mulonga, Nkana, North-Western, Southern and Western) were established by the PCU 
through the WSFG. In 2003, 2006 and 2009, three more CUs (Chambeshi, Lukanga and 
Luapula) were established, respectively. Chipata Water and Sewerage Company 
transformed into the Eastern Water and Sewerage Company after extra service areas 
besides Chipata town were delegated by NWASCO to the utility (NWASCO, 2011).  
 
As at 2009, the total number of service providers across the urban regions decreased from 
84 providers to 17 organizations. Richards et al. (2008) highlight the importance of CUs 
as a tool to pursue commercialization, especially, if they operate at optimal scales. By 
mandating CUs to provide services across multiple municipalities, the regulator/sector 
                                                      
107 KIZ 2, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 20, 25, 24. 
108 KIZ 2. 
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can “enable the realization of synergies and economies of scale and thus improve 
prospects for commercial viability” (Richards et al., 2008:20).  
 
CUs are regulated by NWASCO through ten-year renewable licenses. In these licenses, 
specific CU’s Service level guarantees and agreements (henceforth, SLG&A) are defined. 
These SLG&A define each CU’s services quality, continuity, coverage, reliability, cost-
efficiency, functionability and customer care targets (NWASCO, 2004a). Since 2008, the 
best performing CUs relative to these priori defined SLG&A are periodically rewarded 
through the Regulation by Incentive program (NWASCO, 2009). 
 
By 2010, CUs served 75 percent of the total urban population within licensed service 
areas in Zambia (see Table 3.3). This corresponded to about 4 million customers 
(NWASCO, 2010a). Moreover, this is equivalent to about 3 and 25 percent increase in 
coverage compared to service coverage levels in 2006 and 2002, respectively (see Table 
3.3). Over the same time, CUs have reduced their water losses and improved their 
metering and collection efficiencies among other key efficiency indicators.  
 
Table 3.3:   Urban water sector performance in Zambia, 2002 - 2010 
Indicator 2002 2006 2010 
Service coverage 60 % 73 % 75 % 
Total connections 182,600 213,053 293,796 
Metering ratio (metered/total connections) 21 % 39 % 55 % 
Water losses (unaccounted for water) 51 % 48 % 45 % 
Collection efficiency 60 % 77 % 86 % 
Staff per 1,000 connections 12 11 11 
Sources: NWASCO, 2002: 2006: 2010a. 
Service coverage: Served population/total urban population in licensed service areas. 
 
 
Third, as part of the reforms, water resource development functions have been delegated 
to  the  MEWD.109 Besides, the MEWD is responsible for the overarching water policy 
making. The physical planning of water supply and sanitation services is the mandate of 
the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) through the Department of 
Infrastructure Support Services (ZWP, 2008). Evidently, the organizational setup of the 
                                                      
109 KIZ 6, 16. 
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Zambian urban water sector is/has been strongly associated with the policies and 
institutions designed – following the reforms, to guide the sector. These developments are 
chronologically summarized in Table 3.4. Governance structures established prior to the 
reforms (as at 1993) are compared with those instituted at the onset or during the 
implementation of the neoliberal reforms.  
 
Table 3.4:   Shifts in policies, institutions and organizations in the Zambian urban water 
                    sector 
 
Governance structure Established as at 1993 Established by 2010 
Policies 
 
 
- Local Government Act Cap 281 
   (1991). 
 
- National Water Policy (1994, revised in 
   2010). 
- Water Supply and Sanitation Act (1997). 
   
Institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Non autonomous supply and 
   regulatory agencies. 
- Inexistent performance 
   management and benchmarking 
   practices. 
- No (full) cost recovery. 
- Self regulation. 
 
- Autonomous agencies (2000). 
- Performance management through SLG&A  
    (2001). 
- Benchmarking by use of partial indicators  
    (2002). 
- Quasi-competition (2002). 
- Incentive regulation (2008). 
- (Full) cost-recovery (2008). 
 
Organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Water boards as surface water 
   abstraction regulators (1946). 
- DWA under MWLNR as water 
   service developer and supplier 
   across district townships. 
- LAs as water service providers 
   across municipal/city councils. 
- Other multi providers as water 
   service providers especially, 
   where DWA and LAs’ services 
   lacked. 
- Lusaka LA transformed into 
  LWSC (1989). 
- Chipata LA transformed into  
  CWSC (1992). 
- Inter-ministerial PCU (by 1995). 
- Water sector development group (by 1995). 
- NWASCO as an independent regulator  
   (2000).  
- MEWD & MLGH mandates separated 
   (2000). 
- Public commercial utilities (2000). 
- Water watch groups (2002). 
- Devolution trust fund (2003). 
- Part-time inspectors (2005). 
- Desk officers (2007). 
 
 
 
 
DWA: Department of water affairs, MWLNR: Ministry of water, land and natural resources (changed into the MEWD in 1992), 
LAs: Local authorities,  Multi providers: Other ministries such as the ministry of local government and housing, private 
companies, local and international organizations, LWSC: Lusaka water and sewerage company, CWSC: Chipata water and 
sewerage company, SLG&A: Service level guarantees & agreements, PCU: Programme coordination unit, MEWD: Ministry of 
energy and water development. 
 
 
3.3.5 Enabling environment for change 
Governance shifts at the policy, institutional and organizational spheres since the 1990s 
in Zambia have been supported and made possible by the availability of technical, 
financial and political support at both global and national polity levels. First, in executing 
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its responsibilities towards increased sector commercialization, the WSFG received both 
technical and financial support from the Germany (GTZ110 and KfW) and Norwegian111 
governments.112  Technical support was in the form of institutional development and 
capacity building programmes, among other aspects.  
 
GTZ among other partners has been a “faithful partner to the Zambian water sector since 
the early 1990s. Compared to the World Bank, the Germany corporate partners literally 
maintain their technical assistant officers on the ground.113 “The World Bank gives you 
(CU) a loan, workshop and two tones of analytical work followed by the signing of the 
terms of reference”.114 The German partners have physically maintained their technical 
staff in the form of ‘management advisors’, etc., within the MEWD, MLGH and in some 
CUs including the Eastern Water and Sewerage Company.  
 
Secondly, the Germany government facilitated the transformation of the Inter-ministerial 
PCU into an independent regulator (NWASCO) in 2000. The Danish International 
Development Agency with support of the GTZ (until 2010) supports NWSCO’s 
benchmarking exercises through the “Regulation by Incentive” program (NWASCO, 
2010a: 2011). Thirdly in 2003, the Germany government pioneered the establishment of 
the Devolution Trust Fund (hereafter, DTF). Initially, DTF was instigated to facilitate the 
establishment and development of regional CUs in Zambia.115  
 
Overtime and with the support of other external financiers (Danish government, the 
European Union, etc), the fund has primarily being used to subsidize water supply and 
sanitation service provision projects across the peri-urban areas (NWASCO, 2010a: 
2011).116 These projects are funded from the ‘general fund’ portfolio of DTF through 
established regional CUs. On the other hand, CUs’ performance improvement activities 
                                                      
110 Since 2010, GTZ merged its activities globally with the German Development Service (DED) and the Capacity 
building International (Inwent) to form the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
organization. 
111 Through the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation. 
112 KIZ 4, 13, 20, 27. 
113 KIZ 23 
114 KI 22 
115 These developments are further summarized in Table 3.4. 
116 KIZ 13. 
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(including, meter installations) are funded from the ‘performance enhancement revolving 
fund’ portfolio of DTF. CUs obtain these latter funds in the form of loans (NWASCO, 
2010a: 2011). 
 
Fourthly, the water sector reform processes have benefited from increased internal 
technical capacity building.117 Since 2000, urban water sector employees in Zambia have 
attained advanced training in water engineering, infrastructure development, utility 
regulation and management among other water-related courses from both national and 
international professional institutions supported by the Dutch, Danish and Germany 
governments, among others (NWASCO, 2006: 2010a: 2010b).  
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a four-tier framework for analyzing reform processes. In 
explaining neoliberalistic reform developments in the Zambian urban water sector, we 
distinguished four mutually dependent governance structures. At any given time after the 
introduction of the reforms, resultant organizational arrangements are found to mold on 
the established policies and institutions, given the prevailing infrastructure or resources at 
the national and global levels. 
 
Considering the Zambian urban water sector case, we draw a few lessons. First, under 
pressure from international financing agencies, policies in support of PSP were advanced 
in the 1990s. While these policies often called for the creation of private organizations to 
provide water services, actual full PSP (privatization) was postponed and ultimately 
suspended owing to the lack of support at the national water policy levels. PSP at national 
policy and legal framework discourses faced limited (or no) objection, but the actual 
replacement of public-owned WUs with privately-owned providers was strongly 
opposed.   
 
                                                      
117 KIZ 13, 20. 
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Secondly, the incorporation of private sector institutions in the sector continued with 
minimal opposition. Presently, the Zambian urban water sector is characterized by its 
endeavor to (i) increase utilities efficiency through quasi-competition induced for 
instance by the annual benchmarking exercises, (ii) achieve full cost–recovery in the 
long-run and eventually, (iii) attain complete effectiveness – that is, universal services 
coverage. Moreover, established utilities are regulated by an independent regulator as 
provided by the Water Supply and Sanitation Act. Thirdly, the inclusion of these private 
sector institutions was strongly promoted and supported by the existing resources 
(technical, financial, political, etc) and technology. These ‘enabling environmental 
elements’ have been supported by actors at both global and national policy domains.  
 
Fourthly, it is important to note that the urban water sector reforms implemented in 
Zambia in the past two decades are not specific to Zambia but mirror those introduced in 
other African countries such as Uganda, Namibia, Kenya and Mozambique. As such, an 
analogous conceptual framework can adaptively be used to characterize, explain and 
understand reform processes in, but not limited to the urban water sectors in these 
African countries. Chapter four explores the role of these governance shifts on urban 
WUs’ performance. 
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CHAPTER 4: Managerial ownership and urban water utilities efficiency118 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Given  marginal  investment  realities  across  urban  water  sectors  in  most  developing  
countries, the call for utilities’ operational efficiency advancement seems indisputably 
central. This is elemental, especially for Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia and South-
East Asia regions that experience unrivaled demands for qualitative water supplies. 
Among other factors, these regions face demographic e.g., high urbanization rates and 
varying geo-climatic challenges that threaten their raw water quantities and quality 
(UNICEF and WHO, 2011).  
 
To surmount WUs’ inefficiency, the Ugandan government like most African countries, 
embarked on diverse organizational and institutional water sector reforms in the late 
1990s (MWLE, 2001). Chapter 2 characterizes these reforms in detail. Following the 
neoliberalistic urban water sector reforms, service provision mandates for gazetted large 
and small urban towns were delegated to two agencies. The NWSC was responsible for 
the former towns while services provision for the small urban towns was the task of local 
governments (MWLE, 2001).  
 
Both NWSC and the local governments sign a renewable three year performance contract 
with the government – that is, the Ministry of Water and Environment (hereafter, MWE). 
Secondly, they own the respective water distribution assets on behalf of the government. 
Thirdly, they engage self-procured WUs through renewable three-year management 
contracts, to supply water on their behalf across towns under their mandate (MWLE, 
2001). Compared to long-term contractual arrangements, short term management 
contracts assure regular competitive bidding. The latter is decisive for utilities’ 
operational efficiency improvement (Seppala et al., 2001). Although susceptible 
however, to adverse selection problems - where parties hide useful information ex-ante 
                                                      
118 An earlier version of this chapter is available as: Mbuvi, D., and Tarsim, A. Managerial ownership and urban water 
utilities  efficiency in  Uganda,  UNU-MERIT Working Paper  2011-036.  We are  indebted to  the  participants  of  the  XI 
European Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity Analysis (EWEPA2009) conference for insightful remarks on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
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(e.g., actual infrastructure state, market size), short term management contracts are less 
vulnerable to post-contractual renegotiations predominant in long-term contractual pacts. 
Long-term contracts are prone to moral hazard problems related to unobserved or hidden 
contingencies that translate in high transaction costs to governments or regulators (Lane, 
2000; Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009).  
 
WUs under NWSC’s oversight are publicly owned. WUs under the local governments are 
privately owned as provided by the Local Government Act, Cap 243 (RoU, 2008). The 
MWE regulates and provides technical support to all urban WUs in Uganda (MWLE, 
2008). Regulation is tied to the a priori defined partial performance indicators as 
provided in the respective management contracts. 
 
In attempts to advance utilities operational efficiency given inherent resource limitations, 
it  is  worthwhile  to  examine  the  impact  of  these  organizational  forms  on  WU’s  
performance. Normally, traditional production frontier models (parametric or non-
parametric) are used to link actual produced outputs to optimal production levels defined 
by the best-practice frontier (Fried et al., 2008). This is often the case when observed 
firms or group of firms are homogenous in nature. Urban WU-groups in Uganda are 
however heterogeneous with respect to their managerial ownership and scale of 
operation. By implication, operational efficiency differences across both WU-groups 
depend on these structural differences, among other factors.  
 
We use the metafrontier technique based on DEA estimators (Rao et al., 2003; O’Donnell 
et al., 2007). The metafrontier approach is preferred for two main reasons. First, it 
permits us to capture specific utilities’ technical efficiency relative to each WU-group’s 
frontier. This is achieved by computing each WU’s distance to the specific WU-group’s 
frontier. Secondly, it allows us to estimate and explain technological differences/gaps 
between both WU-groups while taking into account between WU-groups’ heterogeneity. 
Here, we assess specific WU-group frontier’s distance to the best-practice technology 
available across the urban water supply sector in Uganda – i.e., as defined by the 
metafrontier.  
 72
Despite their advantages over econometric frontier techniques (see Section 1.4.1), two-
stage approaches (where WUs’ efficiency is computed in a first stage and then regressed 
on several external factors in a second stage) face several statistical limitations like the 
serial correlation of estimated values in both stages. This is a problem especially, in finite 
samples that can result in incorrect and misleading estimates. To overcome these 
limitations, we use the two-stage double bootstrap truncated regression technique (Simar 
and Wilson, 2007). The technique (i) allows us to mitigate the deterministic nature of the 
metafrontier technique and (ii) enables consistent inferencing while controlling for likely 
noise-impacts in the data (see also, Section 1.4.1). This enables us to examine whether 
WUs’ efficiency is different across both WU-groups in Uganda and whether other utility 
and sector specific environmental factors explain differences in efficiency between the 
groups.  
 
As evident in Annex 4.1, few efficiency assessments exist for urban water sectors in 
Africa. This is mainly due to data inexistency or/and inconsistency problems (Parker and 
Kirkpatrick, 2005; see also Sheshinski and Lòpez-Calva, 2003; Kun et al., 2007 and 
Walter et al., 2009 for other regions). We rely on self-collected operational data from 
both urban WU-groups in Uganda between 2005 and 2007. Since the late 1990s when the 
MWE  initiated  reforms  across  the  Ugandan  urban  water  sector,  limited  performance  
analyses that incorporate the sector’s complexity - in terms of multiple-input use and 
multi-output production, exist. Available annual performance assessment reports use 
partial rather than multidimensional performance indicators such as, the share of people 
with or without access to safe water systems (see for e.g., MWLE, 2006: 2007: 2008). 
 
We understand managerial ownership to constitute or follow from the transfer by the 
government of service provision mandates through management contracts. The study 
findings are of interest to a wide range of stakeholders including utility managers, sector 
regulators, academics and other decision makers in Uganda, Africa and the developing 
countries in general. They provide useful insights on the role of organizational changes 
on utilities’ efficiency advancement.  
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The following section discusses the role of managerial ownership on WUs’ performance. 
Section 4.3 develops the analytical framework while section 4.4 characterizes trends in 
water resources and water services provision in Uganda. The empirical methodology and 
data used for the study are defined in section 4.5. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 discuss the study’s 
results and conclusion.    
 
 
4.2 Managerial ownership and water utilities performance  
 
Common to the 1990 reform programmes that were rolled out across public network 
utilities such as electricity, gas, telecommunications and water supply is the change in the 
ownership of assets and/or service provision rights (Seppala et al., 2001; Parker and 
Kirkpatrick, 2005; Boubakri et al., 2008). In Africa, countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, Mozambique and Senegal have engaged private organizations to abstract, treat 
and distribute water services (see Section 6.1). In other countries such as Uganda - for the 
small towns, private operators have only been involved in services provision. For the 
majority African countries including Eritrea, Namibia and Zambia, water supply - from 
abstraction to waste water disposal, is the mandate of the government (Mbuvi et al., 
2012).  
 
Theoretically, public and privately-owned utilities differ in a number of ways that 
influence their operational efficiency. Governments through tax payers own public WUs 
while private shareholders own private firms. By regulating input prices among other 
aspects, governments control public utilities’ production and service delivery decisions. 
Public control guarantees or is meant to guarantee inclusive quality services provision for 
optimal social welfare. Public control is advanced, especially, for the urban water supply 
industry that is geographically monopolistic, characterized by high initial investment 
sunk costs and hardly competitive in nature (Waterson, 1988; Seppala et al., 2001; 
Joskow, 2007; Spronk, 2010; see also Section 1.1). Competition in the industry is limited 
by the non-detachability of water production and distribution networks within specific 
service areas.  
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Government control and subsidization of public-owned utilities pose multiple 
implications. First, it entails superfluous cost overruns. This follows from, among others, 
weak budget oversights, conflicting trade union interests and low propensity to market 
take-over in case of bankruptcy (Boubakri et al., 2008; Marques, 2008a; Lin et al., 2009).  
 
Second, public ownership lends itself to attenuated foresightedness and systems 
innovativeness (Tisdell and Hartley, 2008). Structurally, public utility property rights are 
designed in a way that they can not be transferred (or their expected returns capitalized) 
by their owners, i.e., the citizens (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978). At the same time, it is 
very costly for individual citizens to monitor public managers’ activities. Besides, as 
noted by public choice theorists, public utility managers do not necessarily act for the 
public interest, but their self or for the benefit of their appointing authorities’. This 
weakens public planning, operations efficiency and activity specialization (Byrnes, 1985; 
Vining and Boardman, 1992). 
 
Private utility managers face persistent pursuit for profits with limited multi-tasking and 
free-riding problems (Seppala et al., 2001; Anwandter and Ozuna, 2002). This, coupled 
with hardly politicized shareholder performance monitoring, results in high allocation 
efficiency, innovativeness and responsiveness to consumer demands 119  (Tisdell and 
Hartley, 2008; Spronk, 2010). Besides, multiple hybrid ownership arrangements i.e., 
between public and private actors, exist in urban water supply. These range from simple 
operational (service, lease, concession, etc) contracts to build (own, operate and transfer) 
arrangements. For a detailed review, see Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995) and Twort et al. 
(2000).120 Hybrid modes differ in the contractual duration and in the manner in which 
associated mandates (decision making, capital investments and revenue allocation, etc) 
and  risks  are  allocated.  As  earlier  broached,  this  chapter  focuses  on  two  hybrid  
organizational forms; public-public and public-private, under management contracts. 
 
                                                      
119 Especially in competitive industries or sectors. 
120 Other privatization options involving either formal or informal contracts between public and private (including 
volunteers, not-for profit organizations) actors are discussed by Johnston and Seidenstat (2001). 
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Empirical literature is inconclusive on the role of ownership on urban WUs’ efficiency 
(see Annex 4.1). Compared to public-owned WUs, privately121  owned utilities have 
previously been found to be more cost effective, responsive to costumer demands, less 
corrupt, well governed and more likely to exploit scale, scope and costumer density 
economies (see Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978: 1980; Raffiee et al., 1993; Bhattacharyya et 
al., 1995; Estache and Rossi, 2002; Bitran and Valenzuela, 2003; Moreira et al., 2005; 
Andrés et al., 2008; Gassner et al., 2009; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2009; Correia and Marques, 
2011; Wang et al., 2011).   
 
Private rather than public ownership is however characterized by low (or no) capital 
investments,122 operations-downsizing, high retail prices, exclusive service provision and 
high information asymmetries (Lynk, 1993; Bhattacharyya et al., 1994; Shaoul, 1997; 
García-Sánchez, 2006; Saal et al., 2007; Marques, 2008a; Souza et al., 2008; Ruester and 
Zschille, 2010).  Drawing from a metaanalytic study, Bel et al. (2010) found no sufficient 
support for cost-savings with private production. They examined 27 econometric studies 
that analyzed cost differences in the production of water supply and solid waste 
collection services among privately and public-owned firms. 
 
A few empirical studies nonetheless, found no significant difference between privately 
and public-owned urban WUs in both developed and developing countries (see 
Feigenbaum et al., 1983; Hausman et al., 1986; Byrnes et al., 1986; Teeples and Glyer, 
1987; Lambert et al., 1993; Estache and Rossi, 2002; Saal and Parker, 2004; Kirkpatrick 
et al., 2006; Souza et al., 2007).  
 
While earlier empirical literature does not provide a clear direction, such uncertainty 
reflects the continued relevance of the issue. Changes in urban WUs’ ownership in Africa 
remain highly contested as countries implement (e.g. Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia) or initiate (e.g., 
                                                      
121 In addition to the completely privatized urban markets, we also considered markets under hybrid (public-private) 
governance structures. 
122 In some cases as noted by Davis (2005), private capital investments surpass pre-privatization investments but at 
levels below the target investments provided in the hybrid-contracts e.g., in Cancun, Mexico (1994) and Hamilton, 
Canada (1995). In other cases as was in the Conakry city of Senegal, post-privatization capital investments are mainly 
facilitated by international financing organizations such as the World Bank than the engaged private operators.   
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Democratic Republic of Congo) neoliberalistic reform agendas in their urban water 
sectors (ECA, 2005; AMCW et al., 2006; Osumanu, 2008). This chapter provides new 
evidence on the role of service provision ownership on urban WUs’ technical efficiency.  
 
 
4.3 Analytical framework  
 
DEA takes into account most service sectors’ complexity – i.e., reflected in their multi-
input and multi-output nature (see Section 1.4.1). For similar utilities, DEA estimates 
specific WU’s efficiency in relation to a best-practice frontier (Fried et al., 2008). While 
the deterministic technique compares favourably with parametric approaches (Chalos and 
Cherian, 1995), it avoids a priori specification of the production function that is often 
unknown for most public service utilities. The metafrontier technique in particular, 
permits efficiency measurements across dissimilar utility-groups relative to an 
overarching best practice frontier (metafrontier).  
 
Metafrontier is defined as the boundary of an unrestricted technology set that envelopes 
specific utility-groups’ frontiers. This allows for the estimation of individual utilities’ 
technical efficiency relative to the individual group’s best-practice frontier i.e., defined 
by the group’s observations. Second, it permits the estimation of specific group’s 
technology gaps relative to the metafrontier - where the metafrontier reflects the overall 
available technology accessible across observed utility-groups. Technical efficiency 
denotes the ratio of the maximal achievable to the actually attained outputs given certain 
input mixes123 (Fried et al., 2008). Efficiency estimates provide useful insights that can 
inform performance improvement designs within and across utility-groups.  
 
Both WU-groups observed in this chapter share similar water distribution technology. 
They distribute potable water through piped network systems (MWLE, 2006: 2007). 
Nonetheless, they differ in two main aspects that potentially influence their resource 
usage among other choices. First, they differ in their managerial ownership nature. 
Second, they operate under different scales. In 2006 for example, the public-public 
                                                      
123 Or the ratio of the minimal inputs required to the actual inputs used given a certain output level, in the alternative 
resource-saving case. 
 77
owned utilities provided piped water services to about 1,669,182 (out of a total of 
2,384,546) customers within their licensed jurisdiction. The public-private owned utilities 
served on the other hand 451,823 (out of a total of 996,335) persons with piped water 
services  within  their  service  areas.  In  total,  there  existed  18  (public-public) and 71 
(public-private) urban towns (utilities) with functional piped water systems in Uganda in 
2006 (MWLE, 2006).  
 
Since WU-groups’ production technologies can potentially criss-cross or overlap (refer 
also to Table 4.1), the metafrontier is preferred as it envelopes both WU-group’s frontier. 
This enables us to identify and explain likely gaps in technology between the specific 
WU-group’s frontier and the metafrontier, among other aspects. Besides, smaller WUs or 
WU-groups can conceptually consolidate and increase their sizes. On the other hand, 
larger WUs or WU-groups can split-up and decrease their operation scales. In such cases 
where WU-groups can practically switch from one technology (production possibility set) 
to another, the metafrontier technique offers a better analytical approach in examining 
and understanding performance difference among such groups.  
 
We use the managerial ownership dummy variable under VRS to capture unobserved 
structural differences due to dissimilarities in service provision ownership – i.e., fixed for 
each WU in a certain WU-group. A metatechnology set  MFT  is associated with 
technologically feasible input and output sets based on non-negative input  x  and output 
 y  vectors of the dimension 1uM  and 1uN  respectively.  MFT  is specified as:  
 
 ^ `yproducecanx;y;x:y,xTMF 00 tt                                               [4.1] 
 
 
With minimal investment potentials, the call for WUs’ cost minimization for a given 
output would seem much plausible.  In the case of Uganda alike most African countries 
where universal piped water coverage is still a delusion, utilities’ cost efficiency while 
vital, seems less urgent than utilities’ output maximization with given resources 
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(investments, etc).  Additionally and partly due to the recently advanced performance-
based regulation, it is unlikely in the short-term, for utilities to alter their input (capital, 
labour, etc) mixes and preset tariffs but their output mixes. The liberty to change output 
mixes given the prevailing resources, provides utilities with multiple opportunities in 
attaining a priori set performance targets with sufficient cost-recovery (Estache and 
Rossi, 2002).  
 
We thus adopt an output oriented technological specification. To estimate technical 
efficiencies  MFT  across utility-groups, an output metadistance function  ^ `y,xoMFD  is 
defined on the output set representing the metafrontier technology set as:   
 
     ^ `xPyyxD MFMFMFoMF MF ! TTT :0inf,                                                     [4.2] 
 
Where  y,xMFD  is the maximal radial expansion of unit outputs given existing input 
resources.  xMFP  is the output set defined for any input vector as 
   ^ `MFMF TyxyxP  ,:  while,  ‘inf’  stands  for  ‘infimum’.  ‘Inf’  allows  for  the  
possibility that a minimum may not exist ĺ i.e.,  MFT  = +f  is possible (see Coelli et al., 
2005). 
 
In the absence of price information (input costs, output revenue) we use distance 
functions to define the multiple-input and multiple-output technology sets (Coelli and 
Perelman, 1999).  In the output-oriented case, distance functions are non-decreasing in y, 
decreasing in x, linearly homogenous in y and convex in y (Coelli et al., 2005). Relative 
to the metafrontier, a given utility  yx,  is technically efficient if the output metadistance 
function equals to one. This implies that  yx,  is located on the outer boundary of the 
production possibility set.  
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To further estimate individual WU’s technical efficiency scores relative to each group’s 
best-practice frontier, an nth group-specific technology set  nGFT  is defined (equation 4.3) 
and represented in terms of its group-specific distance function (equation 4.4).  
 
 ^ `yproducetongroupinWUsbyusedbecanxyxyxT nGF ;0;0:, tt   [4.3] 
 
         ^ ` NnxPyyxD nGFnGFnGFnGF nGF ...3,2,1,:0inf,  ! TTT                                 [4.4] 
 
Where  xP nGF  represents the group specific output set whose boundaries define the group 
frontier.    ^ ` NnTyxyxP nGFnGF ...3,2,1,,:   . WUi is technically efficient relative to 
its group best-practice frontier if its group specific distance function is equal to one. The 
technical efficiency score  n
GFi
TE  of a given WUi is thus computed as the distance 
relative to the group frontier  nGFnGF ii DTE  .  
 
Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of a convex metafrontier ABCDE that envelopes 
utility-groups A2’ and Q1’ frontiers.124 The distance between the metafrontier ( NMFD , 
overarching dotted line) and either group’s frontiers ( nGFD ) provides a measure of the 
technology gap ratio (DMTR). The farther a specific group’s average efficiency is to one, 
the farther (in terms of output production) to the maximum potential output given the 
technology available across the urban water sector, WUs within the specific group are.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
124 Note that, an adjusted representation can be made for cases with more than 2 utility-groups. 
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Figure 4.1:   Schematic illustration of the metafrontier technique*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Technology gap (DMTR) measures the ratio of group-n’s output relative to the potentially 
attainable output defined by the metafrontier, given observed input units. The technology 
gap for the public-private owned utility-group is for example computed as (O’Donnell et 
al., 2007):  
 
 
                                                     [4.5] 
 
We use the two stage double bootstrap DEA VRS technique to estimate both utility-
groups’ production technologies and the metafrontier in the first stage. We further 
examine, in the second stage, the influence on the estimated efficiency scores of various 
exogenous variables. The metafrontier is computed by pooling all utility-groups’ 
observations. DEA VRS solves a similar optimization problem as outlined in equation 
1.3.  
   yxDyxDyxMTR PprGFPprMFPpr ,,),(  
* For utilities producing unit output with unit input. An output orientation under VRS is assumed.  
Source: Authors illustration. 
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4.4 Water resources and services provision trends in Uganda 
 
Uganda unlike many African countries is well endowed with adequate water resources. 
The country has a mean annual rainfall of 1300 millimetres (mm). This ranges from 100 
mm in the semi-arid parts of Karamoja to 3000 mm in the Northeastern region of the 
country (UN-Water and WWAP, 2006). Renewable water resources are estimated at 66 
km3 per year, nationally. By 2007, per capita annual internal renewable water resources 
were estimated at 1,412 cubic meters (m3/inh/y). This endowment exceeds by far the 
internal renewable fresh water resources in some (30 percent) African countries with 
quantities below 1000 m3/inh/y (AfDB, 2010). These countries include among others 
Algeria (342 m3/inh/y), Burkina Faso (906 m3/inh/y),  Egypt  (24  m3/inh/y), Libya (104 
m3/inh/y), Kenya (630 m3/inh/y) and Tunisia (418 m3/inh/y). Levels below 
1,700m3/inh/y, 1,000m3/inh/y and 500m3/inh/y denote respectively, water stressed, water 
scarce and absolute water scarce conditions (UNDP, 2006). 
 
Prominent fresh water reservoirs in Africa including (i) the Nile basin - the longest in the 
world, (ii) rivers Ruizi, Katonga, Kafu, Mpologoma and Aswa, and (iii) lakes Kyoga, 
Albert, George, Edward and Victoria pass through or are found in Uganda (UN-Water 
and WWAP, 2006). Lake Victoria is the world’s second largest freshwater lake and the 
main source of River Nile. Consequently, 82 percent of the land in Uganda is arable (UN-
Water and WWAP, 2006). 
 
More than 40 percent of the urban population however lacked access to improved water 
supply systems by 2008 (MWLE, 2008). This was equivalent to about 1.7 million urban 
residents out a total of 4.4 million. This number is projected to rise with increased 
urbanization and population growth rates, among other factors. More so, sewerage 
service provision remains an enormous challenge constrained by low infrastructural 
development. By 2007, only 10 percent of the population living in the large urban towns 
had access to improved sewerage services (Mugisha, 2007). While improved sewerage 
service provision is equally indispensable for a healthy productive population, this 
chapter (and thesis) focuses only on improved water supply provision.   
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Besides catchment-level institutions that protect fresh water reservoirs, WUs constitute a 
major  actor  in  sustainable  water  resource  and  supply  management.  They  invest  -  with  
public or private sector support, in infrastructural development, maintenance, services 
distribution and waste water disposal. Secondly, they guarantee water resources 
sustainability against inevitable water shortages owing to seasonal or highly contested 
surface and underground water catchments. 
 
 
4.5 Empirical specification and data  
 
We characterize water distribution technology across the Ugandan urban water sector in 
terms of one input; operational expenditures (OPEX) and two outputs; the volumetric 
amount of water sold and services coverage. The latter is defined by the number of 
customers served with piped water systems in WUs’ service areas. Volumetric water sold 
rather than the total amount of water supplied from the production sites is preferred for 
two main reasons. First, for improved collection efficiencies with minimal (or no) water 
losses, WU managers have to employ more field staff and incur high network 
maintenance costs reflected in their operating expenses. In such cases, the amount of 
water sold reflects better the input requirement.  
 
Secondly, to distribute water, utilities with higher water losses reflected also in reduced 
revenue collections could appear efficient due to their low input use (operating expenses). 
Hence, the amount of water sold provides a better output indicator that takes also into 
account, water losses (non-revenue water). To attain universal piped water service 
coverage for all urban customers in Uganda, WUs need to strengthen their revenue 
collection for reinvestments in systems’ extension and maintenance.  
 
In the short term and given marginal (or no) capital investments, utilities incur higher 
maintenance-related rather than capital-related expenditure. We therefore, use utilities’ 
OPEX as the aggregate measure of the incurred physical inputs given prices.125 Since 
                                                      
125  Essentially, costs on all inputs (including capital) or their equivalent quantity measures are required for 
comprehensive production function estimation. We were unable to access capital expenditure and key physical capital 
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WUs in Uganda face similar input prices, OPEX reflects an aggregated cost-measure that 
is linked to network maintenance, labour and other materials’ expenditure. More so, the 
use of OPEX allows us to capture other managerial malfunctions linked for example, to 
corrupt practices in resources utilization.  
 
We  use  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  price  deflators  to  convert  WUs’  OPEX  into  
constant-dollar GDP measures. Contrary to other price indices such as the Consumer 
Price Index, GDP price deflators are preferred as they take into account annual changes 
in countries’ consumption and investment patterns. To explain efficiency differences 
between the two WU-groups, we first examine the influence of WUs’ target population as 
a share of the total active water connections on utilities efficiency. Increased market 
capture is associated with declines in unserved customers within utilities service areas. 
This can result in either high or low WUs’ efficiency. Efficiency decreases are likely if 
service connectivity operations entail higher input use. Secondly, we investigate the 
impact of WUs’ managerial ownership structure on efficiency. 
 
We rely on data from 27 urban WUs in Uganda; 10 public-public and 17 public-private 
owned. The sample represents more than 23 percent of the total urban WUs established in 
Uganda by 2007. Whereas the data is limited, it permits consistent technical efficiency 
estimation and comparison across both WU-groups between 2005 and 2007. Given the 
short analysis period, it is unlikely that major technological changes occurred across both 
utility-groups. Thus, we focus on utilities performance due to efficiency changes. 
 
We obtained some operational data from the water sector’s online annual reports. 
However, to cross-check the validity of gathered information and fill-in missing 
information gaps, a field visit to Uganda was necessary by the end of 2008. During the 
visit, we were allowed access to the internal management information systems of the 
Directorate of Water Development (of the MWE) and NWSC. Both information 
                                                                                                                                                                  
proxies’  (e.g.,  network length)  data  for  the  public-private WU-group in particular. Use of OPEX as the single input 
measure is nonetheless consistent with earlier studies in the water sector (see for example, Estache and Rossi, 2002). 
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depositories capture and store centrally, operational information for the public-private 
and the public-public owned WUs.  
 
Table 4.1 provides some summary statistics of the highlighted input, output and 
environmental variables between 2005 and 2007. Over the three years, the public-public 
owned urban WUs expensed about five million Ugandan shillings more than the public-
private owned utilities. The public-public rather than the public-private owned utilities 
were thus able to advance piped water services to more customers. Coverage by the 
public-private (compared to the public-public) owned utilities was less by twenty six 
thousand customers.  
 
Compared to the public-private owned  WUs,  the  public-public utilities managed to 
penetrate better their urban water markets and meet much of their existing demand for 
quality water services. This is reflected in their lower share of target population per total 
water connections (see Table 4.1). The public-public owned WUs made more collections 
than their counterparts. Considering the former group, the average utility sold eleven 
thousand more cubic meters of water than the average public-private owned utility (see 
Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1:   Input, output and environmental variables summary statistic 
 
 Group WUs Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Input variable 
Operational 
expenditures* 
Public-public 30 49054899 22114458 24076000 98396000 
Public-private 51 43514117 26801008 7760589 155864768 
All 81 45566258 25168687 7760589 155864768 
Output variables126      
 
 
Volumetric water sold 
(cubic meters) 
Public-public 30 53131 27054 16346 119500 
Public-private 51 42004 22509 12251 99224 
All 81 46125 24723 12251 119500 
       
Served population 
with piped water 
(persons) 
Public-public 30 38789 20704 9727 94669 
Public-private 51 11820 4684 3144 27684 
All 81 21809 18462 3144 94669 
       
Environmental variables 
Managerial ownership 
(dummy variable) 
Public-public 30 1 0 1 1 
Public-private 51 0 0 0 0 
All 81 0.37 0.49 0 1 
       
Target population over 
total water connections 
share 
Public-public 30 20.30 6.43 12.81 37.46 
Public-private 51 57.99 50.30 14.26 316.95 
All 81 44.03 43.95 12.81 316.95 
* GDP price deflated 
WUs: Urban water utilities. 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Study results and discussion 
4.6.1 Efficiency and market organization  
In light of the ‘service-expanding’ objective of the Ugandan urban water sector like other 
similar sectors in most developing countries, technical inefficiency implies that utilities 
can potentially increase their output without changing their input levels relative to their 
respective group (for individual WUs) and meta-frontier (for WU-groups). Table 4.2 
provides the bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates relative to the (i) specific 
group’s best practice frontier and (ii) overall urban water distribution technology (defined 
by the metafrontier).  
                                                      
126 The volumetric water sold variable across both WU-groups is higher than the corresponding served population 
(SerP) variable across both groups. Likely, the average utility across both groups sells high cubic meters of water per 
individual connections that are not shared by more than one household. On the other hand, it is likely that some water is 
sold  to  water  tankers  or  other  private  vendors  –  whose customers  do not  end up into  the  SerP counts  for  both WU-
groups. While we lack sufficient proof especially for the later observation, it is unlikely that either situation occurs 
differently across both WU-groups.  
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The average public-public owned utility produced 78 percent of the potentially attainable 
output, given prevailing inputs, relative to the water distribution technology across the 
public-public owned utilities. This was 14 percent more than the average public-private 
owned utility when assessed relative to the public-private group’s best-practice frontier 
for a given input level.  
 
The technological gap with respect to the public-public owned group’s frontier is 
estimated at 0.83. This is higher than the public-private group’s metatechnology ratio (of 
0.74). By implication and given the group-specific inputs, the maximum output that could 
be produced by specific WUs from either group is 83 percent and 74 percent of the output 
that is possible if the technology as defined by the metafrontier is used (see Table 4.2). 
As such, the average public-public and public-private owned utilities can at maximum 
attain 5 and 10 percent more outputs (i.e., difference between their feasible and actual 
outputs) respectively, if the metatechnology is adopted. Moreover, the public-private, 
compared to the public-public owned utilities seem to operate under less favourable 
environments that are beyond the control of the related utility managers.127 We estimated 
the gaps, similarly to the metatechnology ratio defined in equation 4.5.  
 
Technology gap differences across both WU-groups can be explained by the differently 
implemented regulatory frameworks in Uganda. While WUs in both groups sign 
performance contracts with the government (MWE), the public-public owned utilities 
self-regulate their operations, since the early 2000, through the NWSC (see Muhairwe, 
2009). Such internal monitoring helps to improve the public-public owned utilities’ 
technical efficiency. This is evidenced by their shorter technology gap (i.e., the difference 
between their actual produced outputs and what is feasible, as estimated by the 
metafrontier). Private management flexibilities among other traits traditionally 
predominant with the private sector were found insufficiently relevant in advancing 
performance among utilities structured along public-private partnerships.  
 
                                                      
127 When compared to the public-public owned utilities, the public-private WUs incur as high operating costs in 
comparison to their ensuing outputs (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.2:   Bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates (DEA VRS)* 
 
 Group frontier   Metafrontier  Metatechnology ratio (**) 
Group 
Public-
public 
Public-
private All  
Public- 
public 
Public- 
private All  
Public- 
public 
Public- 
private All 
WUs 30 51 81  30 51 81  30 51 81 
Mean 0.781 0.638 0.732  0.648 0.465 0.586  0.829 0.736 0.797 
Median 0.718 0.616 0.650  0.586 0.416 0.496  0.790 0.759 0.783 
Std. Dev. 0.176 0.211 0.211  0.173 0.196 0.199  0.128 0.239 0.205 
* Weighted by the total number of served population per utilities’ licensed jurisdiction. 
** Technical efficiency relative to metafrontier by technical efficiency relative to the group frontier ratio. 
 
 
 
 
Exploring utility efficiency estimates overtime provided further insightful trends. 128 
Public-public owned utilities produced 25, 21 and 20 percent less output relative to their 
respective group frontiers in 2005, 2006 and 2007 (see Table 4.3). The average public-
private owned utility produced 35, 41 and 34 percent less output (given existing inputs) 
relative to its respective group’s water distribution technology in 2005, 2006 and 2007 
(see Table 4.3).  
 
Though the public-private compared to the public-public owned utilities were overall 
found less technical efficient, their metatechnology ratio declined overtime. If the 
metatechnology as estimated by the metafrontier was adopted given the yearly group’s 
specific resources, the feasible output for the average public-private owned utility would 
increase overtime. That is, 0.66 (2005), to 0.78 (2006) and to 0.79 in 2007. In reality 
however, the average public-private owned utility did not attain these outputs, but 0.65 
(2005), 0.59 (2006) and 0.66 in 2007. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the MWE has 
also introduced performance-based regulation across the public-private owned utilities 
since mid 2000 (MWLE, 2006: 2007: 2008). 
 
On the other hand, the gap between what is feasible (if the metatechnology is adopted) 
and what was actually produced (given the yearly group-specific resources) by the 
average public-public utility, declined overtime. That is, from 8 percent (2005) to 5 
percent (2006) and to 3 percent in 2007 (see Table 4.3). 
                                                      
128 We first estimated utilities’ technical efficiency within each group and later, across the groups. To estimate the 
metafrontier for the latter exploration, both groups’ data was pooled. 
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Table 4.3:   Yearly bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates* 
 
Group Period   Group Frontier Meta frontier Metatechnology ratio** 
Public-public 2005 Mean 0.751 0.620 0.826 
  Median 0.721 0.567 0.802 
 2006 Mean 0.790 0.663 0.835 
  Median 0.720 0.617 0.789 
 2007 Mean 0.798 0.659 0.826 
  Median 0.711 0.607 0.797 
      
Public-private 2005 Mean 0.651 0.426 0.656 
  Median 0.616 0.404 0.643 
 2006 Mean 0.593 0.466 0.777 
  Median 0.602 0.486 0.787 
 2007 Mean 0.658 0.509 0.794 
  Median 0.650 0.479 0.769 
* Weighted by the total number of served population per utilities’ licensed jurisdiction. 
** As earlier defined.  
 
 
 
4.6.2 Economies of scale  
To determine possible scale economies (or diseconomies) among WUs in Uganda, we 
compared WUs’ VRS technical efficiency scores with those computed under NIRS (non 
increasing returns to scale). We computed NIRS by restricting the sum of weights in 
equation 1.3 to less than or equal to one ( 1d¦ itO ). Identical VRS and NIRS technical 
efficiency scores signify decreasing returns to scale (DRS) while dissimilar VRS and 
NIRS technical efficiency scores denote operation in an increasing return to scale (IRS) 
region (Krasachat, 2003). 
 
Most public-public owned utilities were found to operate under a DRS region. The 
majority public-private owned WUs were however found to operate under an IRS region 
(see Table 4.4). 3 and 1 utilities were found to operate, overtime, under a DRS region for 
the public-public and the public-private owned WUs, respectively. 2 and 5 WUs were 
found to operate under an IRS region for the public-public and the public-private owned 
utilities. For the rest public-public owned; 2, 3 and 4 utilities operated under a DRS in 
2005, 2006 and 2007. Nevertheless, 3 (2005), 2 (2006) and 1 (2007) utilities were found 
to operate under an IRS region. Considering the public-private owned WUs, 5, 6 and 9 
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utilities were found to operate under an IRS region in 2005, 2006 and 2007. During the 
same period, 6, 5 and 2 WUs operated under a DRS region.  
 
Table 4.4:   Return to scale estimates 
Public-public owned water utilities Public-private owned water utilities 
UTILITY 2005 2006 2007 UTILITY 2005 2006 2007 
Arua D D D Adjumani D I D 
Bushenyi I I I Bugiri D I I 
FPortal I D D Busia I D I 
Kabale I D D Buwenge I I I 
Kasese I I I Kaliro I I I 
Lira D I I Kalisizo D D D 
Masaka D D D Kamuli I I I 
Mbale I D D Kapchorwa I I I 
Soroti D I D Kayunga I D I 
Tororo D D D Kiboga I I D 
    Kitgum I D I 
    Kumi D D I 
    Luwero D I I 
    Moyo I I I 
    Nakasongola D I I 
    Rukungiri D I I 
    Wobulenzi I D I 
I: increasing returns to scale, D: decreasing returns to scale. 
 
 
 
In terms of the urban water market characterization, WUs operating under a DRS region 
have reached and exceeded their optimum water distribution capacity. That is, in terms of 
attaining optimal services provision with the existing resources. To accommodate 
potential growth in demand, these utilities could either split-up or prioritize individual 
rather than shared piped water connections. Given the positive correlation between 
household income (better education, etc) and increased willingness and ability to connect 
to individual water connections (see Larson et al., 2006), such would subsequently 
reinforce cross-subsidized services to low income customers. 
 
WUs operating under an IRS region could on the other hand, merge with other utilities. 
This would certainly involve increased investments in infrastructure and human 
development among other aspects. Such would nonetheless, allow for increased 
effectiveness among WUs - in terms of water mains’ expansion (to new customers) and 
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maintenance (for existing customers) at affordable user rates. Besides, utilities could 
more so, exploit customer density economies and benefit from increased collections for 
re-investment. 
  
Learning from a meta-regression analysis of 43 studies on scale and scope economies 
between public and privately-owned WUs, Carvalho et al. (2012) acknowledge that there 
is no consensus in literature on the preferable optimal operation sizes for urban WUs. 
They however note that, small compared to large WUs enjoy significant scale economies. 
In reality nonetheless, small-sized utilities rarely benefit from these economies of scale 
owing to their low output levels. Mizutani and Urakami, (2001) identified 766,000 as the 
optimal size of water consumption population in Japan. They examined 112 WUs in 1994 
with a cost-function. Across both WU-groups in Uganda, diseconomies of scale happen 
after 29,868 customers have been served across utilities’ service areas. This service 
coverage corresponds to about 53,551 cubic meters of delivered water. To identify 
utilities’ optimal sizes, we computed the average of all firms operating under IRS and 
DRS regions for the three years (2005-2007). 
 
 
4.6.3 Managerial ownership and utilities efficiency 
 
To further explain performance disparities between both WU-groups, we explored in a 
second stage129 interlinkages between utilities’ technical efficiency and their extents in 
market capture and structure (see Section 4.5). Increases in the share of target population 
over the total active water connections were associated with declined efficiency. This was 
however, not significant (see Table 4.5). Public-public managerial ownership was found 
to be significantly and positively linked to increased WUs’ efficiency. Public-public 
rather than public-private organizational arrangement was linked to a 15 percent increase 
in utilities’ efficiency.  
 
                                                      
129 That is, similar to Simar and Wilson (2007). 
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This positive outcome attests the inherent links between efficiency and effectiveness. 
Indeed, to achieve a priori specified performance targets, (strongly) regulated utilities are 
motivated to improve their technical efficiency. Across the public-public rather than the 
public-private owned utilities in Uganda, exemplary performance is quarterly rewarded 
with bonuses, cash prizes, trophies and staff promotions (Muhairwe, 2009). Poorly 
performing managers, for more than 3 consecutive months, are demoted or laid off.  
 
Table 4.5:   Efficiency determinants 
 
Dependent variable: Bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates relative to the metafrontier 
 Parameter Standard deviation P-value 
Constant (N=81) 0.431 0.047 0.000(***) 
Managerial ownership (public-public = 1) 0.147 0.047 0.002(***) 
Share of target population over total water connections  -0.00009 0.001 0.895 
Sigma constant 0.190 0.016 0.000(***) 
 (***) statistically significant at all levels (10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively), N: observed sample size 
 
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In response to the late 1990s neoliberalistic urban water sector reforms, two managerial 
ownership structures emerged in Uganda; the public-public and the public-private. Using 
a two-stage double bootstrap truncated regression metafrontier technique; this chapter 
examined first, technical efficiency differences and technology gaps between these two 
heterogeneous urban WU-groups in Uganda. Secondly, we explored whether WUs’ 
technical efficiency is significantly different across both WU-groups and whether other 
utility-specific environmental factors explain performance differences between the 
groups.  
 
Relative to the accessible water distribution technology across both WU-groups, the 
public-public owned utilities produced more (78 percent) potentially attainable output 
given existing inputs. The public-private owned utilities produced much fewer outputs 
(64 percent) relative to the potentially attainable outputs given existing resources 
available to utilities within the group. This implies that, both WU-groups can potentially 
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increase their output, given existing input resources by 22 (for the public-public) and 36 
(for the public-private) percent, relative to their respective best-practice frontiers.  
 
The public-public (compared to the public-private) group’s frontier was found much 
closer to the overall urban water sector best practice frontier - defined by the 
metafrontier. Such declined technology gap can be as a result of the additional self-
monitoring of WUs under NWSC’s mandate. Regular benchmarking for the public-public 
owned utilities creates and retains intra-group competition that transforms subsequently, 
in enhanced group performance. The public-public (than public-private) managerial 
ownership arrangement was found significantly and positively linked to increased WUs’ 
technical efficiency.  
 
Indeed under a public-public (than a public-private) arrangement, investments are more 
directly linked to service provision. Such facilitates water mains expansion (and 
maintenance) to new governmental, residential and industrial premises. Since procured 
private operators under the public-private arrangement only manage existing assets, it is 
unlikely that they invest in systems’ expansion. Following Prasad (2008, see also 
conclusions by Swyngedouw, 2009), infrastructural investments in urban water supply, 
especially in the developing countries, are unattractive to private investors.  
 
Studying urban WUs in China, Wang et al. (2011) found a negative correlation between 
(domestic) private sector participation and investments in fixed assets. Not only do the 
lumpy investments (in relation to market size) face more than 20 years recovery time; but 
it is socio-politically impossible for private operators to set their own cost-recovery 
tariffs. Under these constraints, lighter forms of public-private arrangements including 
the use of management contracts, will persist in the water supply industry for most 
developing countries (Davis, 2005). 
 
Besides, the technology gap across the public-private owned utilities was found to 
decline overtime. Such decline is attributable to the increased performance-based 
regulation advanced across the utilities by the government. Such initiative, though not as 
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advanced as the benchmarking exercises across the public-public owned utilities, can 
eventually help bridge performance gaps between both groups. Such is likely especially, 
for the utilities operating under an IRS region. 
 
It is possible that other input (e.g., capital costs) and output (e.g., total active connections) 
variables define better both WU-groups’ production technologies. More so, we 
acknowledge that other factors that are specific to either WU-groups or/and specific 
utilities (e.g., customer density, water losses, etc) influence both WU-groups’ technical 
efficiency. Due to data limitations among other methodological constraints (degrees of 
freedom problems, etc) however, we only accounted for a few of these aspects in this 
chapter. Consideration of additional production and environmental variables in future 
follow-up analyses would certainly offer more insights.  
 
Chapter 5 extents this study by comparatively looking at the overall productivity (and its 
determinants) of the public-public owned urban WUs in Uganda and those in Zambia.  
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Annex 4.1:   Earlier studies on the role of ownership on urban water supply utilities efficiency 
 
Author(s) Data (period, place) Technique Variables Significant (in)efficiency determinants 
     Private rather than publicly-owned urban WUs are more (significantly) efficient 
Crain & Zardkoodi, 1978 112: 88 public, 24 private (1970, North America) CD prod function 3 inputs; 1 output (High) OPEX especially, by public utilities 
Crain & Zardkoohi, 1980 78 (1970, North America) Multiple regression 2 inputs; 1 output, 1 Z High labor costs & less capital investments   
 Raffiee et al., 1993 112: 238 public, 33 private (1989, North America) CD cost function 4 inputs; 1 output  Property rights attenuation in public utilities 
Bhattacharyya et al., 1995* 221: 190 public, 31 private (1992,  North America ) Translog cost function 3 inputs; 1 output  Operation scale is positively linked to cost-inefficiency 
Estache & Kouassi, 2002 21: 18 public, 3 private (1995-97, Africa) CD prod function  5 inputs; 1 output; 3 Z Corruption & sector governance 
Bitran & Valenzuela, 2003 13: 8 public, 5 private (1998-2001,  Chile ) Performance indicators 2 inputs; 3 outputs; 1 Z Private equity, economies of scale 
Moreira et al., 2005 148: 135 public, 13 private (2002,  Brazil ) CD prod function 2 inputs; 1 output Capital and labor overuse  
Andrés et al., 2008 49 (15 years, 8 LA countries) Econometric  3 inputs; 3 outputs; 3 Z Water losses,  service continuity and reliability 
Gassner et al., 2009 977: 836 public, 141 private (1973-2005, LA & Cb) Regression & DD 1 input; 5 outputs; 3 Z Labor productivity & daily water supply hours 
Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2009 34: 8 public, 26 private (2001, Spain) DEA 4 inputs; 3 outputs; 5 Z Labor productivity & density economies 
Correia & Marques, 2011 68: 14 public, 23 private, 31 SA (2004-05, Portugal) Translog cost function 4 inputs; 2 outputs; 5 Z Scale and scope economies 
Wang et al., 2011 35: 5 public, 30 private (1998-2008, China) Regressions 1 input; 2 outputs; 6 Z Per capita income  
     
Public rather than privately-owned urban WUs are more (significantly) efficient 
Lynk, 1993 10 private (1979/80 to 1987/88, United Kingdom) Multiproduct cost function 3 inputs; 3 outputs; 2 Z Joint service production 
Bhattacharyya et al., 1994 257: 225 public, 32 private (1992,  North America ) TGV cost function 2 inputs; 1 output; 1 Z Excessive capitalization under rate of return regulation 
Shaoul, 1997 10 private (1985-1999, England and Wales) Accounting techniques 3 inputs; 3 outputs Decreased technological change 
García-Sánchez, 2006 24: (1999, Spain) DEA, tobit regression 3 inputs; 3 outputs; 10 Z Population density 
Saal et al., 2007 10 private (1985-2000, England and Wales) GPP index 3 inputs; 4 outputs; 4 Z Undue operation scale, technical economic losses 
Marques, 2008a 70 (1994-2001, Portugal) PI, TFP and DEA 2 inputs; 2 outputs; 4 Z Investment costs and outsourcing 
Souza et al., 2008 342: 324 public, 18 private (2002-2004, Brazil) CD cost function 1 input; 1 output; 4 Z Population density and the percentage of treated water  
     
No significant  efficiency difference between public and privately-owned urban WUs 
Feigenbaum & Teeples, 1983 319: 262 public, 57 private (1970,  North America ) Hedonic cost function 4 inputs; 1 output; 5 Z High labor, energy and purchased water costs 
Hausman et al., 1986 64: 32 public, 32 private (1899,  North America ) Ordinary Least Squares 7 inputs; 3 outputs  Rates of return 
Byrnes et al., 1986 127: 68 public, 59 private (1976,  North America ) Linear programming 7 inputs; 1 output  Scale of operation 
Teeples & Gyler, 1987 119: 67 public, 52 private (1980,  North America ) Dual cost function 8 inputs; 1 output; 8 Z Model mis-specification 
Lambert et al., 1993 270: 238 public, 32 private ( North America ) DEA 4 inputs; 1 output  Capital, labor, energy and material overuse 
Estache & Rossi, 2002 50: 30 public, 20 private (1995, Asia and Pacific) CD cost function 1 input; 3 outputs; 6 Z High labor costs but low service coverage rates.  
Saal & Parker, 2004 10 private (1985-1999, England and Wales) PIN, Translog cost function 
 
5 inputs; 1 output  High labor productivity growth 
Kirkpatrick et al., 2006 14, out of 110 (2000, Africa) DEA, CD cost function 3 inputs; 2 outputs; 7 Z Regulation, but not significant 
Souza et al., 2007 164: 149 public, 15 private (2002, Brazil) Translog cost function 2 inputs; 1 output; 4 Z Cost (in) efficiency 
* i.e., for small-scaled utilities where privately-owned WUs are found to be more cost-efficient than the publicly-owned utilities.   
Z’s: Environmental variables, CD: Cobb-Douglas, Prod: Production, LA: Latin America, Cb: Caribbean, RE: Random effects, FE: Fixed effects, DD: Difference-in-difference based on the propensity score nearest-neighbour matching,  
SA: Semi autonomous, TGV: Translog generalized variable, PR: Provincial regulated water operators,  OPEX: Operating costs, TFP: Total factor productivity, GPP: Generalized parametric productivity, PIN: Price index numbers. 
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CHAPTER 5: Productivity and productivity determinants in urban water 
supply130 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Due to the lack of reliable data, earlier literature has ignored urban WUs’ productivity 
aspects for most developing countries. Previous literature largely focuses on developed 
countries (Ashton, 2000a; Garcia and Thomas, 2001; Coelli and Walding, 2005; Saal et 
al., 2007; Marques, 2008b; De Witte and Marques, 2011; Abbott and Cohen, 2009). 
Using a rich and self-collected dataset from Uganda and Zambia, we explore urban WUs’ 
productivity changes since the mid 2000s. Although some data are available online from 
annual sector reports, field research was necessary to counteract inherent operational data 
challenges - such as inexistency, inconsistency or inaccuracy. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, it analyses urban water 
provision in Uganda and Zambia between 2007 and 2009. For detailed information on the 
specific reform processes across both sectors, see respectively, Chapters 2 and 3. Uganda 
and Zambia share comparable operational environments including relatively stable 
political and macro-economic environments (important for long-term planning), 
topography, weather conditions, urban population densities and increasing demands for 
quality and adequate water services delivery. The conclusions of this chapter do not only 
apply to the two countries however, but to other African countries that have implemented 
(or are in the process of implementing) organizational and institutional reforms.  
 
As a second contribution, we focus on efficiency and effectiveness aspects of water 
supply and link them to WUs’ productivity growths. In the prospect of an unserved urban 
population of about 35 percent (WSP-WB, 2009), the call for efficiency (or doing things 
right) seems less important. Many people would consider the main priority of WUs as 
                                                      
130 This chapter is adapted from “Productivity and its determinants in the African urban water supply” submitted to the 
Data Envelopment Analysis Journal (with Kristof De Witte). We are grateful to the participants of the VI North 
American Productivity Workshop, the 15th African International Water Congress and Exhibition and three anonymous 
referees for insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We would like to thank the National Water Supply 
and Sanitation Council - the water supply and sewerage service regulator in Zambia and the National Water and 
Sewerage Corporation - the national urban water and sewerage service provider in Uganda, for allowing access to and 
use of the rich and quality-controlled datasets used in this chapter. 
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providing services to all citizens, rather than providing such efficiently but to a few 
(urban and rich) customers. We examine these competing goals in section 5.4.2. We find 
that a trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness can exist in the short run. This is 
possible for example, if performance improvements (e.g., in terms of increased metering) 
entail large fixed costs. Given increasing demands amidst limited raw water resources, 
we nonetheless conclude that effectiveness (attaining actual targets) is as important as 
working efficiently (i.e., not wasting resources in the process of providing services) at 
least, in the long-run.  
 
To assess WUs’ productivity improvements over time, we apply an output-oriented 
Malmquist productivity index (MPI). The MPI was first introduced by Caves et al. (1982) 
after Malmquist (1953). Using a MPI, this paper goes beyond the usual partial (single-
factor or uni-dimensional) productivity measures that have been used as a monitoring 
device by most African urban water sector stakeholders (WSP-WB, 2009; Tynan and 
Kingdom, 2002). Partial indicators such as staff productivity, barely provide the true 
productivity. In contrast, they provide simple ratios of output to input variables for 
particular utilities (Fried et al., 2008; Coelli et al., 2005, see also Section 1.4.1).   
 
Various variants of the MPI have been suggested (e.g., Grosskopf, 1993; Ray and Desli, 
1997; Färe et al., 1998; Balk, 2001). Färe et al. (1994) decomposed the index under 
constant returns to scale (CRS) into productivity changes due to mutually exclusive 
technical and efficiency components. By adding a VRS constraint, the authors further 
decomposed the estimated efficiency changes into pure technical change and scale 
efficiency changes.  
 
While it is important to measure WUs' productivity growth against VRS in order to 
distinguish productivity gains or losses due to scale effects (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 
1995), VRS assumptions result into linear programming infeasibilities especially when 
more than one production period is observed (Shestalova, 2003; Pastor and Lovell, 2005). 
Under the service maximization (i.e., output-orientation) assumption, such infeasible 
utilities remain efficient but under arbitrary declined outputs. As such, they are not 
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involved in the construction of the specific period’s technology frontier (Tone, 2004). To 
address this problem, we follow the MPI of Pastor et al. (2011) that (i) allows utilities to 
experience either technical progress or regress and (ii) maintains earlier computed 
estimates, even when new additional analysis periods are added.  
 
Pastor et al. (2011) use a biennial MPI framework that is inspired on DEA (see Section 
1.4). We adapt the biennial MPI to a bootstrapped procedure (Simar and Wilson, 1998: 
1999).  The latter allows us to replicate the underlying sampling distribution and, as such, 
account for the noise in the data. Indeed, measurement errors are likely, given the 
inevitable incentives faced by WUs in most developing countries to modify or amplify 
their operational data towards their national MDGs attainment. 
 
Despite its uniqueness, the data has two limitations. First, due to data constraints, the 
paper describes productivity changes across only two urban WU sectors in Africa. This 
hinders the control of country-specific exogenous factors (e.g., corruption, customer’s 
wealth) that potentially influence utilities productivity overtime. Second, the analysis is 
over a limited time period of three years. Only after mid 2000, consistent operational 
information has been documented across both urban sectors. Consequently, we are unable 
to (i) draw causal links between the implemented reform strategies and the resultant 
productivity improvements, and (ii) draw strong economic policy recommendations 
based on the implemented reforms. Nevertheless, it is insightful to describe and explain 
observed productivity changes across urban WUs in Africa. Particularly as we link them 
to various utility-specific environmental factors and explore their correction with 
eventual utilities’ effectiveness.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The subsequent section details the 
productivity growth conceptual and analytical framework. The data and the model 
applied for the analysis are described in section 5.3. Productivity growth estimates for 
both sectors are explored and explained in detail within section 5.4. A final section 
concludes the chapter.   
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5.2 Productivity and productivity change assessment 
5.2.1 Productivity assessment  
Productivity can be considered as the ratio between produced products (or delivered 
services) and the used resources. In the literature, a major distinction has been made 
between partial and multifactor measures (see Section 1.4.1). Restricting inputs and 
outputs to uni-dimensional interpretations, however, can result in the misinterpretation of 
a specific firm’s productivity. Multifactor indexes account for heterogeneous inputs to 
produce multiple outputs. This chapter concentrates on these multifactor measures.  
 
Consider a set of N inputs x and M outputs y for WUi. To aggregate the inputs and 
outputs into a single productivity measure at time t , market prices (input costs and output 
revenue) are often used as weights. In the absence of explicit price information, implicit 
prices are used as shadow weights on each input and output. As such, each input is 
weighted by weight a and each output by weight b to obtain an aggregate productivity 
measure (index) delineated as:  
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To generate optimal weights (i.e., a and b) that maximizes each WU’s productivity, the 
DEA linear programming algorithm can be used (equation 5.2, see also Coelli et al., 
2005). DEA generates endogenously, the implicit weights for all observed inputs and 
outputs.   
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Where a, b, yi, xi, are as earlier defined and 1'  ixa  allows for the estimation of finite 
optimal weight solutions. 
 
5.2.2 Productivity change assessment  
Productivity change assessment explores changes in productivity over time. Various 
productivity growth models have been outlined (e.g., in Färe et al., 2011; Fried et al., 
2008; Sherman and Zhu, 2006; Coelli et al., 2005 and references therein). We apply the 
biennial MPI (Pastor et al., 2011). The latter is convenient in the current setting as, first, it 
avoids infeasible solutions, which are likely in an intertemporal analysis. Second, it 
maintains previously computed productivity estimates when additional time periods are 
considered. Third, it captures utility productivity changes due to either technical progress 
or regress. 131  Finally and alike most MPIs, it does neither require explicit price 
information (on observed inputs and outputs), nor prior information on the production 
function of or the relationship between observed inputs and outputs. 
 
By use of distance functions,132 biennial MPI estimates the radial distance of the observed 
output and input vectors for WUi in periods t (first analysis period) and 1t  (subsequent 
analysis period) relative to a biennial technology (TB) that is made up of the convex hull 
of both period t and 1t technologies (i.e., Tt and  Tt+1 technologies, respectively). 
Assuming a WUi with different sets of N inputs x and M outputs y in periods t and 1t ; 
its biennial technology (TB) would comprise the product of both period’s technologies. 
Period t (Tt) and 1t (Tt+1) technologies can respectively be defined as: 
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131 Pastor et al. (2011) point to the non-circularity/non-transitivity of the biennial MPI. We follow Fried et al. (2008) in 
that we assume the circularity property to be of less importance in the present case.   
132 To aggregate multi-input and output variables in productivity measurement, distance functions do not require market 
price information (for observed inputs and outputs) as is the case for some price-number indexes such as Laspeyres, 
Paasche, Fisher, Bennet-Bowley and Tòrnqvist. This permits productivity measurement for most public sectors 
especially in the developing countries, for whose explicit price information is often missing or hard to compute (see 
Fried et al., 2008). 
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where MN represents WUi’s input and output vectors and 0ttiO imposes a CRS 
technology. Under VRS assumptions, this CRS constraint is relaxed to 1
1
 ¦
 
K
i
t
iO . In case 
of a two-period analysis, biennial MPI technology is analogous to a metafrontier 
technology that envelopes all observations in two consecutive analysis periods (Pastor 
and Lovell, 2005). In the event of more than two analyses periods, a series of t - 1 
(number of time periods – 1) overlapping biennial technologies exist for each pair-wise 
comparison of adjacent periods (Pastor et al., 2011). 
 
Based  on  the  TB (biennial technology), biennial output distance functions can thus be 
defined assuming either CRS or VRS. Output distance functions specify the maximal 
proportional expansion of output (services) vectors, given constant input vectors. Input 
distance functions on the other hand, indicate the maximal proportional contraction of 
input (resources) vectors, given unit output vectors. In the VRS case for WUi, this can be 
illustrated as:  
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B
ov represents  the  maximal  radial  expansion  of  WUi’s productivity given 
existing resources and relative to the biennial VRS (best-practice) technology ( BovT ). 
Given the biennial output distance functions, the biennial VRS MPI estimator can be 
defined as: 
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Where the numerator and the denominator represent, respectively, the radial distance of 
WUi in period 1t  and t  relative to the biennial technology. The biennial CRS MPI 
measure ( BocMPI ) is analogously denoted by replacing subscripts v (VRS) by c (CRS). 
Since both 1t  and t  technologies are included in the biennial technology, estimating 
the geometric mean of both technologies, as is the case in Färe et al. (1994), is no longer 
necessary in the present MPI measurement. Assuming an output orientation, Figure 5.1 
illustrates the biennial MPI framework, with given inputs, between periods t  and 1t .   
 
Figure 5.1:   Biennial Malmquist productivity index framework 
 
                                       
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider utilities 1 and 2 observed in both periods t and 1t . Both CRS and VRS 
biennial technologies ( BocT and 
B
ovT , respectively) are defined in grey lines. The 
corresponding period 1t  and t  technologies are respectively denoted in dotted and 
plain lines.  Following equation 5.6, the biennial VRS MPI ( BovMPI ) measure of utility 1 
can be defined as e/c*d/f; and the biennial CRS MPI ( BocMPI ) measure as e/a*b/f. Where 
c, d, a and b are all located on the grey lines. Biennial MPI outcome values can either be 
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smaller, equal or larger than one. This indicates respectively for WUi, deteriorating, 
constant and improving productivity between periods t and 1t  relative to the biennial 
VRS (best-practice) or CRS (benchmark) technology and given certain input resources. 
 
5.2.3 Productivity change decomposition 
The biennial MPI framework allows us to decompose estimated productivity 
improvements over time, into several productivity drivers including technical change (TC 
or frontier shift), technical efficiency change (TEC) and scale change (SC). The frontier 
shift (TC) denotes utilities’ innovative ability (inability) to produce more (or less) with a 
given vector of input units in period 1t  compared to the levels feasible in the base 
period (period t ) relative to the biennial technology. Based on the WUi’s choice of input 
and output combinations, its technical change with respect to the best practice (VRS) 
biennial technology can be denoted as:  
 
)y,x(d
)y,x(d.
)y,x(d
)y,x(d                                    
)y,x(d
)y,x(d
)y,x(d
)y,x(d)y,x,y,x(TC
ttt
ov
ttt
ov
ttB
ov
ttB
ov
ttt
ov
ttt
ov
ttB
ov
ttB
ovttttB
ov
111
11
11111
11




 
 
                                    [5.7]                                     
 
 
Where subscripts o and v denote, respectively, output orientation and VRS assumptions. 
B
ovTC  values of more than one denote technological progress in period 1t  compared to 
period t . In other words, it indicates that the best practice technology in period 1t  
along the ray denoted by )y,x( tt 11   is closer to the biennial best practice frontier than is 
the best practice technology in period t  along the ray defined by )y,x( tt . On the 
contrary, BovTC  values of less than one indicate technological regress (decline) in period 
1t  compared to period t . 
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Technical efficiency change (TEC) estimates the distance shift of produced outputs in 
relation to the maximum potential outputs attainable. It is measured by the extent to 
which a WU can radially expand its observed output vector to operate on or closer to the 
best practice frontier. TEC (also called catch-up, learning or diffusion) is represented by: 
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With BovTEC  being the technical efficiency change measure under a VRS output-
orientation. BovTEC values of less than, equal or more than one imply decreased, constant 
and increased efficiency change in period 1t  in relation to the base period t .  
 
Relaxing the CRS benchmark technology to assume VRS,133 biennial MPI scores can 
further be decomposed into scale change (SC). SC measures the deviation resulting from 
the adoption of VRS technology in relation to the underlying CRS technology. It reflects 
a movement towards the technologically optimal scale of operation given the biennial 
technology. SC components are defined as:  
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Where BoSC  is the scale change measure. oc indicates an output-orientation under CRS. 
B
oSC values of more than, equal or less than one imply, respectively, increased, constant 
or decreased scale effects between period 1t  and period t .  
 
                                                      
133 VRS permits efficiency increment and decline with respect to firm sizes. Assuming CRS implies that firms are able 
to linearly scale up or down their input and/or output variables without increasing or decreasing their efficiency. In 
section 5, we use Wilson (2010)’s R routine that allows us to estimate a bootstrapped biennial Malmquist VRS model.   
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Overall,  CRS  biennial  MPI  measure  is  a  product  of  the  VRS  biennial  MPI  measure  
(product of technical change and technical efficiency change) and scale change effects. 
That is: 
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Where the first, second and last components represent WUi’s technical efficiency change, 
technical change and scale change components.  
 
To estimate the  BocMPI (or  BovMPI ) measures, distance functions (d) need to be revealed. 
Following earlier literature, we estimate the distance functions (d) by use of the non-
parametric DEA technique (see Section 1.4.1). As a major drawback, the original DEA 
models are deterministic in that they do not assume noise or measurement errors, which 
might be present in the data (see Section 5.3.1). Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999) suggest 
using bootstrap resampling procedures to avoid this shortcoming. The bootstrap 
algorithm approximates the unknown sampling distribution of the DEA estimator by 
simulating its data generation process given a certain statistical model (see also Section 
1.4).  
 
As a major advantage, the bootstrap reveals information on the bias, standard deviation 
and the bootstrap confidence interval bounds of the DEA estimators (for a detailed 
discussion, see Simar and Wilson, 1999). We estimate the technical change (TCvrs), 
technical efficiency change (TECvrs) and scale change (SC) effects by relying on the 
distance functions estimated by use of a bootstrapped DEA.  
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5.3 Data and model specification 
5.3.1 Data and field study  
Walter et al. (2009) point to the absence of reliable data as a key factor limiting 
quantitative productivity analyses in the water sector. This is particularly relevant for 
most developing economies where consistent water and sanitation data are missing owing 
partly to fragmented service delivery and, partly to the inherent inconsistencies in data 
(with frequent sector restructuring). Consequently, for most countries, only decentralized 
and non-harmonized databases exist (Marques, 2008b; Corton and Berg, 2009).  
 
For our analysis, we first obtained utilities’ operational data from the annual sector 
reports available online via NWASCO (in Zambia)’s and the NWSC (in Uganda)’s 
websites. Second, to cross-check the validity and fill-in any missing information, a field 
visit to both agencies between September and November 2009 was arranged. Both 
agencies have a central computerized information management system that captures, 
documents and stores all existing WUs’ operational information. During the visits, we 
were allowed access to this detailed information. Moreover, related sector publications 
from the Ministries concerned with water supply development (the MWE in Uganda and 
the MLGH in Zambia) were used for the study.  
 
By 2009, there were 10 urban WUs in Zambia134 and 23 in Uganda (i.e., public-public 
owned). As consistent data was unavailable for years prior to 2007 (especially for the 
Zambian WUs), we considered 2007 as our base year. After removing135 outliers and 
observations with incomplete data, we analyzed a total of 23 urban WUs (9 Zambian and 
14 Ugandan) for the periods between 2007 and 2009.136 The sample represents 90 and 61 
percent of the total urban WUs (i.e., under public managerial ownership) in Zambia and 
Uganda, and about 178*106 and 1.2*105 volumetric amounts of drinking water in 2009, 
respectively.  
                                                      
134 These are commonly referred to as commercial utilities (refer to Table 3.2). The 11 th utility as shown in the Table 
was established by the end of 2009 and became functional by early 2010 (NWASCO, 2010a). 
135 In addition to dropping utilities with missing data, we omitted observations with extreme ratios (between considered 
inputs and outputs). For other approaches in detecting and dealing with outliers, see Emrouznejad and De Witte (2010: 
1577). 
136  While three years are not enough for an extensive productivity trends’ exploration, we provide insightful 
productivity differences among both WU-groups, given our data limitations.  
 106
5.3.2 Model specification 
The input and output variables applied in the analysis are in line with previous literature 
(e.g., Marques, 2008b; Corton and Berg, 2009; Ashton, 2000a; Saal et al., 2007; Coelli 
and Walding, 2005). Following Marques (2008b), the input and output values are better 
expressed in quantities rather than in monetary values, especially in cross-country 
analyses. The former do not (i) require any a priori updating that is prone to inevitable 
distortions resulting from different cost accounting approaches across sectors, (ii) depend 
on the prevailing water tariffs - that could influence subsequent water sales and, (iii) 
demand prior monetary conversion. Similarly, Coelli and Walding (2005) argue against a 
priori monetary conversion into real measures. The authors show that the search for an 
appropriate and specific price deflator apart from the normally used Consumer Price 
Index is challenging (especially with the unavailability of comparable data) and could be 
misleading.  
 
To proxy labor and capital, we use the number of employees and network length (in 
meters) as input variables. 137  Zambian utilities encounter higher labor and capital 
expenditures than their Ugandan counterparts. This is particularly exemplified by their 
higher employee count and water mains (network) length. Over the three years, the 
average Zambian utility employs more than seven times the total staff engaged by the 
average Ugandan utility (see Table 5.1). Employee count is found to increase overtime by 
6.4 percent i.e., from 265 in 2007 to 282 in 2009.  
 
This is higher than the Ugandan utilities whose employee count is found to increase by 
5.7 percent. The utility with the highest (and lowest) number of employees engages 782 
(and 65) persons in Zambia but 92 (and 18) persons in Uganda by 2009. Moreover, 
Zambian WUs are found to extend their water supply network by more than nine-fold the 
Ugandan WUs’ mains length, overtime. By 2009, the utility with the least (and most) 
mains is found to establish about 138,000 (and 8,572,000) meters of network in Zambia 
and about 63,000 (and 390,000) meters of network in Uganda (see Table 5.1). 
                                                      
137 This is contrary to Chapter 4 where owing to data limitations, especially for the public-private owned WU-group, 
aggregate operating costs were used to proxy utilities inputs. 
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Water coverage (i.e., the number of served population within specific WUs’ licensed 
jurisdiction) represents the main output. It captures both equity aspects in water service 
delivery as well as potential utilities’ effectiveness trends (as higher water coverage is 
required for national MDG’s attainment). Table 5.1 indicates that more people have 
access to piped water supply systems for the Zambian than the Ugandan WUs. Zambian 
WUs supply more than six-fold the population served with piped water systems in 
Uganda. They (Zambian WUs) serve on average about 360,000 persons while the 
Ugandan utilities serve about 57,000 customers within their licensed jurisdictions (i.e., 
between 2007 and 2009).  
 
In relation to their total target population within their licensed jurisdictions, the Zambian 
utilities serve about 71 percent of their total licensed population while the Ugandan 
utilities serve on average about 69 percent of their total target population. The WU with 
the most (and least) coverage is found to serve about 89 (and 57) percent of its total target 
population in Zambia but 83 (and 46) percent in Uganda (i.e., by 2009, see Table 5.1). 
Looking at this particular uni-dimensional measure, Zambian utilities are found to be 
more effective in terms of their licensed-market penetration (customer coverage) than the 
Ugandan WUs.  
Moreover, they have higher water coverage per total network length (about 66 percent) 
than their Ugandan counterparts who serve about 46 percent of their costumers per mains 
length. Per employee, Zambian utilities serve fewer (about 1196) customers than urban 
WUs in Uganda that serve about 1716 customers per staff. In addition to being more 
effective, Zambian urban WUs are moreover found (in this uni-dimensional perspective) 
more efficient in their labor and capital resources usage. Evidently, Zambian utilities 
operate at higher scales. In the subsequent section (5.4), we examine in a multi-
dimensional perspective, how and to what extent, their productivity growths are due to 
scale changes among other aspects. We compare these results with the findings from the 
Ugandan WUs.  
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Robustness tests with other output variables (including WUs volumetric water sold) 
delivered very similar outcomes. 138  To avoid any degrees of freedom (and related 
dimensionality) problems as discussed in Section 1.4.1, we limited our input and output 
variables to three.  
Table 5.1:   Input and output variables summary statistics 
 
Output variable Country Year WUs Mean STDev Maximum Minimum 
Water coverage* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 
 
 
 
2007 14 56,571 38,158 136,525 11,835 
2008 14 52,987 38,243 152,624 12,313 
2009 14 62,650 47,526 199,883 13,440 
Zambia 
 
 
 
2007 9 349,521 364,589 1,039,138 53,006 
2008 9 356,776 338,593 1,105,242 63,429 
2009 9 374,182 350,656 1,168,390 76,268 
Input variables 
Total network length 
(in meters) 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 
 
 
 
2007 14 124,526 53,878 270,530 64,430 
2008 14 128,636 54,790 276,530 64,430 
2009 14 138,066 81,820 390,171 63,412 
Zambia 
 
 
 
2007 9 1,094,893 1,980,164 6,321,610 127,000 
2008 9 1,248,981 2,198,947 7,040,670 127,000 
2009 9 1,488,926 2,681,554 8,572,500 138,137 
Total number of 
employees 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 
 
 
 
2007 14 35 19 80 19 
2008 14 37 21 81 16 
2009 14 37 22 92 18 
Zambia 
 
 
 
2007 9 265 219 627 66 
2008 9 265 179 627 69 
2009 9 282 220 782 65 
Partial indicators 
Water coverage/Total 
target population 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 
 
 
 
2007 14 0.682 0.151 0.901 0.378 
2008 14 0.678 0.119 0.820 0.430 
2009 14 0.721 0.107 0.826 0.463 
Zambia 
 
 
 
2007 9 0.688 0.195 0.920 0.387 
2008 9 0.707 0.143 0.880 0.501 
2009 9 0.743 0.129 0.889 0.572 
 
Water coverage/Number 
of staff 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 
 
 
 
2007 14 1,804 1,390 5,251 592 
2008 14 1,573 1,021 4,154 616 
2009 14 1,772 1,004 4,482 747 
Zambia 
 
 
 
2007 9 1,162 420 1,715 597 
2008 9 1,198 416 1,763 672 
2009 9 1,229 309 1,596 756 
 
Water coverage/Total 
network length 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 
 
 
 
2007 14 0.489 0.400 1.631 0.184 
2008 14 0.419 0.296 1.312 0.191 
2009 14 0.469 0.291 1.289 0.198 
Zambia 
 
 
 
2007 9 0.879 1.292 4.234 0.034 
2008 9 0.568 0.373 1.262 0.051 
2009 9 0.517 0.319 1.046 0.044 
* Population served with potable piped water supplies within each WUs’ licensed jurisdiction. 
STDev: Standard deviation.  
                                                      
138 The findings are available upon request. 
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As discussed in Section 5.1, productivity can be influenced by background variables 
beyond the control of WU managers. To distinguish the main productivity drivers, we 
examine the influence of four control variables in a second stage. In particular, we link 
utilities productivity growth with the proportion of metered connections, non-revenue 
water, unserved population and network density.  
 
Metering share is a proxy of service delivery quality. Indeed, increased metering – that is, 
the proportion of connections with operational meters over the total connections reflects 
(i) relatively accurate and consistent water consumption billing, (ii) eased identification 
and rectification of illegalities (including leakages and meter recordings manipulation) at 
the customer connection points and ultimately, (iii) increased collections. In addition, 
improved metering permits better water conservation controls by both WU managers and 
service users. Most water connections are metered (about 97 percent) for WUs in Uganda 
than in Zambia (where only about 55 percent of established water connections are 
metered) i.e., in 2009. Nonetheless, the share of metering as a proposition of all 
established connections across both urban water sectors is found to increase from 2007 to 
2009 (see Table 5.2). 
 
Water  losses  are  a  serious  issue  for  many  developed  countries  as  they  indicate  
underinvestment in infrastructure. In developing countries, water losses represent also 
illegal water connections, leaks along distribution mains and meter reading inaccuracies. 
Water losses are measured in terms of the share of non revenue water. That is, the 
difference between water supplied and water billed to the total water supplied.139 High 
water losses compromise utilities returns per investment and eventually, their abilities to 
completely penetrate their licensed markets. In 2008 for example, the total revenue loss 
due to non revenue water for urban WUs in Zambia amounted to about 201 billion 
                                                      
139 Aggregate measures are used since the data does not allow further differentiation into various types of losses; 
administrative, economic or physical. Nonetheless, it is likely that comparable water loss tendencies happen across 
Uganda and Zambia. 
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Kwacha (about 43$ million140) compared to 187 billion Kwacha (about 40$ million) lost 
in 2007 (NWASCO, 2008).  
 
Water loss minimization means an increase in water sales in the long run but at a cost in 
the short run. As Corton and Berg (2009) note, utility managers, especially in most 
developing countries, find it more lucrative to expand water services to wealthier 
customers than rehabilitate destroyed or aged water works. Such laxity results in costly 
exclusion (cf. the increasing urbanization of safe water system’s poverty following which 
increased illegal connections are inevitable). With the ongoing reform programs that 
advance increased quality services delivery for all customers (including the urban poor), 
WUs need to minimize water losses in the short term and improve sales in the long-run. 
For both cases, less water is lost overtime, see Table 5.2. Tynan and Kingdom (2002) and 
WSP-WB (2009) advance non-revenue water levels of about 23 and 25 percent as good 
practice for African WUs. This is by far lower than the levels obtained in Zambia (42 
percent water losses).  
 
Besides, the share of unserved population matters for effectiveness. 29 and 31 percent of 
the urban population in Zambia and Uganda respectively, is on average, unserved (see 
Table 5.2). Network density matters as well. It is defined as the share of water 
connections per network length (in meters). High network densities can be favorable as 
they result in many connections with minimal network expansion. In addition, they signal 
the likely existence of many commercial, institutional and industrial connections (Corton 
and Berg, 2009). Either high or low network densities are an important policy issue 
related to urban WUs’ productivity. Zambian WUs have higher network densities than in 
Uganda. They are found to establish about 5 percent connections per unit mains length 
while the average Ugandan utility is found to make about 4 percent connections per 
established unit mains length (see Table 5.2).  
 
 
 
                                                      
140 By January 2010, 1$ (American dollar) was equivalent to about 4610 Zambian Kwacha and about 1945 Ugandan 
shillings (http://www.xe.com/ucc/).  
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Table 5.2:   Environmental variables summary statistics 
Variable Country Year WUs Mean STDev Maximum Minimum 
Metering share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 2007 14 0.933 0.070 0.987 0.738 
 2008 14 0.930 0.089 0.998 0.709 
 2009 14 0.965 0.059 1.000 0.803 
Zambia 2007 9 0.457 0.372 1.000 0.027 
 2008 9 0.505 0.344 1.000 0.076 
 2009 9 0.549 0.316 1.000 0.103 
 
Non revenue water share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 2007 14 0.180 0.107 0.448 0.002 
 2008 14 0.169 0.072 0.290 0.074 
 2009 14 0.155 0.054 0.255 0.094 
Zambia 2007 9 0.453 0.100 0.581 0.307 
 2008 9 0.419 0.076 0.532 0.296 
 2009 9 0.398 0.057 0.507 0.308 
 
Network density 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 2007 14 0.038 0.013 0.069 0.022 
 2008 14 0.041 0.014 0.076 0.023 
 2009 14 0.042 0.016 0.079 0.024 
Zambia 2007 9 0.074 0.112 0.366 0.003 
 2008 9 0.045 0.028 0.094 0.006 
 2009 9 0.039 0.023 0.075 0.005 
 
Share of unserved 
population 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 2007 14 0.318 0.151 0.622 0.099 
 2008 14 0.322 0.119 0.570 0.180 
 2009 14 0.279 0.107 0.537 0.175 
Zambia 2007 9 0.312 0.195 0.613 0.080 
 2008 9 0.293 0.143 0.499 0.121 
 2009 9 0.257 0.129 0.428 0.111 
Abbreviations as earlier defined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Performance changes in the Ugandan and Zambian urban water sectors 
5.4.1 Malmquist productivity change 
Using the input and output variables described in Section 5.3.2, we estimate the multi-
dimensional bootstrapped biennial MPI measures (see equation 5.10). The bootstrap 
procedure allows us to reduce the influence of bias arising from measurement errors. For 
presentational clarity, we only present the bias corrected weighted estimates. 141  The 
cumulative biennial Malmquist productivity growth estimates are presented in Table 5.3 
                                                      
141  Detailed estimates of the standard error, bias and confidence interval can be obtained upon request. All MPI 
estimates are weighted by the size of the utility. Output Farrell efficiency estimates (inverse of the output Shephard 
efficiency estimates) are reported.  
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in the column denoted by MPGvrs. We observe a clear difference in performance across 
urban WUs in Zambia and Uganda.  
 
Looking at the technical efficiency estimates, most WUs operate inefficiently relative to 
each sector’s VRS (best-practice) and CRS (benchmark) technology (see Table 5.3). 
Assuming VRS, WUs across both sectors can on average expand their output by 40.2 
points given their existing resources (see Table 5.3). To operate on the best practice 
frontier and given their present input values, Ugandan utilities can potentially advance 
their service production by 53 percent and Zambian utilities by 37 percent. While 
Zambian utilities are found to be more technical efficient (i.e., under VRS assumptions) 
than their Ugandan counterparts, we observe a decline in technical inefficiency for most 
WUs across both sectors (see Annex 5.1). 
 
Both sectors experienced an increased productivity change of about 7 percent between 
2007 and 2009. Ugandan WUs are found to experience the highest productivity growth. 
They increased their productivity by 14 percent while their Zambian counterparts 
increased their productivity by only 4 percent (see Table 5.3). Thanks to the biennial MPI 
decomposition, one can decompose observed productivity changes across both urban 
water sectors into a number of underlying productivity drivers. This provides us with 
further additional insights.  
 
First, consider the case of the Ugandan urban water sector. We observe (i) a catch-up of 
the firms lagging behind of about 38 percent due to increased efficiency changes, but (ii) 
a decrease in efficiency of the best practice firms of about 13 percent and (iii) a decline in 
scale changes of about 3 percent. As such, productivity growth increases are largely as a 
result of increased efficiency changes. Such productivity increases can be attributed to the 
increased investments that occurred across the urban water sector in the late 2008 when 
NWSC’s long-term debt to both local and external financiers (totaling to about 154 
billion Ugandan Shillings) was converted into equity (NWSC, 2008).142 Such conversion 
meant that much of the internally generated revenue could henceforth become reinvested 
                                                      
142 Equivalent to 88,719,899$ (based on 2008 conversion rates, http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates) 
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in expanding (and maintaining) potable water distribution infrastructure to new (and old) 
customers (NWSC, 2009b). 
 
Second, consider the case of the Zambian urban water sector. In contrast to Uganda, we 
observe relatively lower positive productivity gains (of about 4 percent) between 2007 
and 2009 (see Table 5.3). While lagging (inefficient) utilities experience increased 
efficiency changes of about 20 percent, the best practice firms are found to decrease their 
efficiency by 11 percent. Consequently, observed firms are found to encounter a decrease 
in scale changes of about 16 percent.  Observed advances in productivity are mainly due 
to efficiency change increases. 
 
Table 5.3:   Biennial Malmquist productivity index and components 
  
Country* WUs TEvrs (%) TEcrs (%) MPGvrs TCvrs143 TECvrs SC 
Uganda & Zambia 69 59.8 36.7 6.5 -11.3 23.2 -13.8 
Uganda 42 46.8 36.8 13.5 -12.9 37.8 -3.1 
Zambia 27 62.9 36.7 4.4 -11.0 19.5 -16.4 
*Bias-corrected cumulative scores weighted by service coverage.  
TEvrs (%): Average technical efficiency, 2007-09; TEcrs (%): Average technical efficiency, 2007-09; MPG: Cumulative biennial productivity 
growth estimates (i.e., raw estimate-1*100), between 2007/08 and 2008/09; TCvrs: Technical change due to frontier shifts; TECvrs: Technical 
efficiency change due to catch-up effects; SC: Scale change effects. The rest as earlier defined. 
         
 
 
5.4.2 Productivity change drivers  
Literature counts various techniques by which the influence of exogenous variables on 
firms’ productivity can be estimated (see for instance Fried et al., 2008). Due to data 
restrictions (in particular high degrees of freedom), the methodological options for a 
second stage (i.e., exploring what drives productivity estimates) are limited. In this 
chapter we limit the analysis to simple correlations (similar to, e.g., Aston, 2000a; 
Marques, 2008b). In our opinion, this yields in the current setting, the most reliable 
insights.  
 
                                                      
143 Negative average technical change rates are likely in this non-sequential Malmquist environment where estimated 
utilities’ efficiency frontiers can shift and especially decline in the second year, compared to the first year (such as 
Kabale and N.Western WUs in Annex 5.1). 
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To examine the underlying relationships between the computed productivity growth 
estimates and observed utility-specific exogenous factors, we group all observed utilities 
across both sectors into groups of three (low, medium and high) based on their respective 
group-specific exogenous variable measure (see Table 5.4). For each group, we estimate 
the correlation between metering efficiency, water losses and network densities with 
observed productivity growth.  
 
Table 5.4:   Exogenous variable categorization* 
 
Variable Country WUs Low (%) Medium (%) High (%) 
Metering efficiency Uganda 42 <85 86-95 >96 
 Zambia 27 <40 41-60 >61 
      
Water losses Uganda 42 <10 11-23 >24 
 Zambia 27 <35 36-50 >51 
      
Network density Uganda 42 <3 3.1 - 4 >4.1 
 Zambia 27 <1.9 2 - 4.5 >4.6 
      
Unserved population Uganda 42 < 23 24 – 30 > 31 
 Zambia 27 < 16 17 – 32 > 33 
* Although each categorization is unique for each specific case, one can notice insightful trends between WUs’ productivity growth 
and the four group-specific exogenous variables. 
%: Percent 
 
 
5.4.2.1   Metering efficiency and utilities productivity  
Ugandan WUs have the highest metering efficiency (see Annex 5.2). Low metering is 
matched with (i) high technical efficiency as well as (ii) high productivity growth (see 
Annex 5.2). As WUs set-up more meters for established connections, their productivity 
declines (mainly in the short to medium-run, see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2:   Metering efficiency and urban WUs productivity   
 
 
 
5.4.2.2 Water losses and utilities productivity 
To understand the link between observed productivity growths and water losses, we 
analogously group each sector’s utilities into three categories – that is, those with low, 
medium or high shares of non-revenue water, respectively. For both sectors, the lower the 
proportions of non-revenue water, the lower the technical efficiency (see Annex 5.3). 
Moreover and taking the case of the Ugandan utilities in particular, the more utilities 
invest (e.g., employ more staff, make more input purchases) in maintaining existing (or 
installing new) water distribution infrastructure, the more water loss problems are 
minimized but at the expense of less productivity gains especially, in the short-to medium 
term (see Figure 5.3). In the case of Zambia, as WUs increase their efficiency (thanks to 
higher water losses), their catch-up opportunities decline and consequently, encounter 
less productivity gains.  
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Figure 5.3:   Water losses and urban WUs productivity  
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2.3 Network density and utilities productivity 
High network densities are positively correlated with WUs technical efficiency. Hence, as 
utilities establish more connections per unit mains length, the more efficient they become 
(see Annex 5.4). Nonetheless, high network densities are found largely correlated with 
lower productivity gains across both utility-groups (see Figure 5.4).  
 
 
Figure 5.4:   Network density and urban WUs productivity  
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5.4.3 Urban water utilities productivity and effectiveness  
5.4.3.1 Service coverage and utilities productivity 
In addition to examining the productivity change determinants, we further explore the 
correlation between utilities effectiveness and resultant productivity changes. Again, we 
group observed utilities relative to their service coverage (served population as a share of 
the total target licensed population) proportions (see Annex 5.5). Increased piped water 
services coverage is associated with declined productivity gains in the short-run (see 
Figure 5.5). The latter suggests that, for complete effectiveness in the long-run, WU 
managers are likely to encounter temporal productivity losses due to increased resource 
use in, among others, establishing new connections per mains length, metering and 
mains’ extension and maintenance.   
 
Figure 5.5:   Service coverage and urban WUs productivity  
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.3.2 Urban water utilities catch-up rates 
To understand how WUs increased (or decreased) their efficiency overtime, we group all 
utilities with respect to their initial technical efficiency in 2007. For both cases, utilities 
experience positive catch-up rates overtime (see Figure 5.6). In other words, utilities with 
the lowest technical efficiency scores in 2007 are found to improve their efficiency to 
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operate on (or near to) the best practice frontier by the end of the analysis period in 2009. 
Catch-up increases overtime are potentially linked to higher (increasing) utility 
effectiveness. 
Figure 5.6:   Urban WUs catch-up rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
Given growing urban populations, water providers in Africa face various challenges in 
their effort to extent and sustain access to safe water supplies. Given resource scarcity 
constraints, they face quality-related problems. This limits their efforts to expand (to new 
developmental and settlement areas) and sustain (for already existing customers) quality 
water distribution systems in a cost-effective manner. Increased access to quality water 
supply systems is among the MDGs for which the majority of the African nations have 
agreed to attain by 2015. 
 
This chapter discussed urban WUs’ productivity and its determinants in Uganda and 
Zambia. Based on the one-dimensional estimates, Zambian utilities are more effective in 
terms of output expansion. They serve, on average, more customers as a proportion of 
their market share (entire urban population within their licensed jurisdiction). This is 
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largely attributed to their higher network densities (connections per unit mains length). 
For both WU groups, water coverage (or customer base) is among the key performance 
indicators prioritized by the sector.  
 
Each WU signs a management contract with the regulator (NWSC in Uganda and 
NWASCO in Zambia) in which various performance indicators are a priori agreed upon 
by both parties. WUs’ monitoring is thus based on these a priori designed performance 
targets. Nonetheless, most of the established connections for WUs in Zambia are not 
metered and consequently, suffer from higher water loss problems as compared to urban 
WUs in Uganda. Given our output-maximization study objective, the Zambian utilities 
are observed to be more technical efficient but at the expense of high non-revenue water 
owing partly, to limited connections’ metering. Inefficiency for both WU-groups is found 
to decrease overtime. 
 
To allow for a multi-dimensional interpretation, a bootstrapped biennial Malmquist 
productivity index (MPI) was estimated. The MPI decomposes WUs’ productivity 
changes into (i) frontier shifts due to technical changes of the best practice observations, 
(ii) technical efficiency changes due to catch-up effects of the non-best practice 
observations and (iii) productivity changes, thanks to improvements in scale. Based on 
this multi-dimensional productivity growth estimates, WUs in Uganda and Zambia 
experience, on average, positive productivity gains. Given their lower initial efficiency 
levels, the Ugandan utilities exhibit a higher productivity growth by the end of the 
analysis period. Productivity gains for urban WUs in Zambia are largely affected by 
declined scale changes.  
 
On productivity change determinants, we observe that high investments in urban water 
distribution correlate negatively with WUs’ productivity. As utilities strengthen their 
metering efficiency and address their water loss problems, they lower their initial 
productivity. Nonetheless, we observe a positive correlation between network density and 
utilities productivity growth. To be effective (complete market penetration in the long-
run), WU managers will likely face decreased productivity in the short-run but gain 
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overtime from positive efficiency changes to eventually operate on (near to the) best 
practice effectiveness frontier. For more understanding on the links between efficiency 
and effectiveness, a step-wise decomposition framework is provided in Chapter 6.  
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Annex 5.1:   Technical efficiency estimates (Bias-corrected) 
UGANDA ZAMBIA 
 2007 2008 2009  2007 2008 2009 
Water Utility TE_VRS TE_CRS TE_VRS TE_CRS TE_VRS TE_CRS Water Utility TE_VRS TE_CRS TE_VRS TE_CRS TE_VRS TE_CRS 
              
ARUA 0.254 0.251 0.279 0.254 0.297 0.291 CHAMBESHI  0.279 0.108 0.290 0.111 0.343 0.132 
BUSHENYI 0.147 0.094 0.153 0.098 0.174 0.123 CHIPATA  0.240 0.192 0.272 0.211 0.346 0.250 
ENTEBBE 0.203 0.133 0.200 0.138 0.225 0.178 KAFUBU  0.633 0.324 0.641 0.341 0.647 0.260 
F.PORTAL 0.356 0.290 0.360 0.294 0.213 0.220 LUSAKA 0.751 0.451 0.752 0.415 0.746 0.403 
GULU 0.762 0.837 0.630 0.673 0.708 0.730 MULONGA  0.503 0.206 0.530 0.202 0.525 0.200 
JINJA 0.505 0.250 0.620 0.306 0.753 0.365 NKANA  0.658 0.639 0.726 0.482 0.746 0.446 
KABALE 0.271 0.256 0.237 0.223 0.278 0.246 N.WESTERN 0.527 0.293 0.507 0.280 0.512 0.260 
KASESE 0.767 0.547 0.655 0.521 0.655 0.478 SOUTHERN  0.447 0.268 0.451 0.271 0.472 0.229 
LIRA 0.685 0.673 0.423 0.391 0.489 0.428 WESTERN  0.206 0.177 0.253 0.227 0.284 0.240 
MASAKA 0.278 0.203 0.294 0.220 0.334 0.264        
MBALE 0.262 0.164 0.254 0.155 0.307 0.181        
MBARARA 0.336 0.270 0.286 0.229 0.311 0.246        
SOROTI 0.150 0.131 0.149 0.135 0.343 0.274        
TORORO 0.150 0.155 0.130 0.120 0.228 0.210        
Mean (weighted) 0.366 0.304 0.334 0.268 0.380 0.303  0.472 0.295 0.491 0.282 0.514 0.269 
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Annex 5.2:   Metering efficiency, technical efficiency and productivity growth 
 
 
Annex 5.3:   Water losses, technical efficiency and productivity growth 
Country WUs Water losses (%) TEvrs (%) MPGvrs TCvrs TECvrs SC 
Uganda 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
Low 51 7.66 -9.26 17.65 -4.48 
Medium 41 2.72 -7.49 15.75 -0.70 
High 56 17.37 -2.60 24.69 -0.78 
 
Zambia 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
Low 58 5.76 -7.73 14.61 -5.31 
Medium 61 2.32 -6.25 10.55 -12.33 
High 68 0.43 -3.05 3.58 4.69 
Water losses measured in terms of the share of non revenue water. The rest as earlier defined.   
 
 
Annex 5.4:    Network density, technical efficiency and productivity growth 
Country WUs Network density (%) TEvrs (%) MPGvrs TCvrs TECvrs SC 
Uganda 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
Low 28 19.13 12.58 11.87 -0.27 
Medium 47 10.30 -9.48 27.26 -2.93 
High 51 2.73 -8.42 12.06 -0.50 
 
Zambia 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
Low 49 3.13 -9.27 14.42 -3.16 
Medium 63 1.58 -6.39 9.49 -15.64 
High 67 2.18 -4.01 7.62 -5.71 
Network density measured as the share of water connections per network length. The rest as earlier defined.  
 
 
Annex 5.5:   Urban water services coverage and productivity growth 
Country WUs Unserved population (%) MPGvrs TCvrs TECvrs SC 
Uganda 42 Low 4.40 -6.67 11.73 -2.08 
  Medium 8.99 -3.15 14.57 -1.48 
  High 15.50 -13.79 48.39 -0.04 
 
Zambia 27 Low 0.31 -9.09 11.18 -12.57 
  Medium 2.64 -1.63 4.46 -6.98 
  High 6.53 -12.71 26.52 -1.40 
 
 
Country WUs Meter_Eff (%) TEvrs (%) MPGvrs TCvrs TECvrs SC 
Uganda 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
Low 55 16.56 -8.52 27.24 -0.72 
Medium 53 -4.19 -9.73 5.92 -0.91 
High 41 5.66 -5.37 16.54 -1.91 
 
Zambia 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
Low 53 3.98 -7.83 15.56 -8.83 
Medium 72 1.08 -3.60 5.15 -7.99 
High 45 2.75 -9.97 14.28 -10.38 
Meter_Effic: Metering share. The rest as earlier defined.   
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CHAPTER 6: Efficiency and effectiveness analysis144  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Faced with limited inputs and increasing safe water coverage deficiency challenges, 
urban WUs in Africa need to operate both efficiently and effectively. Farrell (1957) 
defines overall WU’s efficiency as a product of both allocative efficiency and technical 
efficiency.145 This chapter, similar to chapters 4 and 5, focuses on the latter and defines 
(technical) efficiency as the equiproportionate physical output expansion with given 
inputs. Or the physical input minimization for a given (physical) output level - in the 
alternative case where policy makers aim to minimize WUs’ inputs for a given output 
level. Utilities’ effectiveness reflects the extent to which sector objectives are met within 
each WU’s licensed jurisdiction. In other words, besides obtaining a maximal output with 
the given resources (i.e., efficiency), utility managers need to universally meet their 
customer demands for quality (i.e., non-contaminated) and reliable (constant daily flow) 
water supply services (i.e., effectiveness). 
 
Effectiveness can loosely be defined as ‘doing the right things’. The need for 
effectiveness is made clear by looking at service delivery levels. By 2006, African urban 
WUs only delivered water to about 65 percent of the population within their licensed 
jurisdiction (WSP-WB, 2009). This is low when compared to other developing regions 
that served on average 73 (East Asia and Pacific region), 85 (Central Asia region) and 85 
(Latin America and the Caribbean region) percent of their urban populations with safe 
piped water services in 2006 (WSP-WB, 2009). This chapter examines whether utility 
managers in the different African countries (can) meet the demand for qualitative and 
reliable water supply.  
 
                                                      
144 This chapter is available as: Mbuvi, D., De Witte, K., and Perelman, S. (2012). Urban water sector performance in 
Africa: A Stepwise bias-corrected efficiency and effectiveness analysis, Utilities Policy, 22: 31–40, 
doi:10.1016/j.jup.2012.02.004. We are grateful to the participants of the DEA2011 conference (DEA Applications 
parallel session) and two anonymous referees for insightful comments on a previous draft of this paper. We are 
indebted to Josses Mugabi (WSP World Bank) for his assistance in accessing the WOP dataset. 
145  For more information on how these components are decomposed when either output maximization or cost 
minimization objectives are considered, see also Fried et al. (2008).   
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Efficiency can on the other hand, be delineated as ‘doing things right’. The call for an 
efficient use of inputs is clear when one looks at WUs’ costs and revenues. At the cost 
side and owing to the increasing multi-sectoral competition for the shrinking renewable 
water resources, production costs are increasing over time (UNESCO and Earthscan, 
2009). At the revenue side, WUs often incur low cost-recovery levels as most user tariffs 
are centrally regulated (Madhoo, 2007). Even though increasing costs and decreasing 
revenues do not influence efficiency directly, they create pressure on utility managers to 
use their existing inputs in a better and, thus, more efficient way. This chapter explores to 
what extent utility managers are using their inputs to produce outputs. That is, if utilities 
would produce as efficiently as the best practice observation(s), how much more outputs 
would they produce with their given inputs?  
 
We propose an approach to measure efficiency and effectiveness trends over time. We 
rely on productivity analysis techniques that enable us to identify utilities’ efficiency and 
effectiveness. We further decompose utilities’ ineffectiveness from inefficiency. This 
enables us to identify the highest (and lowest) performing WUs. Moreover, it allows us to 
identify specific performance improvement areas that can potentially inform and facilitate 
sector restructuring, reorganization and targeted decision making (on tariffs, quality 
standards) while limiting inevitable sector conflicts (Berg, 2007), adverse selection and 
moral hazard incentive problems (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). To further explain WU’s 
performance, the influence of different environmental factors on WUs’ efficiency and 
effectiveness levels is explored. Here, we consider different national, sector and utility 
specific  environmental  factors  that  are  beyond  the  control  of  WU  managers  but  
potentially influence managers’ abilities to transform fixed inputs into controllable 
outputs. 
 
We focus on the African urban water sector that has incurred increased organizational 
and institutional restructuring since the 1990s. Among other objectives, these reforms aim 
at improved utility efficiency and effectiveness (Estache and Kouassi, 2002; Kirkpatrick 
et al., 2006; Mwanza, 2010; see also Section 1.2.2). Subsequently, most African urban 
water sectors are governed by similarly orchestrated water legislations that define the 
 125
respective key sector mission(s) and provide clear mandates (regarding service provision, 
regulation and policy making, among others) for the different sector stakeholders.  
 
Across the African continent, urban piped water services are largely provided by public 
companies, either by the central government (e.g., in Eritrea), state owned agencies 
(Uganda and Ghana), full fledged water departments within local authorities (Namibia, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe) or public companies owned by municipalities (Kenya and 
Zambia; see WHO and UNICEF, 2000). A few African countries (including Cape Verde, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal) engage private actors through 
contractual arrangements other than service and management contracts (Mwanza, 2010). 
Following the commercialization reforms that were introduced across most of these 
countries, utilities are expected to operate efficiently - that is, expand outputs with given 
inputs. Moreover, utilities are required to work effectively: to reach their target in the 
form of complete coverage with quality and reliable water services for all customers 
within their licensed service areas.   
 
Efficiency and effectiveness, and especially their interdependence in the context of the 
African urban water sector, have been explored only diminutively in previous literature. 
Exceptions are studies by Estache and Kouassi (2002) and Kirkpatrick et al. (2006). 
Using a Cobb-Douglas production function, Estache and Kouassi found the public owned 
African urban WUs less efficient than the privately-owned utilities. The latter (compared 
to the former) utilities were found less corrupt and well governed. They observed a total 
of 21 (18 public, 3 private) utilities between 1995 and 1997. Kirkpatrick et al. did not 
observe any efficiency differences between publicly and privately-owned African urban 
WUs. They compared results from both parametric (Cobb-Douglas cost function) and 
non-parametric (DEA) techniques on 14 utilities. Both studies quantified inefficiency 
between the publicly and privately-owned urban WUs in Africa. 
 
For most public sectors (education, water supply, etc.), explicit market price information 
is missing or unreliable. In such cases, productivity analyses examine the extent to which 
utilities can technically increase their delivered outputs with given physical resources. 
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Utilities’ efficiency is then estimated against a frontier of best practice observations. In 
other words, with or without market price information, public utilities are supposed to 
operate efficiently and not waste scarce resources in such production process (Pestieau 
and Tulkens, 1993). 
 
As for the African urban WUs, there might exist significant measurement errors in the 
data. To mitigate the influence of measurement errors in a nonparametric framework, we 
determine, similar to chapters 4 and 5, a frontier consisting of best practice utilities by the 
use of a double bootstrap technique that is based on the truncated maximum likelihood 
estimators (Simar and Wilson, 2007). In an alternative case, one could estimate a (semi-
)parametric frontier such as the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (see for e.g., Greene, 2008 
for a discussion). As we do not have any a priori information on the specification of the 
production frontier, we rely only on non-parametric techniques. The double bootstrap 
approach permits the estimation of bias-corrected technical efficiency scores (with the 
bias arising from possible measurement errors) and allows for the examination of 
efficiency covariates. We distinguish various influences that characterize the observed 
WUs’ operating environments. Identified inefficiency and ineffectiveness sources form 
the basis on which future performance improvement policies at the macro (country), 
meso (sector) and micro (utility) levels can be formulated.  
 
We further disentangle WUs’ ineffectiveness from inefficiency. We measure to what 
extent utilities are able to achieve their differently prioritized effectiveness goals for all 
customers within their licensed service areas. To do so, as noted in Lovell et al. (1995), it 
is necessary to aggregate all indicators into a single performance index. The latter helps 
us to summarize the multi-faceted WU’s goals into a single performance measure that is 
easy to interpret and easily useful to sector regulators and utility managers among other 
interested stakeholders, in designing and enforcing appropriate performance improvement 
policy strategies (Saisana and Tarantola, 2002).  
 
To examine utilities effectiveness, we use a ‘Benefit of the Doubt’ (hereafter BoD) 
analysis (Melyn and Moesen, 1991; Cherchye et al., 2007). This non-parametric 
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technique aggregates observed effectiveness sub-indicators into utility-specific 
performance indexes (explained further in section 6.3.3). The chapter unfolds as follows. 
The next section discusses the analytical framework and the data used for the analysis. 
Section 6.3 provides the study’s empirical model while section 6.4 describes and 
discusses the study findings. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
6.2 Analytical framework and data 
6.2.1 Analytical framework 
To  estimate  WU’s  technical  efficiency  in  our  first  step,  we  rely  on  a  DEA-VRS  
framework as defined earlier in section 1.4.3. The BoD composite estimator (used in step 
2) relies on an analogous optimization problem as the DEA indicator. The only difference 
between both indicators is that the BoD composite (unlike the DEA) estimator, uses a 
vector with only ones as inputs rather than the observed WUs’ input variables. It was first 
introduced by Melyn and Moesen (1991).  
 
In estimating WU’s effectiveness, the BoD estimator is preferred as it exploits the 
attractive features of DEA – that is, it permits endogenous weight selection. BoD values 
closer to (and far from) 1 signify better (and worst) performance in relation to the best 
practice (or benchmark) WUs.  BoD values of 1 indicate best performance of a given 
WU. For more information on the BoD composite estimator, see for e.g., Cherchye et al. 
(2007).  
 
Exogenous characteristics beyond WU managers’ control influence the inputs use, output 
production and consequently, WUs’ efficiency (and effectiveness). Their influence can be 
revealed by various approaches (see Coelli et al., 2005 for a discussion). This chapter 
uses the double bootstrap procedure as outlined earlier in section 1.4. 
 
 
6.2.2 Data 
We rely on the Water Operators Partnership (WOP) dataset. This rich dataset forms part 
of the WOP-Africa self assessment and benchmarking exercise facilitated by the Water 
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and Sanitation Program (WSP) in 2006 across 134 African WUs (WSP-WB, 2009). 
WOP-Africa is part of the Global WOP Alliance provided by the Hashimoto Action Plan 
(UNSGAB, 2006). The latter was launched at the fourth World Water Forum (2005) and 
endorsed by the United National Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water and 
Sanitation. Central to the WOP’s initiative is the improvement of WUs’ productivity 
(efficiency and effectiveness) mainly through peer-to-peer technical support partnerships.  
 
Interestingly, the data collects homogenous information on the different production 
variables across African urban WUs. However, only quantity information on utilities 
water supply (distribution mains length, output levels, etc.) is consistently reported. Most 
observed utilities had some level of outsourcing through service contracts but detailed 
information on these contracts is unavailable. Nonetheless, such outsourcing is likely 
infinitesimal and homogenously spread-out across observed utilities. To further avoid 
data incompatibilities, only quantity vectors that are less prone to national fiscal 
(exchange rates) heterogeneities are used (see section 6.3) 
 
 
6.3 Empirical model specification 
6.3.1 Input, output and quality variables 
The model specification relies on two output measures: water supply service coverage 
(measured in terms of the population served with piped water) and the volumetric water 
sold. The latter is highly correlated with utility revenues that are supposedly reinvested in 
advancing (to new costumers) and maintaining (for existing customers) service coverage. 
Output increases are expected to positively influence WUs’ technical efficiency (and 
effectiveness). Table 6.1 presents some summary statistics. The data corresponds to 51 
urban WUs from 21 African countries. The latter is equivalent to about 60 percent of all 
countries whose urban WU managers or administrators responded to the WOP-Africa self 
assessment and benchmarking questionnaires by 2006.  
 
On average, about 1,463,981 customers are served with piped water systems. The WU 
with the lowest customer coverage serves about one twenty one thousand customers 
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while that with the highest coverage serves about nine million customers. The highest 
performing utility in this partial productivity dimension sells about 112 times more water 
than the lowest performing utility (see Table 6.1).  
 
We consider two inputs: the total number of employees and the water distribution mains 
length (network length). The inputs capture WUs’ labor and capital expenditure, 
respectively. However, since the WOP dataset does not provide disaggregated employee 
categories (full or part time, technical or administrative), we use the aggregated employee 
count that implicitly assumes uniform skill distribution across observed WUs. The 
average utility employs 748 persons. The utility with the most employees hires about 
3,139 persons while that with the lowest employees engages 95 persons. Among other 
capital input measures, water distribution network length is less prone to country-specific 
measurement and exchange rate incompatibilities. The WU with the longest piped water 
system built a water distribution main that is about 300 times longer than the utility with 
the shortest piped water system. 
 
Table 6.1:   African urban water utilities summary statistics, 2006 
 WUs Mean StDev Maximum Minimum 
Input variables 
   Employees (numbers) 51 748 736 3139 95 
   Network length (meters)*1000 51 2,113.748 2,875.012 12,575.000 42.000 
Output variables 
   Population served with piped water*1000 51 1,463.981 1,751.622 9,361.760 121.081 
   Water sold (cubic meters/year)*100000 51 374.12208 439.30290 2,000 17.88500 
Quality variables 
   Total piped water connections*1000 51 114.105 153.773 650.504 9.076 
   Daily water supply hours 51 19 7 24 4 
Sub-indicators 
   Population served/Target population 51 0.695 0.229 1 0.249 
   Water sold/Target population 51 26.26 23.95 97.30 1.51 
   Total water connections/Target population 51 0.081 0.086 0.307 0.004 
Environmental variables 
   Independent regulation (IR, dummy) 51 0.294 0.460 1 0 
   Performance contract use (PC, dummy) 51 0.628 0.488 1 0 
   GDP 51 0.257 0.269 1 0.051 
   Network density 51 0.065 0.049 0.286 0.015 
GDP: Gross domestic product per capita purchasing power parity, Network density: Total piped water connections per unit network 
length. The rest as earlier defined.   
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In addition to this basic model (hereafter referred to as Model 1), we consider different 
output quality variables. Previous literature (see Annex 6.1) considered the latter in the 
form of chemical treatment tests (Antonioli and Filippini, 2001; Corton, 2003; Lin, 2005; 
Lin and Berg, 2008), quality indexes (Saal and Parker, 2000: 2001; Woodbury and 
Dollery, 2004; Erbetta and Cave, 2007; Bottasso and Conti, 2009), service coverage (Lin, 
2005), service continuity (Corton, 2003; Lin, 2005; Lin and Berg, 2008), accounted-for 
water ratio (Lin, 2005), unaccounted-for water (Antonioli and Filippini, 2001; Garcia and 
Thomas, 2001; Tupper and Resende, 2004; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008), annual mains 
breakage per observed output (Bhattacharyya et al., 1994), bathing water intensity (Saal 
et al., 2007) and household ratio (Mizutani and Urakami, 2001). 
 
We capture WUs-output quality in terms of services connectivity and continuity. We use 
the total active piped water connections to proxy the former. Earlier WU efficiency 
studies have treated water connections variedly. Assuming a cost minimization objective, 
utilities’ water connections have previously been used as a proxy for capital input (see 
Estache and Kouassi, 2002; Lin, 2005; Lin and Berg, 2008), utilities output (see Ashton, 
2000a: 2000b; Estache and Rossi, 2002; García-Sánchez, 2006; Saal et al., 2007), 
operational scale (see for example Erbetta and Cave, 2007) and to capture the impact of 
utilities operational environment on cost efficiency (see for example Teeples and Glyer, 
1987).  
 
Holding inputs fixed we argue that to supply non-contaminated water, piped water 
distribution systems matter. This is importantly so for regions like Africa where universal 
urban water services coverage and increased mortality rates (owing especially to high 
water borne/water related diseases, see Gasana et al., 2002; Mutunga, 2007) are key 
developmental challenges. Using the case of India, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) found 
piped water delivery positively and significantly associated with reduced prevalence and 
duration of water borne diseases (e.g., diarrhea). As the safety of alternative urban non-
piped water distribution systems is not always guaranteed and can consequently accrue 
costs to affected customers, we use dissimilar to earlier studies, the number of active 
piped water connections as a proxy for utilities output quality.  
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To capture services continuity, we use utilities daily hours of service provision. For 
connected customers, however, utilities can only provide water supply services for a 
maximum of 24 hours. As such, the variable is by construction restricted (between 0 and 
24). To avoid imposing such a restriction to the DEA linear program, we adjust the output 
quality variable to take into account hours of daily water supply per connection. We 
therefore use the product of the daily hours of service provision and total piped water 
connections to capture utilities’ service continuity. We consider service connectivity as a 
quality variable in Model 2. The smallest performing WU makes 9076 piped water 
connections (serving about 742,000 customers). This is 72 times less than the utility with 
the highest number of connections (650,504 but serving about 4,134,000 customers) 
within its licensed jurisdiction.  
 
Model 3 includes service continuity. Constant service continuity for connected customers 
is associated with improved public health among other socio-economic advancements. 
The average observed utility provides daily piped water services over 19 hours (see Table 
6.1).  
 
6.3.2 Environmental variables 
Often, urban WUs fail to reach their performance targets due to country specific (e.g., 
national income), sector specific (e.g., adopted regulatory structure) and/or utility specific 
(e.g., customer density) factors. In an attempt to explain this inability, we identify four 
environmental factors that potentially influence utilities’ performance (technical 
efficiency and/or effectiveness). First, urban water supply is highly capital intensive. The 
lower the national per capita income, the lower the abilities to pay for public services, the 
less accrued returns are allocated for capital (re)investment and the more exclusive water 
service provision becomes. Wealthier economies are more likely to (i) subsidize water 
infrastructure investments and (ii) maintain strong regulatory institutions (Franceys and 
Gerlach, 2008). To capture these country-specific differences, we use the gross domestic 
product per capita purchasing power parity (hereafter, GDP) indicator (WDI and GDF, 
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2010).  Across observed countries, GDP is on average 3,431$ (i.e., 25.7 percent146, see 
Table 6.1). Gabon is the wealthiest country (GDP = 13,349$) in the sample, while 
Malawi is the poorest with a GDP value of 681.37$. 
 
Second, regulation (largely economic regulation) is often adopted in the form of either 
formal (licenses) or informal (sector-specific commitments) rules. Strict regulatory 
systems (in the form of independent regulation) potentially results in increased regulatory 
risks (new expensive standards, tariffs) or sector credibility that respectively, augment 
sector uncertainty or/and investments (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006). Mwanza (2010) 
advocates for the creation of independent statutory regulatory agencies in Africa based on 
(i) clear legislative frameworks free from ministerial control, (ii) transparent procedures 
for appointing the board of directors, commissioners and key staff, (iii) secure tenure for 
elected oversight members remunerated based on private salary structures, (iv) 
sustainable finances through a regulatory fee charged on the regulated utilities, and (v) 
depolicized reporting mechanisms for the elected oversight members. 
 
The WOP-Africa dataset distinguishes two main types of utilities: those regulated by an 
independent regulator and those regulated by the use of performance contracts (WSP-
WB, 2009). In Africa, independent regulatory structures are commonly established solely 
for the water sector (e.g., in Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia) or conjointly with other 
sectors including energy, telecommunications, waste removal and gas development 
sectors for example in Burundi, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, 
Tanzania and Rwanda (see MWI, 2002; NWASCO, 2004b; Oelmann, 2007; Osumanu, 
2008; URT, 2009; Mwanza, 2010). By 2006, about 29 percent of the observed urban 
water sectors in Africa had adopted independent regulatory institutions (see Table 6.1). 
 
Regulation by contracts (e.g., in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon and Senegal) is 
commonly organized within a ministerial department or an asset holding agency and 
overseen by an independent committee (MWR, 2001). About 63 percent of the observed 
urban water sectors had introduced regulation by performance contracts by 2006 (see 
                                                      
146 Countries GDP values are normalized - as a share of the maximum GDP value across observed African countries in 
2006. 
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Table 6.1). We use two dummy variables (i) independent regulation and, (ii) performance 
contract use to capture these potential reverse causalities between utilities performance 
and regulatory strictness (at the sector level).  
 
Thirdly, among other ways by which WUs can respond to customer demands for 
increased quality services provision is by augmenting the number of customers 
(population served) per mains length. Nonetheless, since all observed utilities provide 
services to urban populations that are more or less homogeneously populated (per square 
kilometer), we consider the influence of WUs’ network densities (rather than customer 
densities) on their performance. To capture these network density economies at the utility 
level, we use the number of piped water connections per unit network length. On average, 
most observed WUs in Africa connect 6.5 percent of their population per unit network 
length. The smallest performing WU makes about 1.5 percent water connections per its 
established piped water distribution system (see Table 6.1). 
 
 
6.3.3 Stepwise model  
In assessing WUs’ performance, we define a step-wise empirical model consisting of four 
steps. In step 1, we estimate utilities’ technical efficiency (output expansion) under given 
resource constraints. Here, we rely on the input and output variables detailed in section 
6.3.1 and the DEA-VRS model outlined in section 1.4.3. 
 
Given unit input on one hand, utility managers seek to attain various effectiveness targets 
within their licensed service areas. They are supposed to serve as many customers with 
quality water systems, sell as much water, connect as many customers and provide 
reliable services for connected customers. Across observed WUs, 70 percent of the target 
population within utilities licensed jurisdictions are served with quality water supply 
systems (see Table 6.1). On average, observed utilities are able to sell about 26 cubic 
meters of water per customer per annum (though some water is often lost along the 
distribution system) and make about 81 connections by 1,000 inhabitants (see Table 6.1). 
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To meet these effectiveness goals for all customers within their licensed jurisdictions, 
utility managers need not only to perform better in one of the targets, but in all of them.  
 
To aggregate the different effectiveness targets, one can use the prices of the sub-
indicators as weights. In addition (or alternatively), one could seek experts’ opinion on 
the exact significance attached to all identified sub-indicators. Such price and/or 
subjective value information can then be used in defining the lower and upper bounds 
between which each of the identified sub-indicator can be allowed to vary. This kind of 
aggregation helps to enhance the resultant performance indexes’ discriminatory power, 
credibility and acceptability among related sector stakeholders. Thanassoulis et al. (2004) 
and Nardo et al. (2005) provide an overview of diverse aggregation techniques.  
 
For most public service sectors however, only sub-indicator’s quantitative information is 
(consistently) available. In other cases, it is not a guarantee that a consensual point is 
attained regarding the exact sub-indicator’s weights (Cherchye et al., 2007). To avoid 
such risks,  we rely in  a  second step,  on the BoD weighting approach (Cherchye et  al.,  
2007). The BoD framework allows each utility to freely (and endogenously) choose non-
negative weights for all selected sub-indicators that maximize its eventual effectiveness 
performance relative to other observed WUs.  
 
As such, specific utilities’ poor performance can only be blamed on the particular self-
selected BoD weights rather than on some a priori defined (often unfair or non-
consensual, etc) sub-indicator weighting system (Shwartz et al., 2010). By construction, 
resultant performance indexes (bounded between 0 and 1) only reflect utilities 
‘achievement’ given unit input - that is, “without explicit reference to the inputs that are 
used in achieving such performance” (Cherchye et al., 2007). This is unlike normal DEA 
problems where existing input resources are taken into account. BoD values of one imply 
100 percent effectiveness while values near to (far from) one denote high (or low) 
effectiveness, relative to the benchmark utilities located on the best-practice effectiveness 
frontier.  
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On the other hand and due to inefficiencies, utilities could fail to attain 100 percent 
effectiveness. Or vice versa, ineffective supply could foster a higher efficiency. To 
examine this relationship we use in a third step, the ratio of utilities’ effectiveness (BoD) 
by technical efficiency (TE). We refer to this ratio as the utilities ‘Potential Input 
Capacity’ (PIC).  
 
Consider in Figure 6.1 (i.e., Fig 6.1a to 6.1c) utilities ‘A’ and ‘B’. Figure 6.1a presents 
the technical efficiency of the observations. It is presented in an output-oriented 
framework where we normalized the inputs. Observation ‘A’ is clearly more efficient 
than observation ‘B’, although not as efficient as its best practice. Therefore, observation 
‘A’ and ‘B’ are located below the best practice frontier. Figure 6.1b presents the 
effectiveness of the two observations. Here, the outputs are presented relatively to the 
unit input (i.e., the BoD framework).147 Both observations are as effective.  
 
Figure 6.1c presents the PIC ratio. The ratio of effectiveness to technical efficiency 
equals to the distances OABoD/OATE and OBBoD/OBTE, respectively for ‘A’ and ‘B’. This 
ratio is denoted, respectively, by the distances OAPIC (utility A) and OBPIC (utility B), see 
Fig 6.1c. Given a priori defined output target (to serve all the target population within 
each utilities’ jurisdiction), the ratio indicates to what extent utilities potentially use 
available input resources (capital, labor, etc) to reach the target. 
 
PIC values of less than one indicate resources deficiency. Affected utilities need more 
input resources to attain 100 percent effectiveness (reflected by the distance S for utility 
A in Fig 6.1c). For utilities with a PIC value < 1, ineffectiveness is a more serious issue 
than inefficiency. PIC values larger than one denote utilities’ excess use of resources. 
That is, if the specific utilities were technical efficient, they would reach their targets with 
less input resources (reflected by the distance V for utility B in Fig 6.1c). For these 
utilities with PIC > 1, inefficiency is a larger problem than ineffectiveness. PIC values 
                                                      
147 While in reality both output variables are complementary, we assume that utilities can moreover substitute one 
output with the other (e.g., can increase their vvolumetric water sold without necessarily increasing their served 
population). This is for instance possible for utilities with high individual water connections rather than high shared 
connections.  
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equal to one indicate exact resource allocation for observed utilities. That is, if observed 
utilities are technical efficient, then, they are also 100 percent effective.  
 
Figure 6.1:   Step-wise model     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a fourth and final step, we explore different inefficiency and ineffectiveness 
determinants. Unlike earlier studies that relied on the traditional two-step approach 
(where an environmental variable is regressed on the estimated efficiency scores), we use 
the double bootstrap procedure such that we correct for the measurement bias in the 
estimates (see Simar and Wilson, 2007: 2011 for an extensive discussion). Note that this 
fourth step allows us to indicate correlations between efficiency, effectiveness and 
environmental variables. Although not explicitly stated below, this does not allow us to 
draw causal interpretations. Figure 6.2 illustrates the four steps.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATE (0.9) 
BTE (0.4) 
O y2 
y1 
z2 O 
z1 
APIC (0.6) V
BPIC (1.3) 
S 
ABoD (0.5) 
BBoD (0.5) 
O z2 
z1 
Abbreviations: TE, x, BoD, PIC and y: as earlier defined, z: Variable representing the ratio of population served and 
volumetric water sold over target population (see Section 6.3.3). 
Source: Authors illustration. 
 
Fig 6.1a: Technical Efficiency 
TE, x is given 
Fig 6.1b: Benefit of the Doubt 
BoD, x = 1 
Fig 6.1c: Potential Input Capacity 
PIC = BoD/TE 
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Figure 6.2:   Urban water utilities performance - stepwise analytical framework 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Water utilities efficiency and effectiveness 
 
Table 6.2 presents the results of the analyses. Through the three model specifications (see 
section 6.3.1), utilities are observed to be more effective than efficient. On average, 
technical efficiency across the three model specifications amounts to 70% (when no 
output quality variables are considered), 63% (when service connectivity variables are 
considered) and 68% (when service continuity variables are considered). Effectiveness 
amounts in the three specifications to 71%, 73% and 71%, respectively. A quarter of the 
observed utilities have the possibility to increase their effectiveness by 44 percent and 
technical efficiency by 51 percent. The latter, through the three model specifications, is 
equivalent to about 56 (Model 1), 49.1 (Model 2) and 48.8 (Model 3) percent. This 
implies that, when a quarter of the observed utilities is considered, utilities are found to 
be less technical inefficient and ineffective only when service continuity quality variables 
are considered.   
 
* Besides this basic model specification, two output quality (service connectivity and adjusted service continuity) 
variables are considered respectively, in Models 2 and 3 (see Section 6.3.1). Source: Authors illustration. 
 
1. Efficiency analysis 
Inputs: Employees, network length 
Outputs: Service coverage, water sales* 
 
2. Effectiveness analysis by Benefit of the Doubt 
Used ratios of similar (to the technical efficiency 
analysis) output variables with utilities target population 
within their licensed jurisdictions. 
3. Potential Input Capacity analysis (PIC) 
(Benefit of the Doubt/Technical efficiency) 
4. Environmental factors analysis  
(See section 6.3.2) 
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As the average hides some information, we focus on the different quartiles of the 
efficiency distribution. In model 1, technical efficiency of the third quartile amounts to 
80%. This decreases to 71% in model 2 and to 76% in model 3. However, effectiveness 
results do not show this pattern. Utilities effectiveness stays around 87% in all the three 
model specifications.  
 
From the potential input capacity levels (PIC), we learn that the utilities (across the three 
model specifications) face more inefficiency than ineffectiveness problems. This implies 
that, if observed utilities would have been technical efficient, they would attain 100 
percent  effectiveness  with  less  resources  (inputs).  As  such,  they  do  not  need  any  
additional resources to reach their effectiveness targets but a reduction of their existing 
inputs. The latter corresponds to about 2.4 percent (Model 1), 15.9 percent (Model 2) and 
4.9 percent (Model 3). Note that, these PIC estimates are based on the underlying mean 
values thus, they do not necessarily correspond to the ratio of estimated TE and BoD 
means. 
 
Across the three model specifications, technical efficiency is positively and significantly 
correlated with effectiveness only in the model without output quality variables 
(correlation of .29, p-value 0.0369) and if service continuity quality variables are 
considered (.44, p-value 0.0014). While the relation is not very strong, an increase in 
technical efficiency is potentially allied with an increase in effectiveness. 
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Table 6.2:   Utilities technical efficiency, effectiveness and potential input capacity estimates 
 TE BoD  PIC 
Model 1* 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 0.696 0.713 1.024 
Median 0.576 0.682 1.155 
Quartile 1 0.437 0.557 1.005 
Quartile 3 0.796 0.868 1.454 
Maximum 0.896 0.971 5.023 
Minimum 0.156 0.228 0.254 
 
Model 2  
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 0.626 0.726 1.159 
Median 0.619 0.681 1.248 
Quartile 1 0.509 0.547 0.906 
Quartile 3 0.706 0.885 1.399 
Maximum 0.871 0.968 20.413 
Minimum 0.038 0.229 0.263 
 
Model 3  
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 0.677 0.710 1.049 
Median 0.664 0.676 1.139 
Quartile 1 0.512 0.562 0.870 
Quartile 3 0.755 0.869 1.319 
Maximum 0.900 0.968 2.959 
Minimum 0.220 0.230 0.255 
TE: Technical efficiency, BoD: Effectiveness, PIC: Potential input capacity. All estimates are weighted by the population served. 
*For all models (1-3), similar 51 WUs are observed. Model 1 corresponds to network length and employees as inputs; and 
coverage and water sales as outputs. Models 2 and 3 add respectively, service connectivity and continuity as outputs to Model 1.  
 
6.4.1 Regional performance 
To identify regional patterns, we explore in Table 6.3 regional utility-performance 
differences. Across the three model specifications, East African urban WUs (such as from 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) are more technical inefficient than ineffective. 
Given their existing resources, these utilities can expand their outputs by 45 percent, 39 
percent and 38 percent along models 1 to 3, respectively (see Table 6.3). Nonetheless, to 
entirely penetrate their licensed markets (i.e., completely attain their effectiveness targets 
for all population within their licensed jurisdictions) these utilities should increase their 
effectiveness (across the three model specifications) by 38 percent. Such performance 
improvement will demand no additional input usage (signaled respectively through the 
three models by PIC values of more than one). 
 
Looking at both South African (including Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, 
Zambia) and West African (such as Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, 
Nigeria) utilities, analogous conclusions are observed. Like their East African 
counterparts, these utilities seem less ineffective than technically inefficient. As indicated 
 140
by their PIC values of more than one, observed utilities can indeed attain increased 
performance (100 percent effectiveness) with fewer resources than their present amounts. 
Input excess of about 35 and 16 percent across the three model specifications for the two 
regions respectively, is on average observed.  
 
Through the three model specifications, South African utilities are the best performing - 
both in terms of effectiveness and technical efficiency. They are followed by (when only 
models 2 and 3 results are considered) the East African and finally the West African 
utilities (see Table 6.3).  
Table 6.3:   Mean performance estimates per region 
 Region TE BoD PIC 
Model  1*  
 
 
 
East Africa  0.556 0.623 1.456 
Central Africa** 0.735 0.580 0.790 
South Africa  0.586 0.805 1.520 
West Africa  0.588 0.599 1.140 
 
Model  2  
 
 
 
East Africa  0.607 0.625 2.564 
Central Africa** 0.655 0.604 0.922 
South Africa  0.644 0.810 1.300 
West Africa  0.550 0.604 1.168 
 
Model  3 
 
 
 
East Africa  0.617 0.629 1.068 
Central Africa** 0.705 0.604 0.857 
South Africa  0.669 0.794 1.233 
West Africa  0.575 0.597 1.161 
* For all models (1-3), similar 51 WUs are observed. TE, BoD and PIC: As earlier defined.  
** Only one utility is observed per model. All estimates are weighted by the population served. 
 
 
6.4.2 Explaining utility performance differences 
To explain efficiency and effectiveness differences, the following specification is 
estimated (in a similar vein as in Simar and Wilson, 2007): 
 
i   density NetworkiGDPiPCiIRiiiWUperf HEEEED  4321                           [6.1] 
 
Where WUperfi denotes WUi’s performance in terms of efficiency or effectiveness, and 
4321 ,,,E  represent the estimated marginal effects on WUi’s performance of the regulation 
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(independent or not - IR), the use of performance contracts (PC),148  gross domestic 
product per capita purchasing power parity (GDP) and utilities network density.149   
 
The results are presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. To examine the robustness of our results, 
we explored in different models the influences of additional country-specific (including 
political stability and corruption levels), sector-specific (such as, annual sector reports 
availability) and utility-specific (including utility ownership and scale economies) 
variables. While their influences are insignificant, estimated utility performance scores 
remain largely unchanged. 
 
Only countries’ GDP is found to positively and significantly correlate to technical 
efficiency especially when service connectivity and continuity variables are considered 
(see Table 6.4). An increase by US$ 1,000 of a specific country’s GDP (say from US$ 
2,420 to US$ 3,420) is significantly associated with a technical efficiency increase of 
9.75 and 11.2 (i.e., when Models 2 and 3 results are considered, respectively). These 
particular findings are consistent with De Witte and Marques (2009). Using non-
parametric envelopment techniques, the authors explored 122 urban WUs in Australia, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom (England and Wales) and found a 
positive correlation between utilities technical efficiency and regional wealth per capita 
(measured in gross regional product per capita).  
 
The use of stricter regulatory systems (independent regulation) correlates positively with 
WUs’ technical efficiency. A sub-sample with either regulation or the use of performance 
contracts yields similar results. This is only significant when service connectivity 
variables are considered. Previous literature provides mixed results on the correlation 
between utilities’ efficiency and the kind of adopted regulatory structure. Anwandter and 
Ozuna (2002) found an insignificant link between autonomous (independent) regulation 
and urban WUs efficiency. They observed a sample of 110 utilities in Mexico in 1995. 
                                                      
148  We carefully examined the existence of any multicollinearity between regulation and the use of performance 
contracts, but found no evidence. 
149 It is likely that all four environmental aspects are correlated. We checked for these but found no significant results. 
Given our data and methodological-related constraints, we thus consider the four variables to offer sufficient variation 
for the analysis.  
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Similar results were observed by Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) on a sample of 14 African 
urban WUs in 2000.150  
 
On the other hand, and based on 211 and 10 urban WUs in Wisconsin and, England and 
Wales respectively, Aubert and Reynaud (2005) and Fabrizio and Martin (2007) found 
analogous positive and significant correlation between regulation and efficiency. See also 
Erbetta and Cave (2007) and the references therein. In our case, a 1 percent increase in 
independent regulation is significantly associated with a 9.7 percent increase in technical 
efficiency (i.e., when Model 2 results are considered). Other control variables (use of 
performance contracts and network density) yield insignificant influences on utilities 
technical efficiency (see Table 6.4).  
 
Table 6.4:   Technical efficiency determinants 
Variable Model 1** Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.514 (0.082)*** 0.439 (0.063) *** 0.483 (0.067)*** 
Independent regulation (dummy) 0.015 (0.089) 0.097 (0.057) * 0.008 (0.070) 
Performance contract use (dummy) -0.045 (0.076) 0.043 (0.053) 0.026 (0.060) 
GDP 0.197 (0.127) 0.236 (0.086)*** 0.271 (0.094)*** 
Network density 0.613 (0.759) 0.702 (0.604) 0.780 (0.502) 
Note: Standard error between brackets; * and *** denote respectively, statistical significance at 10 and 1 percent.  
** For all models (1-3), similar 51 WUs are observed. GDP and Network density as earlier defined. 
 
 
 
Repeating the double bootstrap procedure on the effectiveness scores yields slightly 
different estimates.151 The results are presented in Table 6.5. A 1% increase in countries’ 
GDP is positively and significantly linked to a more than 30 percent increase (on average 
across the model specifications) in utilities effectiveness. Interestingly, network density is 
found negatively correlated with utilities’ effectiveness. This finding is, however, 
insignificant through the three model specifications. Though lower influences (compared 
to the estimated influence on utilities technical efficiency) are on average observed across 
the three specifications of about 4.4 percent, higher network densities are found to be 
                                                      
150 See also Ferro et al. (2011) for Latin American WUs observed between 2003 and 2008. 
151  Alternatively, one could just relate the estimated effectiveness scores with the actual output compositions for 
specific WUs. While this is interesting, we preferred to examine the main effectiveness drivers in a second-stage 
analysis. 
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good for technical efficiency improvement, but at the expense of reduced effectiveness. 
This can especially be the case when customers are sparsely located across specific WUs’ 
licensed jurisdictions.  
 
The remaining exogenous factors (independent regulation and use of performance 
contracts) are found to positively but insignificantly influence utilities’ effectiveness (see 
Table 6.5).  
Table 6.5:   Effectiveness determinants 
Variable Model 1*  Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.542 (0.076) *** 0.541 (0.078) *** 0.539 (0.076) *** 
Independent regulation (dummy) 0.008 (0.070) 0.018 (0.069) 0.023 (0.070) 
Performance contract use (dummy) 0.092 (0.064) 0.089 (0.063) 0.080 (0.060) 
GDP 0.326 (0.122)*** 0.340 (0.121)*** 0.319 (0.119) *** 
Network density -0.066 (0.909) -0.062 (0.873) -0.004 (0.884) 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter explored the use of benchmarking techniques in facilitating informed policy 
decisions across the African urban water sector. Using the double bootstrap procedure in 
a step-wise model approach, technical efficiency scores were first estimated and 
compared across different model specifications. The first (basic) specification ignored 
output quality variables. The second and third specification took into account both service 
connectivity (in terms of active piped water connections) and service continuity factors 
(measured in daily hours of water supply).  
 
Second, utilities effectiveness levels were explored and unbundled from inefficiency in a 
third  step.  In  the  latter  step,  we  used  the  ratio  of  WUs’  effectiveness  to  technical  
efficiency to understand the key reasons behind utilities poor performance (due to either 
inefficiency or ineffectiveness) and the extent to which observed utilities utilize available 
resources to reach their effectiveness targets. We referred to this ratio as the ‘potential 
input capacity’ (PIC). PIC values of less than, more than or equal to one denote WUs’ 
resources deficiency, excess use of input resources (due to higher inefficiency than 
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ineffectiveness problems) and, exact resource allocation. Finally, possible influences of 
country, sector and utility-specific environmental variables on utilities’ technical 
efficiency (and effectiveness) levels were explored.  
 
The results pointed out that most utilities faced more inefficiency than ineffectiveness 
problems (PIC values > 1). Consequently, if the utilities would have been performing as 
efficiently as the best practice observations, they would achieve their effectiveness targets 
with fewer resources. To provide water supply services to all the population within their 
licensed jurisdiction and attain 100 percent effectiveness, these utilities would not need 
any additional resources. 
 
Across the African region, no major performance differences were observed. Utilities 
across the East, West and Southern African regions seemed less ineffective than 
technically inefficient. To fully penetrate their markets, these utilities would need to 
reduce their input use (as evident from their PIC values of more than one). Nonetheless, 
South African utilities were the most well performing (both effectively and efficiently) 
followed by (i.e., when both service connectivity and continuity variables were 
considered) the East African and the West African utilities. 
 
Only countries’ economic development (measured in terms of the gross domestic product 
per capita purchasing power parity) was found positively and significantly linked to 
utilities technical efficiency and effectiveness. Network density correlated positively to 
WUs’ technical efficiency but negatively influenced utilities’ effectiveness. This was, 
however, insignificant across the three model specifications. Independent regulation was 
found positively linked to WUs’ technical efficiency and effectiveness. However, this 
was only significant when service connectivity variables were considered. 
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Annex 6.1: Quality variables used in urban water distribution efficiency studies 
Author  Urban WUs (period, place)  Technique Quality variable used Quality variable influence on efficiency 
Bhattacharyya et al., 1994 257 (1992,  North America) TGV cost function Mains breakdowns/output/year Increased inputs requirement 
Saal and Parker, 2000 10 (1985-1999, England and Wales) MO translog cost function 9 water quality measures* Quality-driven scope economies  
Antonioli & Filippini, 2001 32 (1991-1995, Italy) CD variable cost function Water losses, WSCtreatment Only WSCtreatment increases variable costs  
Garcia & Thomas, 2001 55 (1995-1997, France) GMM, translog cost function Network losses Increased input  requirement 
Saal & Parker, 2001 10 (1985-1999, England and Wales) Tornqvist indexes 9 water quality measures* Lower productivity post-privatization  
Mizutani & Urakami, 2001 112 (1994,  Japan) Log-linear, translog, hedonic function Purifier level, household ratio Better network and scale economies capture 
Corton, 2003 44 (1996-1998,  Peru) Regression techniques CL tests, SCty, WSCtreatment No significant impact on operation costs 
Tupper & Resende, 2004 20 (1996–2000, Brazil) DEA with tobit regression Water loss index Positive significant influence  
Woodbury & Dollery, 2004 73 (1998-2000,  Australia) DEA with tobit regression Water quality** & service*** indexes Minor variations in utilities efficiency 
Lin, 2005 198 (1996-2001,  Peru) Stochastic cost frontier AW ratio, CL tests, SCv, SCty Positive significant influence 
Saal et al., 2007 10 (1985-2000, England and Wales) GPP index Bathing water intensity Increased input  requirement 
Erbetta & Cave, 2007 10 (1993-2005, England and Wales) DEA, Stochastic frontier WU-specific DWQCI Better output caputure 
Lin & Berg, 2008 38 (1996-2001,  Peru) DEA, PSM and QMPI CL tests & SCty Positive influence 
Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008 38 (2001,  Spain) Translog cost function Unaccounted-for water Positive influence 
Bottasso and Conti, 2009 10 (1995-2004, England and Wales) Translog cost function Water quality Lower productivity post-privatization 
*identified by Ofwat as key for aesthetic, health and cost-effectiveness reasons; **compliance with chemical, physical and microbiological requirements; ***constituting water quality and service complaints and, the average 
customer outage; WUs: Water utilities; TGV: Translog generalized variable; MO: Multiple output; CD: Cobb-Douglas; GPP: Generalized parametric productivity; DEA: Data envelopment analysis; CL tests: positive rate of chlorine 
tests; SCty: Service continuity; WSCtreatment: Water served receiving chemical treatment (percentage); GMM: Generalized method of moments; AW ratio: Accounted-for water ratio; SCv: Service coverage; DWQCI: Drinking 
water quality compliance index as defined by the Drinking Water Inspectorate and the Environment Agency in the UK; PSM: Preference structure model; QMPI: Quality-incorporated Malmquist Productivity index. 
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CHAPTER 7:   Conclusion  
 
7.1 Main findings 
 
This  thesis  contributes  to  the  existing  literature  on  sector  reforms  and  performance  in  
urban water supply. Based on the study findings, we draw five key conclusions. First, 
urban WU restructuring is largely a political process among actors at different policy 
levels. While this finding is not unique (see for e.g., Larbi, 2001), we observe interesting 
trends in Chapter 2. The existence of multiple reform agendas and interests from 
different stakeholders at the global policy level provides sufficient opportunities for 
actors at the national policy level to (i) selectively adopt those reform strategies that suit 
best their national/sector/utility policy interests, and (ii) resist strategies that challenge 
their organizational autonomy. Besides, as power relations across actors (global to 
national) change over time, the respective bargaining positions and eventually the ensuant 
reform dynamics, change. This allows reform trajectories at particular points in time to 
weave in line with the prevailing interests of the most hegemonic actor(s) at both global 
and national policy levels.  
 
In the case of Uganda (see Chapter 2), the change from complete urban water industry’s 
privatization to sector commercialization began with NWSC’s resistance of the 
privatization reforms as advanced by the World Bank. Learning from previously failed 
privatization attempts within and outside Uganda, NWSC managed to showcase 
improved performance without complete privatization. This gained the national bulk 
water utility international recognition and support from other global policy players. 
Forging strategic alliances with these latter players, NWSC managed to challenge and 
change the original neoliberalistic reforms’ path – i.e., from complete sector privatization 
to commercialization.   
 
Second, the intensity and nature of urban WU reform processes is contingent to the 
continuous association of four interdependent governance structures. Given the prevailing 
resources/infrastructure or technology, policies, institutions and organizations interact at 
different speeds and extents. These, as discussed in Chapter 3 translate in major and 
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minor governance shifts in the urban water supply sector. Analyzing these governance 
structures at particular points in time, illuminate diverse shifts that subsequently 
characterize and explain reform trends and outcomes overtime. 
 
Considering the case of the Zambian urban water sector since 1993 - the onset of the 
neoliberalistic reforms, two major governance shifts are evident. At the beginning of the 
reforms, private sector organizations were advanced with a high intensity, across the 
sector. These, similar to the privatization pressures across the Ugandan urban water 
sector (see chapter 2), were advanced by the World Bank. Over time however, these 
private sector organizations in urban water services provision were replaced by private 
sector institutions. These latter changes were built on the existing sector resources 
(technical, financial, human, etc) with the support of other bilateral stakeholders.  
 
Third and since the late 1990s, public sector performance has particularly improved with 
the entrenchment of institutions traditionally predominant with private sector 
management. Chapter 4 examined two WU-groups under different managerial ownership 
arrangements. The public-public owned utility group rather than the public-private owned 
group was found more output-technical efficient. To operate on the best practice frontier, 
utilities in the latter group would need to increase their current outputs with the existing 
resources by 36 percent, compared to 22 percent by the public-public owned utilities.  
 
Besides, the public-public owned utility group operated closer to the best-practice 
technology accessible to both utility groups, as defined by the metafrontier. Compared to 
the public-private owned group, the average public owned utility faced less restrictive 
operating environment. Compared to the former utilities, public-public owned utilities in 
Uganda are largely self-regulated besides regular oversights by the Ministry of Water and 
Environment. This creates and maintains within-utility pressures to operate on or near to 
the best practice frontier. Nonetheless, these utilities operated largely, under decreasing 
returns to scale regions. This was unlike the public-private owned utilities that enjoyed 
economies of scale. 
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Besides technical efficiency increases given the reforms across the Ugandan urban water 
sector (as discussed in Chapter 4), utilities experienced fourthly, positive productivity 
growths. Using the case of both Zambian and Ugandan (public-public owned) urban WUs, 
productivity increases were attributed to positive technical efficiency changes more than 
technical change and/or scale changes, see Chapter 5. However, as utilities expanded 
piped water connections per network length, installed meters and maintained water mains, 
their productivity growth declined, at least in the short term.  
 
Fifth, increased WUs’ performance can either be as a result of efficiency or effectiveness 
advances. We explained and disentangled these performance components in Chapter 6. 
More so as unearthed in the chapter, countries’ economic development is paramount for 
utilities’ efficiency and effectiveness improvements. 
 
 
7.2 Policy ramifications and recommendations 
 
Rational decision makers’ face, among other phenomena, bounded rationality challenges 
(Simon, 1957). They lack knowledge ex-ante, of what might become of newly-designed 
reform programs. Knowledge acquisition is constrained on one hand by their limited 
cognitive capabilities and on the other, by the environment (prevailing or future social-
economic and political developments). With these uncertainties that relay in high 
transaction costs, reformers at all policy levels try to forge strategic alliances with 
specific actors. As evidenced in Chapter 2, these alliances between formerly weak 
national  actors  and  hegemonic  actors  at  the  global  policy  level,  result  in  the  
empowerment of the former weak actors. This changes the rules of the game for certain 
actors and at specific periods of time. The particular forms of these alliances and power 
shifts at specific times are however, dynamic and hardly predictable in the middle to 
long-run.  
 
Besides inherent politics in urban water supply, a careful identification and analysis of 
the underlying governance shifts that epitomize reform processes at particular points in 
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time provide additional insights. Such, as discussed in Chapter 3 unveil major and minor 
governance shifts that allow a better understanding of reform processes. 
 
Turning to the African urban water sector’s organization, universal qualitative services 
coverage is (still) possible under the new public management (see Chapter 4). Firstly, 
private sector investments into the water sector are unlikely in the foreseeable future 
given the unattractiveness of the industry. Secondly, both public and private monopolies 
face comparable principal-agent problems that motivate agents to take advantage of 
innate information asymmetries and extract economic rents at the expense of the principal 
(and subsequently, the customers). Thirdly, the entrenchment of private ethos (institutions) 
into the traditional public enterprises including the use of time-bound contracts has eased 
sector regulation. Competitive bidding for the urban water market and benchmarking 
based on mutually defined performance targets among other aspects have made it 
possible to regulate entry into, products produced in, and utilities operating within the 
market.    
 
Fourthly, active public sector engagement in and subsidization of piped water provision 
in Africa, as is the case in most developed economies (Prasad, 2008; Checchi et al., 2009) 
is likely to persist (Bayliss and McKinley, 2007; Castro, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2009). 
Indeed, the public sector provides water services to more than 90 percent of the world’s 
population (WHO and UNICEF, 2000; Prasad, 2006). Besides, when non-public owned 
water supply systems are abandoned or insolvent, it is the government that is expected to 
take-over and manage such systems. As such, public sector capacities in Africa, alike 
other less developed regions, need strengthening for inclusive, reliable and sustainable 
water services provision.  
 
Whilst benchmarking exercises including the use of productivity growth analyses (see 
Chapter 5) help to discern utilities’ performance, they do not necessarily result in direct 
performance improvements for observed firms. The process nonetheless allows decision 
makers to first, identify potential scopes for efficiency gains – i.e., for both inefficient 
and efficient utilities. To operate on the best practice frontier given prevailing inputs, 
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inefficient utilities can benefit from increased technical efficiency in the subsequent 
periods (t + n) relative to the base period (t). Efficient utilities in the base period can on 
the other hand, increase their innovativeness in producing more outputs given the 
prevailing inputs, relative to the overall technology. Utilities can additionally opt to 
operate at technologically optimal scales given the available technology and benefit from 
scale economies.  
 
Second, the exercise facilitates the identification of diverse productivity change drivers at, 
but not limited to the utility levels. Third, one can correlate estimated productivity 
changes with different efficiency (e.g., water losses) and effectiveness (e.g., services 
coverage) targets at the utility level. Such provides additional insights on whether 
productivity gains are matched with improved (in)efficiency or (in)effectiveness.  
 
Last but not least, efficiency and effectiveness are not a trade-off. Urban WUs can 
improve their effectiveness by increasing their efficiency. This is confirmed in Chapter 6. 
To do so, poor performers should learn from best practices. To improve utilities’ 
performance moreover; policy makers and international organizations such as the United 
Nations should examine and foster diverse efficiency and effectiveness enhancers such as, 
countries per capita wealth.  
 
 
7.3 Study limitations and avenues of further research 
 
First, since actors and operating environments differ from one policy level to another (i.e., 
in space and time), we are unable to generalize the nature and outcomes of the specific 
sector reforms in Uganda and Zambia to other urban water supply sectors in Africa. 
Further research could nonetheless, build on the analytical frameworks outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3, while taking into account inherent structural disparities among utilities 
across the continent, to comparatively analyze and explain sector trends given specific 
reform programs. Second, it would be insightful to examine what these developments (in 
Uganda, Zambia, etc) mean to other actors such as, the water users. 
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Third, the thesis findings are conditional on the specific datasets employed and more so, 
on the ensuing methodological choices. The availability of complete operational data 
(both quantity and cost data) would permit the extension of this study (refer to Chapters 4 
to 6) to explore other kinds of efficiency (including cost and allocative efficiencies) and 
effectiveness measures. Long panel data would allow the control of unobserved 
heterogeneity that would otherwise make specific utilities to speciously appear better than 
others. Consistent data would assure the extension of, for example, the metafrontier 
framework (see Chapter 4) to explore in particular, potential peer and target-utilities from 
which inefficient utilities could learn from. Similarly, it would be insightful to apply the 
proposed step-wise model (see Chapter 6) to other sectors and continents.  
 
Fourth, Chapters 4 to 6 provide some first steps in explaining efficiency and effectiveness 
drivers. Further research is needed to explore and explain the influence of other political 
economy variables, management indicators, quality and equity related factors. Fifth, a 
better understanding of the complex relationship between efficiency and effectiveness is 
needed.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Key informants interview guide 
 
Section 1: Informant Background Information 
This introductory part seeks to understand the main roles (including the objectives and influence) of the 
different actors/stakeholders, in the operations and management of urban water and sanitation provision.  
 
1.   Which organization do you work for? ________________________________________ 
 
2.   What is your current position? _____________________________________ 
 
3.   How would you describe your organization in terms of ownership?  
(i)   Public    (ii)   Private     (iii)   NGO     (iv)   Cooperating development partner           
(v)   Other (please state which)_________________ 
 
4. How would you describe your organization in terms of Management?  
(i)   Public    (ii)   Private     (iii)   NGO     (iv)   Cooperating development partner           
(v)   Other (please state which)_________________ 
 
5.   What activities does your organization get involved in, in light of the Ugandan water  
       supply and sanitation? 
a) ________________________________________________________________________ 
b) ________________________________________________________________________ 
c) ________________________________________________________________________ 
d) ________________________________________________________________________ 
e) ________________________________________________________________________ 
f) ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
6.   For how long have you worked in your current position? ____________ years / months  
 
 
Section 2: Reforms Evolution within the Urban Water Sub-Sector 
This section investigates first; the evolution of sub-sector reforms (reform context) and secondly, the major 
differences (from the reforms design, implementation to present outcomes) based on the specific reform 
parameters, within (and across) the urban water sub-sectors.  
 
7.   In your opinion, has the Ugandan urban water sub-sector been restructured/reformed? 
 (i) Yes                                          (ii) No                      
 (iii) Not sure                                  (iv) I do not know 
 
 (If YES, please continue….) 
 
8.   When were the reforms (i) initiated ___________,  (ii) implemented___________? 
 
9.   How can you grade the pre-reform urban water and sanitation sub-sector performance? 
      (i)   Very poor     (ii)   Poor     (iii)   Medium     (iv)   Good     (v)   Very good 
 187
10.  Why do you think so? In other words, what were the characteristics/nature of the pre-reform    
       sub-sector set-up and performance?  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
11.  In your opinion, what were the main reform drivers at both sub-sector and/or utility level (and  
       who made related decisions/drove the reforms)? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
______________ 
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12.   In your opinion, what were the main reform objectives and expected outcomes (in order of priority - where 1 denotes of the highest priority and 10 denotes  
        of the least priority)? Why were the decisions made or what drove the decisions? Who made the decisions? Who approved (or approves) the decisions? Are  
        the decisions amended? How often? By whom? 
 
Reform objective Expected outcome Why decisions were  made Who made the decisions Who approves decisions Decision amendment 
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Section 3: Reform Implementation 
13.  In your opinion, how were the reform decisions (stated in 12) initiated and implemented at the sector and/or utility levels? Have the originally designed    
       reform objectives been implemented as planned? Why?   
 
Reform objective Nature of implementation (process) Implemented as planned*? Why do you think so? 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
 
 
* (i)  Yes          (ii)  No           (iii)  Not sure           (iv)  I do not know 
Section 4: Stakeholder(s) opinion on the Reform Process  
14.  What do you think of the overall implemented reform programmes within the Ugandan urban  
       water sector? Have they led to increased performance? 
 (i)   Very slightly       (ii)   Slightly     (iii)   Medium     (iv)   Much     (v)   Very much 
 
 
14.1.  Why do you think so? (Please expound your answer)  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
 
 
15. Under whose management mandate is the service provision role in the Ugandan urban water  
      sector? 
       (i)     Public  (ii)   Private           (iii)   Non-governmental      
      (iv)   Cooperating development partner     (v)   Other (please state)_________________ 
 
 
16.   What do you think of the present service provision management model adopted for      
        the urban water sector in Uganda? (large/small towns WSS management, etc) 
 (i)    Very bad idea         (ii)   Bad idea                (iii)   Not bad & not good idea      
 (iv)  Good idea                       (v)   Very good idea 
 
 
16.1.  Why do you think so? (Please expound your answer)  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
17.   Under whose ownership mandate are the assets in water service provision? 
 (i)    Public           (ii)   Private      (iii)   Non-governmental      
 (iv)  Cooperating development partner                (v)   Other (please state)_________________ 
 
 
18.  What do you think of the present ownership (of assets) model adopted for the urban water sector  
       in Uganda? (NWSC, DWD, etc) 
 (i)    Very bad idea  (ii)   Bad idea (iii)   Not bad & not good idea      
 (iv)  Good idea                (v)   Very good idea 
 
 
18.1.  Why do you think so? (Please expound your answer)  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________ 
 
 
19.   What do you think of involving the private sector in water provision in Uganda? 
 (i)    Very bad idea (go to 19.2)                  (ii)   Bad idea (go to 19.2)   
 (iii)  Not bad & not good idea (go to 19.2)                (iv)  Good idea (go to 19.1)   
 (v)   Very good idea (go to 19.1) 
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19.1.   At what level or how should the private sector be involved in WSS delivery? (go to 19.2) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
19.2.   Why do you think so?  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________ 
 
 
20.  What is the process/procedure of the management transfer arrangement from small to large town  
       management?  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________ 
 
 
20.1.   In your opinion, what problems or challenges does such management transfer arrangement face     or what 
problems or challenges evolve as a result of such management transfer arrangement? ĺ to the receiving provider 
(NWSC), sending/previous provider and the (iii) urban water sector? 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
21.   Is the present sector financing sustainable/sufficient now & in the future?  
 (i)    Yes    (ii)   No                       
 (iii)   Not sure   (iv)  I do not know 
 
 
21.1.  Why do you think so? (Please expound your answer)  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________ 
 
 
22.  Do you think the current global financial crisis have had any impact on the financial sustainability  
       of the sector and/or utility operations? 
 (i)   Yes (go to 22.1)  (ii)    No (go to 22.2)                      
 (iii)  Not sure (go to 22.2)  (iv)   I do not know (go to 23) 
 
 
22.1.   If YES, to what extent? (Go to 22.2) 
 (i)   Very badly      (ii)   Badly     (iii)   Medium     (iv)   Not badly     (v)   Not very badly 
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22.2.   Why do you think so? In other words, since when and in what ways have the fiscal crisis  
           impacted the sector or utilities operations’ sustainability? 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
23.   What do you think of the present regulatory arrangement within the Ugandan urban water    
        sector? 
 (i)    Very bad idea             (ii)    Bad idea    (iii)   Not bad & not good idea      
              (iv)   Good idea                           (v)    Very good idea 
 
 
23.1.   Why do you think so? (Please expound your answer) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
24.   Does there exist any incentive programme to WSPs/customers for performance improvement? 
 (i)   Yes    (ii)   No                        
 (iii)  Not sure   (iv)  I do not know  
 
 
24.1.   What is the nature of the incentive programme?  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
25.   To what extent do the urban poor customers (low cost and peri urban customers) benefit from the  
        reform programmes? 
 (i)     Very low  (ii)   Low   (iii)   Medium     
 (iv)   Highly  (v)   Very highly 
 
 
25.1.   Why do you think so?  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
26.   In your opinion, how are the water user charges to the urban poor customers? 
 (i)    Very low  (ii)   Low                    (iii)   Medium    
 (iv)  High               (v)   Very high 
 
 
27.   In your opinion, how is the quality of the water supplied by the water providers to the urban  
        customers?  
 (i)    Very poor  (ii)   Poor                    (iii)   Medium    
 (iv)  Good  (v)   Very good 
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28.   In your opinion, do customers treat their water before drinking?  
 (i)    Yes (which customer types? how? and why?)  
             (ii)    No                              (iii)    Not sure        (iv)   I do not know  
 
 
 
29.   Is there a difference in water quality between the urban rich and urban poor customers? 
 (i)    Yes    (ii)   No                       
 (iii)  Not sure   (iv)  I do not know  
 
 
29.1.   Why do you think so?  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
30. Whom does your organization deal directly with? (i) Customers (ii) Service providers (iii) Others  
 
 
30.1.   At what level? 
 
 
31.   In what ways does your organization receive or/and communicate with water service providers 
       and/or customers?  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
32.   Does your organization keep customer complaints records? 
 (i)     Yes                 (ii)   No                      
 (iii)   Not sure   (iv)  I do not know  
 
 
32.1.   What are the main causes of complaints? 
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33.   In your opinion, what problems, limitations or challenges encounter the successful initiation and/or implementation of the reform programmes (stated 
        in 12)?   
 
Reform objective Encountered problems,  limitations or challenges 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much!! 
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Saamenvatting 
[1]   Voornaamste bevindingen 
De stedelijke watersectoren in de meeste ontwikkelingslanden, en met name in Afrika, zijn op 
verschillende manieren getransformeerd met de opkomst van de neoliberale ideologieën. Deze 
zijn sinds de jaren ’90 voorgesteld en op uiteenlopende wijzen op het continent ingevoerd (zie 
Sectie 1.2.2). Beleidsvormers binnen de sector (en alle geïnteresseerde belanghebbenden) 
moeten de aard van deze transformaties begrijpen, alsook hun invloed op de huidige 
beheersstructuren en hun rol in de verbetering van de openbare voorzieningen (zie Sectie 1.3). 
Met deze thesis proberen we deze complexe zaken te vast te stellen en waardevolle inzichten te 
bieden. We gebruiken hierbij zowel kwalitatieve (interviews sleutelinformanten) als 
kwantitatieve (non-parametrische) benaderingen (zie Sectie 1.4). 
 
Gebaseerd op de uitkomst van het onderzoek trekken we vijf hoofdconclusies. Ten eerste is de 
herstructurering van de stedelijke watervoorziening (hierna WU genoemd) voornamelijk een 
politiek proces tussen actoren op verschillende beleidsniveaus. Hoewel deze bevinding niet uniek 
is,  zullen  we  in  Hoofdstuk  2  interessante  trends  bespreken.  Omdat  verschillende  
belanghebbenden op het niveau van het wereldwijde beleid meerdere agenda’s en belangen 
hebben wat betreft de hervormingen, zijn er voldoende mogelijkheden voor actoren op het 
nationaal beleidsniveau om (i) deze hervormingsstrategieën selectief toe te passen zoals het beste 
aansluit bij de beleidsbelangen van hun land/sector/voorziening, en (ii) die strategieën tegen te 
houden die de organisatorische autonomie bedreigen. Bovendien, terwijl machtsrelaties tussen 
actoren (zowel wereldwijd als landelijk) door de tijd heen veranderen, veranderen ook de 
respectievelijke onderhandelingsposities en uiteindelijk de daaruit volgende 
hervormingsdynamica. Zo ontstaat er op specifieke momenten de mogelijkheid om 
hervormingstrajecten te voegen naar de heersende belangen van de machtigste betrokkene(n) op 
zowel het wereldwijde als het nationale beleidsniveau. In Hoofdstuk 2 worden deze 
ontwikkelingen besproken aan de hand van de casus van de stedelijke watersector in Oeganda. 
Ten tweede is de intensiteit en de aard van het WU-hervormingsproces afhankelijk van de 
aanhoudende samenwerking van vier onderling afhankelijke beheersstructuren. Gezien de 
gangbare middelen/infrastructuur of technologie, zal de interactie tussen het beleid, de 
instellingen en organisaties verschillen in snelheid en mate. Zoals in Hoofdstuk 3 wordt 
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besproken, vertalen deze zich naar grote en kleine bestuursveranderingen binnen de stedelijke 
watervoorzieningssector. Dit wordt geïllustreerd met een casus van de stedelijke 
watervoorziening in Zambia. 
 
Ten derde zijn de prestaties van de openbare sector sinds eind jaren ’90 voornamelijk verbeterd 
door de traditioneel gezien overheersende instellingen te versterken met privé-management. In 
Hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we twee WU-groepen die beide een andere vorm van eigendom en 
management kennen. In plaats van de voorzieningsgroep die zowel in openbare als in private 
handen is, is juist de groep die geheel in openbaar bezit is efficiënter wat betreft de technische 
output. Om zo dicht mogelijk bij de best practice frontier te komen, zou de eerste groep de 
huidige output met de bestaande middelen moeten verhogen met 36 procent, vergeleken met de 
22 procent binnen de voorzieningen die geheel in openbaar bezit zijn.  
 
Daarbij komt de werkwijze van de voorzieningsgroep die geheel in openbaar bezit is dichter bij 
de zogenaamde best practice technologie, die voor beide voorzieningsgroepen voor handen is, 
zoals gedefinieerd door de metafrontier. Vergeleken met de groep die zowel in openbare als 
private handen is, heeft de gemiddelde voorziening in openbaar bezit minder te maken met 
beperkende werkomgevingen dan de gemiddelde voorziening die zowel in openbare als in 
private handen is. Vergeleken met deze laatste groep zijn de voorzieningen die geheel in 
openbaar bezit zijn in Oeganda desondanks grotendeels zelfregulerend, naast het regelmatige 
toezicht van het Ministerie van Water en Omgeving. Dit creëert en onderhoudt een druk binnen 
de voorziening om op of dicht bij de best practice frontier te werken. Aan de andere kant, echter, 
werken deze voorzieningen grotendeels verminderende regio’s in schaalvoordelen.  
 
Naast de toename in technische efficiëntie door de hervormingen binnen de Oegandese stedelijke 
watersector – zie Hoofdstuk 4 – ondervinden voorzieningen ten vierde een positieve groei in 
productiviteit. Aan de hand van de casussen van stedelijke WU’s in zowel Zambia en Oeganda 
(geheel in openbaar bezit), wordt de toename in productiviteit meer toegeschreven aan positieve 
veranderingen binnen de technische efficiëntie dan aan technische veranderingen of 
schaalveranderingen. Zie Hoofdstuk 5. Maar wanneer voorzieningen de waterleidingen per 
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netwerk verlengen, meters installeren en hoofdleidingen onderhouden, neemt de groei in 
productiviteit af, in ieder geval op korte termijn.  
 
Ten vijfde kunnen toegenomen prestaties van WU’s het resultaat zijn van toename in zowel 
efficiëntie als effectiviteit. In Hoofdstuk 6 worden deze prestatiecomponenten ontward en 
uitgelegd. Zoals ook in dit hoofdstuk naar voren komt, is de ontwikkeling van de landseconomie 
het belangrijkste voor de verbeteringen in efficiëntie en effectiviteit van de voorzieningen. 
 
[2]   Onderverdelingen en aanbevelingen van het beleid 
Rationele beleidsvormers krijgen onder andere te maken met problemen op het gebied van 
beperkte rationaliteit (Simon, 1957). Ze hebben een gebrek aan voorkennis van wat het resultaat 
zou kunnen zijn van nieuw-bedachte hervormingsprojecten. De kennisvergaring is aan de ene 
kant begrensd door hun beperkte cognitieve vaardigheden en aan de andere kant door de 
omgeving (overheersende of toekomstige sociaal-economische en politieke ontwikkelingen). 
Met deze onzekerheden, die in hoge transactiekosten resulteren, proberen hervormers op alle 
beleidsniveaus strategische allianties te sluiten met specifieke actoren. Zoals bewezen in 
Hoofdstuk 2 hebben deze allianties, tussen voorheen zwakke nationale actoren en de machtigste 
actoren op het wereldwijde beleidsniveau, tot gevolg dat de voorheen zwakke actoren sterker 
worden. Dit verandert de spelregels voor bepaalde actoren en bepaalde periodes. De specifieke 
vormen van deze allianties en machtsverschuivingen op bepaalde momenten zijn echter 
dynamisch en op gemiddelde tot lange termijn nauwelijks te voorspellen.  
 
Naast de inherente politiek wat betreft de stedelijke watervoorziening kunnen een zorgvuldige 
identificatie en analyse van de veranderingen in het onderliggende beheer, die op specifieke 
momenten hervormingsprocessen samenvatten, extra inzicht bieden. Dergelijke inzichten, zoals 
die in Hoofdstuk 3 worden besproken, laten grote en kleine verschuivingen in het beheer zien 
voor een beter begrip van het hervormingsproces. 
 
Wat de organisatie van de stedelijke watersector in Afrika betreft, is een dekking van universeel 
kwalitatieve diensten (nog steeds) mogelijk onder het nieuwe openbare management (zie 
Hoofdstuk 4). Ten eerste is het onwaarschijnlijk dat er in de nabije toekomst vanuit de 
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privésector wordt geïnvesteerd in de watersector, gezien het een onaantrekkelijke bedrijfstak is. 
Ten tweede hebben zowel openbare als private monopolies te maken met een vergelijkbare 
principaal-agentproblematiek die agenten motiveert om gebruik te maken van de natuurlijke 
informatie-symmetrie en winstgevende huur af te dwingen ten koste van de principaal (en 
vervolgens de klanten). Ten derde heeft de versterking van de privé-ethos (instellingen) binnen 
de traditionele openbare ondernemingen, waaronder het gebruik van tijdgebonden contracten, de 
regulering van de sector verminderd. Onder andere het competitief bieden voor de stedelijke 
watermarkt en benchmarking op basis van wederzijds gestelde prestatiedoelen hebben het 
mogelijk gemaakt om de toegang tot de markt te reguleren, als ook de producten die op de markt 
worden geproduceerd en de voorzieningen die daarbinnen actief zijn. 
 
Ten vierde is het waarschijnlijk dat de betrokkenheid van de actieve openbare sector bij en de 
subsidiëring van de watervoorziening via leidingen in Afrika, zoals in de meeste ontwikkelde 
economieën (Prasad, 2008; Checchi et al., 2009) zal aanhouden (Bayliss and McKinley, 2007; 
Castro, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2009). Inderdaad, de openbare sector verschaft watervoorzieningen 
aan meer dan 90 procent van de wereldbevolking (WHO and UNICEF, 2000; Prasad, 2006). 
Daarnaast, als watervoorzieningssystemen die niet in openbaar bezit zijn worden verlaten of 
failliet gaan, dan wordt er van de overheid verwacht om dergelijke systemen over te nemen en te 
beheren. Daarom is het nodig dat de capaciteiten van de openbare sector in Afrika, alsook andere 
minder ontwikkelde regio’s, worden versterkt voor de voorziening van inclusieve, betrouwbare 
en houdbare watervoorzieningen. 
 
Hoewel benchmarking, waaronder het gebruik van analyses van de productiviteitstoename (zie 
Hoofdstuk 5), bijdraagt om de prestaties van voorzieningen te onderscheiden, heeft het niet 
automatisch tot gevolg dat de prestaties van de geanalyseerde bedrijven ook verbeteren. 
Desondanks geeft het proces beleidsmakers de mogelijkheid om eerst te ontdekken waar ze op 
efficiëntie kunnen winnen – voor zowel inefficiënte als efficiënte voorzieningen. Om op de best 
practice frontier te werken met de huidige input, kunnen inefficiënte voorzieningen gebruik 
maken van een toegenomen technische efficiëntie in de volgende periodes (t + n) relatief aan de 
basisperiode (t). Aan de andere kant kunnen efficiënte voorzieningen tijdens de basisperiode hun 
innovatie verbeteren om meer output te creëren met de huidige input, relatief aan de totale 
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technologie. Daarbij kunnen voorzieningen ervoor kiezen om op de technologisch optimale 
schaal te werken met de beschikbare technologie en voordeel te halen van schaaleconomieën. 
 
Ten tweede bevordert deze oefening de identificatie van diverse prikkels voor 
productiviteitsveranderingen op, maar niet beperkt tot, de voorzieningsniveaus. Ten derde kan 
men verbanden leggen tussen de geschatte productiviteitsveranderingen met verschillende doelen 
op het gebied van efficiëntie (bijvoorbeeld waterverlies) en effectiviteit (bijvoorbeeld de 
spreiding van de voorziening) op het niveau van de voorzieningen. Dit zorgt voor extra inzicht of 
de productiviteitstoename veroorzaakt is door een verbeterde (in)efficiëntie of (in)effectiviteit. 
 
Ten slotte bestaat er geen compromis tussen efficiëntie en effectiviteit. Stedelijke WU’s kunnen 
hun effectiviteit verbeteren door hun efficiëntie te verhogen. Dit wordt bevestigd in Hoofdstuk 6. 
Om dit te bereiken zullen de uitvoerders van de best practices moeten leren. Om de prestatie van 
de voorzieningen te verbeteren, zouden beleidsmakers en internationale organisaties zoals de 
Verenigde Naties diverse efficiëntie- en effectiviteitsverbeteraars moeten onderzoeken en 
aanmoedigen, zoals de nationale welvaart per capita.  
 
Deze thesis kent een aantal beperkingen. Deze worden in Sectie 7.3 genoemd. In deze sectie 
worden bovendien mogelijke benaderingen besproken voor verder onderzoek. 
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